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VULNERABILITY AND JUST DESERT: A 





This Article analyzes risks of serious harms posed to prisoners with 
major mental disorders and investigates their import for sentencing under a 
just deserts analysis.  Drawing upon social science research, the Article 
first establishes that offenders with serious mental illnesses are more likely 
than non-ill offenders to suffer physical and sexual assaults, endure 
housing in solitary confinement, and experience psychological 
deterioration during their carceral terms.  The Article then explores the 
significance of this differential impact for sentencing within a retributive 
framework.  It first suggests a particular expressive understanding of 
punishment, capacious enough to encompass foreseeable, substantial risks 
of serious harm proximately caused by the state during confinement and 
addresses in particular the troublesome issue of prison violence.  It then 
turns to just desert theory and principles of ordinal and cardinal 
proportionality to identify three ways in which vulnerability to serious harm 
may factor into sentencing.  In so doing, the Article advances the current 
debate about the relevance of individual suffering to retributivism and lays 
the theoretical groundwork for the consideration of vulnerability due to 
mental illness as a morally relevant element in sentencing decisions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Criminal punishment involves hard treatment.  Imagine a typical 
offender, without major mental health problems,
1
 sentenced to a term of 
twelve years in prison for simple robbery.
2
  He enters prison nervous, but 
 
1
The “typical” offender does not have a serious mental illness, though individuals with 
mental illnesses are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system.  A 2009 
study of more than 20,000 adults entering five local jails found that 14.5% of male and 
31.0% of female inmates had a serious mental illness.  Henry J. Steadman et al., Prevalence 
of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 761, 764 (2009).  
These rates are three to six times higher than those found in the general population.  The 
Numbers Count: Mental Disorders in America, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-
america/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (citing Ronald C. Kessler et al., The 
Epidemiology of Co-Occurring Addictive and Mental Disorders: Implications for Prevention 
and Service Utilization, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 17 (1996), for the proposition that 
approximately 6% of Americans suffer from a serious mental illness).  Since male prisoners 
constitute 93% of the prisoner population in the United States, this Article will focus on 
male prisoners.  See HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2009 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/p09.pdf. 
2
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:62 (2007) (providing a maximum penalty for 
simple robbery of twelve years).  The mean maximum sentence imposed on an offender 
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determined to protect his physical and emotional well-being.  Initially, he 
keeps to himself and appraises his new environment.  He soon discerns the 
hierarchy among prisoners, the benefits and risks of membership in various 
groups, and the dynamic between prisoners and guards.
3
  He learns both the 
disciplinary rules imposed by the prison and, through observation and a few 
well-placed questions, the unwritten rules among prisoners.  He pays 
careful attention to what conduct and speech will constitute a violation of 
these rules as well as the consequences that will follow.  He learns how to 
put up a tough front, avert danger, and respond to confrontations in a way 
that will deter future acts of aggression.
4
  He forges alliances.  He develops 
a routine.  In a nutshell, he copes.  After a period of a few months,
5
 he 
adjusts.  He learns to live with his sentence.
6
 
Now imagine an offender—serving the same sentence for the same 
crime, committed with the same degree of culpability—with an Axis I 
disorder
7




without a mental illness in a state prison is 141 months, or three months shy of twelve years.  
DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 8 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
3
See RICHARD S. JONES & THOMAS J. SCHMID, DOING TIME: PRISON EXPERIENCE AND 
IDENTITY AMONG FIRST-TIME INMATES 135 (2000) (describing a newcomer’s challenge of 
“understanding the prison hierarchy and recognizing [his] place in it, learning whom to trust 
and whom to avoid, [and] determining how to evade trouble in a trouble-filled 
environment”). 
4
See HANS TOCH, MEN IN CRISIS 146 (2007) (explaining that non-ill offenders adapt to 
prison by behaving in a stoic manner and observing behavior of other inmates). 
5
See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and 
Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1046–49 (2009) (summarizing literature 
demonstrating prisoners’ adaption to incarceration). 
6
This paragraph and the next offer fictitious descriptions of the experiences of two 
hypothetical prisoners.  They are intended simply to highlight and dramatize how severely 
limited cognitive abilities may make one vulnerable to a predictable set of hardships in 
prison, thus giving prison a greater punitive bite.  For in-depth portrayals of the experience 
of prisoners without serious mental illness, see WILBERT RIDEAU, IN THE PLACE OF JUSTICE: 
A STORY OF PUNISHMENT AND DELIVERANCE (2010), ANDREAS SCHROEDER, SHAKING IT 
ROUGH: A PRISON MEMOIR (1976), and GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A 
STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (1958).  For a depiction and discussion of 
prisoners’ adaptation to prison and coping mechanisms, see ANN CORDILIA, THE MAKING OF 
AN INMATE: PRISON AS A WAY OF LIFE (1983) and JONES & SCHMID, supra note 3, at 57–62 
(describing inmates’ survival strategies of territorial caution, impression management, 
selective interaction with other inmates, and partnership). 
7
Axis I disorders, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association, include clinical 
syndromes such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression, as well as chronic brain 
diseases that cause extreme distress and interfere with social and emotional adjustment.  See 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 13–
24, 28 (4th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].  In this paper, “serious mental illness,” 
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enters prison in the midst of delusions: he has been found, and “they” have 
gotten him.  Unsure of whom to trust, he keeps to himself, avoids eye 
contact, and mutters to himself anxiously.  Because his thoughts and speech 
are disorganized, he obsessively repeats himself, uses fabricated words, and 
delivers nonsensical statements as though they were commonplace 
observations.  He soon earns the nickname “Bug”—prison slang for a 
mentally ill inmate
9—and becomes a target for physical and sexual abuse.10  
Feeling alienated and distressed, he withdraws to his cell.  His isolation 
morphs into personal neglect, and guards respond by disciplining him for 
hygiene violations and refusals to leave his cell.  After weeks of silent 
abuse, he strikes another prisoner and lands in solitary confinement.  The 
mental strain of isolation, enforced boredom, and the constant illumination 
of his cell propel him into a deep depression and lead to a psychotic 




These stylized examples illustrate how two sentences of the same 
duration may be equal in name only.  In many ways, these individuals’ 
sentences, as experienced, have vastly different punitive bites.  These 
experiential differences are the predictable result of two distinct 
phenomena.  First, confining individuals with obvious cognitive and 
behavioral deficits in close quarters with (and without adequate protection 
from) large numbers of antisocial persons with excess time and few 
productive activities results in bullying and predation.  Recent studies 
demonstrate that, just as individuals with major mental disorders are 
 
“major mental illness,” “major mental disorder,” and “Axis I disorders” are used 
interchangeably. 
8
This Article takes as its subject prisoners who are found or assumed to be competent to 
stand trial and be sentenced.  Cf. Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare 
Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 952–54 (2010) 
(arguing that if a person is not a fit interlocutor for the state’s retributive message, then he 
does not warrant retributive blame and should not be punished). 
9
See TERRY A. KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS 
AND WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT 20 (1999). 
10
Studies show that individuals with major mental disorders are disproportionately 
vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse in prison.  See infra notes 64–74 (physical assault); 
notes 91–96 (sexual assault). 
11
The above narrative draws upon personal accounts published in Professor Terry 
Kupers’s Prison Madness, information from the American Psychiatric Association, and 
other works in order to portray the experiences of inmates with schizophrenia and other 
serious mental illnesses in correctional facilities.  See Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 
1096, 1098–103 (W.D. Wis. 2001); DSM-IV-TR §§ 295.1–295.3, 295.90; John J. Gibbs, 
Disruption and Distress: Going from the Street to Jail, in COPING WITH IMPRISONMENT 29 
(Nicolette Parisi ed., 1982); KUPERS, supra note 9, at 9–65; TOCH, supra note 4, at 144–55, 
213–14. 
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vulnerable to victimization in the outside world,
12
 they are more susceptible 
than non-ill persons to physical and sexual assault in prison.
13
  Second, 
persons with serious mental illnesses often lack the skills and abilities to 
cope successfully within prison.  Strict conformance with prison rules can 
be very difficult for an individual with cognitive and behavioral limitations, 
and studies confirm that prisoners with serious mental illnesses are more 
likely than non-disordered prisoners to accrue disciplinary violations.
14
  In 
response, prison officials often punish prisoners with major mental 
disorders through solitary confinement,
15
 where they are especially 
susceptible to decompensation, psychotic breaks, and suicide ideation.
16
 
This Article argues that both aspects of vulnerability—vulnerability to 
predation by other offenders and prison guards, as well as vulnerability to 
mental decompensation from an inability to cope within the structure of 
prison—are morally important and, if present above a certain threshold, 
should factor into sentencing to effectuate proportionate punishment.  
Indeed, only by taking these sources of vulnerability into account and 
adjusting sentences accordingly will individuals with serious mental 
illnesses be proportionately punished for their wrongdoing, relative to other 
offenders.
17
  In other words, vulnerability from mental illness should factor 
into a court’s evaluation of the severity of a contemplated penalty to ensure 
that an offender is not overpunished.  Only by treating an offender 
differently (i.e., by recognizing his susceptibility to serious harm) will he be 






See, e.g., Lisa A. Goodman et al., Recent Victimization in Women and Men with 
Severe Mental Illness: Prevalence and Correlates, 14 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 615, 627 (2001) 
(finding that women with severe mental illness were sixteen times more likely than those in 
the community sample to report violent victimization in the past year, and men with severe 
mental illness were ten times more likely than those in the community sample to report an 
assault); Linda A. Teplin et al., Crime Victimization in Adults with Severe Mental Illness: 
Comparison with the National Crime Victimization Survey, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
911, 917 (2005) (finding that more than one quarter of persons with severe mental illness 
had been victims of a violent crime in the past year, a rate more than eleven times higher 
than the general population rates). 
13
See infra notes 64–74 (physical assault), 91–96 (sexual assault). 
14
See infra notes 114–134. 
15
See infra notes 146–149. 
16
See infra notes 151–156. 
17
This Article takes the position that vulnerability should factor into sentencing and is 
not simply an issue appropriate for penal administration.  See infra notes 236–239 and 
accompanying text. 
18
Prior to consideration of vulnerability at the sentencing phase, a defendant’s mental 
illness may reduce his culpability at the guilt phase of his proceeding if he successfully 
mounts an insanity defense or presents diminished capacity evidence demonstrating that he 
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At the moment of sentencing, a judge will likely be aware of an 
offender’s mental disorder19 and may be cognizant of the dangers that 
prison poses to the offender in light of his illness.
20
  However, depending on 
the jurisdiction, the judge may be unable to tailor the offender’s sentence so 
that it will not carry unduly harsh consequences.  Some, but not all, states 
recognize vulnerability to harm in prison as a mitigating factor in their 
statutory sentencing frameworks or sentencing guidelines.
21
  Although 
 
lacked the necessary intent for a crime.  Others have argued for expanding or reducing these 
defensive strategies.  Compare Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role 
of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1246 (2000), with Laura 
Reider, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries of 
Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289 (1998).  This Article 
takes no position on these issues.  Instead, this Article avers that sentence mitigation may be 
necessary for offenders with serious mental illnesses to receive proportionate punishments or 
punishments of appropriate punitive bite, even if mental illness has already factored into a 
culpability determination. 
19
Because an individual’s capacity to understand reality may implicate his culpability 
for past acts and his ability to participate in the adversarial process, a number of steps are 
built into the criminal justice process to allow for consideration of a defendant’s mental 
illness.  These include opportunities to challenge an accused’s competence to stand trial and 
his decisional competence to make the few choices allocated to him, such as whether to 
waive his right to counsel or to plead guilty.  If the accused pleads not guilty, he may use 
evidence of mental illness to advance an insanity defense or demonstrate a lack of intent.  
See supra note 18.  Typically, pretrial services will chronicle an accused’s mental health 
history in the report it prepares for bail determination, and a probation officer will include a 
defendant’s mental health history in the presentencing report created for the court.  See infra 
notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
20
Judges’ familiarity with data regarding the vulnerability of prisoners with serious 
mental illness may vary with their sentencing options.  Presumably, if a trial judge has the 
discretion to modify an individual’s sentence on the basis of his perceived vulnerability, then 
the judge will, over time, learn about the sources and extent of vulnerability associated with 
various sanctions.  Defense counsel will play a role in the judge’s education.  See infra notes 
49–51 and accompanying text. 
21
See D.C. SENTENCING & CRIMINAL CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.2.3(8) (2011) (allowing a judge to sentence outside 
the guidelines where “the court determines that the defendant, by reason of obvious and 
substantial mental or physical impairment or infirmity, cannot be adequately protected or 
treated in any available prison facility”); see also 9 MINN. PRAC., CRIMINAL LAW & 
PROCEDURE § 36.30(k) (3d ed. 2001) (recognizing vulnerability as a mitigating factor though 
case law).  In addition, several other jurisdictions include “excessive hardship” to the 
offender as a factor bearing on the appropriateness of imprisonment as a sanction.  See, e.g., 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-621(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-
7.1(b)(10) (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04(11) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 2005); UTAH SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 ADULT SENTENCING AND 
RELEASE GUIDELINES 13, available at http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/sentencing_
archives.html (under “Adult Sentencing Guidelines” menu, select “Adult Guidelines 2011”).  
Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, mental and emotional conditions are ordinarily 
irrelevant in determining whether a sentence should fall outside the sentencing range 
established by the Guidelines for a criminal offense.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
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judges may retain the discretion to depart from a presumptive sentence due 
to compelling circumstances,
22
 a state’s failure to enumerate vulnerability 
due to a mental condition as a mitigating factor might suggest an inability 
to depart on this basis.  This is a particular concern where a state designates 
mental illness as a mitigating factor when it reduces an offender’s 
culpability.
23
  With limited discretion to depart from a presumptive 
sentence, imprisonment may appear to be the only penalty available to a 
judge when sentencing a vulnerable, seriously disordered offender, 
especially for a serious crime.  Possibly beneficial alternative sanctions, 
such as home detention with electronic supervision, community service 
orders, treatment or residential orders, fines, or probation, may be out of 
reach. 
Legislatures’ and sentencing commissions’ reluctance to authorize 
judges to factor vulnerability into sentencing reflects, and is reinforced by, 
some punishment theorists’ stance on the relationship of vulnerability to 
 
MANUAL § 5H1.3 (2010).  However, under Guideline § 5H1.3, an offender’s vulnerability 
due to mental or emotional conditions may justify a downward departure so long as such 
conditions “are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases 
covered by the guidelines.”  Id.  Some courts have also relied on Guidelines §§ 5K2.0, 
5H1.4, and 5K2.13 to grant downward departures on the basis of suspected or demonstrated 
hardship in prison.  See infra notes 172–175. 
22
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6815(c)(1) (2007 & Supp. 2011) (providing a 
nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that may be considered in determining whether 
substantial and compelling reasons exist for a departure from a presumptive sentence); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(21) (2011) (providing, as a factor supporting a mitigated 
sentence, “[a]ny other mitigating factor reasonably related to the purposes of sentences”).  
Indeed, some state judges have altered offenders’ punishments in response to the perception 
that the defendants’ serious mental illnesses could lead to intolerable suffering in prison.  
See People v. Jackson, Nos. 282708, 284430, 2009 WL 1361956, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 
14, 2009) (approving a trial court’s grant of a downward departure due to “substantial and 
compelling reasons,” one of which was defendant’s history of suicide ideation); People v. 
Zung, 531 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615–16 (App. Div. 1988) (substituting, “as a matter of discretion 
in the interest of justice,” a period of community service for incarceration because 
“uncontroverted medical documents indicate that a period of incarceration would be severely 
detrimental to this defendant’s mental health, and could possibly exacerbate his suicidal 
tendencies”). 
23 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(d)(18) (2012) (allowing for imposition of a 
sentence below the presumptive range when “the defendant committed the offense while 
suffering from a mental disease or defect . . . that was insufficient to constitute a complete 
defense but that significantly affected the defendant’s conduct”); CAL. RULES OF COURT 
§ 4.423(b)(2) (2012) (characterizing as a factor in mitigation that “[t]he defendant was 
suffering from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced culpability for the 
crime”).  The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines contain a similar provision.  See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2011) (“A downward departure may be warranted if (1) the 
defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental 
capacity; and (2) the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the 
commission of the offense.”). 
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punishment.  Since the dismantling of rehabilitation as the dominant 
punishment theory in the late twentieth century,
24
 retributive theories of 
punishment have enjoyed a resurgence in popularity.
25
  Today, retributive 
principles animate the sentencing codes of many jurisdictions.
26
  A common 
tenet of retributive theory posits that punishment should be proportionate: 
its severity should reflect the offender’s culpability and the harm caused by 
his criminal act.
27
  A broad chorus of philosophers and legal scholars—
joined recently by Professors Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, and David 
Gray
28—has asserted that punishment consists only of deprivations or 
unpleasant conditions intentionally imposed and authorized by a lawful 
sentencing authority.
29
  Because punishment is limited to intentional 
hardships, abuse and mental deterioration unintended by a sentencing judge 
 
24
See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1205, 1219–23 (1998). 
25
See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of ‘Just’ 
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 844–45 (2002) (“Retributivism is all the rage.  Whether 
it is a ‘revival,’ a ‘resurgence,’ or a ‘renaissance,’ retributivism’s rapid ‘rise’ since the early 
1970s has been remarkable.”); R.A. Duff, In Defence of One Type of Retributivism: A Reply 
to Bagaric and Amarasekara, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 411, 411 (2000) (“A striking feature of 
penal philosophising during the last thirty years has been the revival of retributivism.”); Jean 
Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1992) (“There has been a steady rise in the popularity of retributivism 
over the last decade, which is surprising given its near death in the 1950’s and 1960’s.”). 
26
See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 76 n.22 (2005) 
(claiming that nearly every jurisdiction in the United States has promulgated sentencing 
codes consistent with Norval Morris’s limiting retributivism); Paul H. Robinson, Competing 
Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
145, 145–46 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=924917 (“In the US, a number of 
sentencing guidelines have adopted desert as their distributive principle, and it is 
increasingly given deference in the ‘purposes’ section of state criminal codes, where it can 
be the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code’s provisions.”).  
Contra Michael Tonry, Looking Back to See the Future of Punishment in America, 74 SOC. 
RES. 353, 363 (2007) (“In this first decade of the twenty-first century, there is neither a 
prevailing punishment paradigm in practice nor a prevailing normative framework for 
assessing or talking about punishment in principle.”). 
27
See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: 
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 4 (2005) (explaining that the desert rationale of proportional 
sentencing underlying retributivism “rests on the idea that the penal sanction should fairly 
reflect the degree of reprehensibleness (that is, the harmfulness and culpability) of the 
actor’s conduct”); Paul Butler, Retribution, For Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1884 
(1999) (“Retribution measures just punishment by considering whether there is 
proportionality between crime and punishment.”); see also infra Part III.B.  While many 
retributivists believe that punishment is just so long as it is proportionate to the moral 
culpability of the offender and the wrong he committed, there are many variations of 
retributivism.  See infra note 180. 
28
See infra note 199. 
29
See infra note 198. 
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(even if foreseen by him)
30
 do not constitute punishment.
31
  Thus, according 
to these theorists, while the foreseeable vulnerability of certain individuals 
to suffering in prison is an unfortunate reality that perhaps merits attention 
by “penal technologists,”32 judges are not obligated to factor this 




In contrast, Professor Adam Kolber—whose theories have been 
expanded upon by Professors John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and 
Jonathan Masur
34—has eloquently argued that, if an offender’s punishment 
 
30
Exactly who is the punisher—the communicator of society’s censure—for purposes of 
retributive punishment is a difficult and complicated question.  See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, 
State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353 (2008) 
(arguing that punishment involves a wide array of actors and institutions with varying intent 
and that judgments about intent are always contestable, and therefore concluding that state 
actors’ intent should be relevant to, but not dispositive of, whether a system is imposing 
punishment).  Clearly, the sentencing judge plays an important role in communicating to an 
offender, through sentencing, society’s stern disapproval of a criminal act.  See R.A. DUFF, 
TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 235–36 (1986).  Even in sentencing, however, the judge’s 
communication is not unfettered: the content of his speech is usually restricted by statutory 
constraints set by a legislature and perhaps guidelines established by a sentencing 
commission.  See Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 954–57 (arguing that legislatures must 
authorize sentencing options to ensure adequate condemnatory treatment).  Additionally, the 
degree to which society’s condemnatory message is communicated through the execution of 
a sentence, by prison guards and other correctional personnel, may play an important 
communicative role.  Cf. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN 
SOCIAL THEORY 180–89 (1990) (exploring the effect of the rationalization and 
bureaucratization of the penal process on the social meaning of punishment).  When multiple 
actors participate in the communication of a message, multiple intentions are often present, 
and the ultimate meaning of the message becomes muddled.  See, e.g., William DeFord, 
Comment, The Dilemma of Expressive Punishment, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 843, 857–60 (2005) 
(identifying the problem, for expressive punishment, of multiple institutional speakers and 
exploring the implications of this involvement for confusing the intent behind, and meaning 
of, the message of punishment).  Exploring the ramifications for expressive punishment of 
the myriad institutional actors involved in the criminal justice system is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
31
See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
32
David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1670 (2010); see also 
infra note 200. 
33
See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
34
See Bronsteen et al., supra note 5, at 1068–80 (exploring the implications of hedonic 
adaption to retributive and mixed theories of punishment); John Bronsteen, Christopher 
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Retribution and the Experience of Punishment, 98 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1463, 1480–81, 1482–95 (2011) (expanding upon their original argument and 
defending the assertion that post-prison outcomes are a component of retributive 
punishment).  Although Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur support Kolber’s 
position on the importance of subjective variance in punishment experience, see, e.g., 
Bronsteen et al., supra note 5, at 1039, they assert that their views on the importance of 
hedonic adaption to retributivism do not depend upon agreement with Kolber, see Bronsteen 
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is to be proportionate to his crime, then a judge should take into account the 
suffering the defendant is likely to endure over the course of his sentence,
35
 
even if this suffering is an unintended part of the punishment.
36
  Kolber’s 
chief concern has been the moral importance of subjective suffering or 
distress.
37
  Kolber equates “suffering” with disutility,38 which he defines 
broadly to include mental states such as boredom, anxiety, and sadness.
39
  
Kolber’s contribution has been substantial, but no attempt has yet been 
made to identify negative emotional states of greater or lesser moral 
importance.
40
  This suggests a belief that all forms of disutility are of equal 




et al., supra, at 1464, and their focus is on the hedonic adaptation of the “typical” offender, 
id. at 1469. 
35
See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
182, 185–86 (2009) [hereinafter Subjective Experience] (arguing that retributivism, by virtue 
of its commitment to proportionality, must consider the variance in offenders’ subjective 
experiences of punishment and therefore that sentencing decisions should reflect these 
variances); see also Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 1565, 1566–67 (2009) [hereinafter Comparative Nature] (arguing that the severity of 
punishment should be measured by deviance from subjects’ baseline states). 
36
See Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 15–16 (2012) 
(asserting that the “justification-symmetry principle” requires that state actors provide 
justification for any harm or risk of harm associated with punishment that would require 
justification if posed by an individual).  Indeed, prior sociological accounts of judges’ actual 
sentencing practices reveal their inclination to take into account the effect of the sanction on 
the offender.  See STANTON WHEELER, KENNETH MANN & AUSTIN SARAT, SITTING IN 
JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 22, 144–52 (1988) (exploring, 
through interviews, the white-collar criminal sentencing practices of federal judges in the 
mid-1980s, before the adoption of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and finding concern for 
the effect of the sanction on the offender as a common consideration in sentencing). 
37
See, e.g., Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 35, at 184–87; Bronsteen et al., 
supra note 5, at 1050–55 (identifying a broad range of negative experiences as relevant to 
punishment severity); cf. Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 908, 973–84 (arguing that 
finely calibrating offenders’ punishment by their “ex post idiosyncratic tastes, capacities, 
and experiences” would threaten the core aims of retributivism). 
38
See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 35, at 212–13. 
39
See id. at 187 n.5, 200. 
40
See Gray, supra note 32, at 1623 (observing that “these scholars often treat all 
suffering as fungible”); Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivists Need Not and Should Not 
Endorse the Subjectivist Account of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 7 (2009) 
(pointing out ambiguities as to which mental states should be treated as disvaluable).  But 
see infra note 41. 
41
Professor Kolber has recently written an innovative piece discussing how 
technological advances in neuroscience are improving our ability to measure states of pain 
and distress.  See Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 635–
40 (2011).  He argues that these technologies should be used to calibrate penalty severity or 
monitor penalties’ effects over time in order to better effectuate proportionate punishment in 
sentencing.  Id.  It is possible that such technologies could provide an objective means to 
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This Article seeks to advance the current debate concerning suffering 
and retributive punishment in two ways.  First, it highlights the practical 
importance of the conversation by situating the theoretical discussion 
within the real-life context of the plight of prisoners with serious mental 
illnesses.
42
  Doing so both illustrates the scope and depth of the problem 
and focuses attention on a population vulnerable to multiple sources of 
serious harm that may be particularly easy to establish as foreseeable, given 
social science data on the experience of this population in prison.
43
  The 
focus of this Article is on objective harms that reasonable people would 
agree are bad and should be avoided, such as sexual assault, physical 




discern between substantial and insubstantial forms of disutility for retributive sentencing. 
42
The focus of this Article is on the experience of prisoners with Axis I disorders.  See 
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7 (defining Axis I disorders).  The studies detailed in this Article, 
however, did not employ uniform mental illness criteria and may be more or less inclusive in 
the diagnoses they accepted.  For reasons explored later, see infra notes 236–239 and 
accompanying text, this paper is written as if prison were a unitary experience, which it is 
certainly not.  This Article assumes that offenders with mental illnesses are housed with the 
general prison population because much of the research on mentally ill prisoners’ experience 
is conducted in this setting.  Many prisons lack specialized housing for inmates with stable 
mental illnesses.  See ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS 2000, at 4 
(2001), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=788 (identifying, from a 
2000 census of state prison facilities, 155 facilities in forty-seven states specializing in 
mental health/psychiatric confinement, with twelve facilities reporting that their primary 
function is mental health confinement; this figure includes both facilities used temporarily to 
house inmates suffering from acute episodes and those used to house seriously mentally ill 
inmates separately from the general population for longer periods of time); 1 NAT’L COMM’N 
ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED INMATES: A 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, at xii (2002), available at http://www.ncchc.org/stbr/Volume1/ 
ExecutiveSummary.pdf (reporting that only 36% of prisons have specialized housing for 
inmates with stable mental health conditions).  A minority of inmates with mental illnesses 
reside in segregated facilities.  See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra, at 1 (“About two-thirds of 
all inmates receiving therapy/counseling or medications were in facilities that didn’t 
specialize in providing mental health services in confinement.”).  I assume for purposes of 
this Article that prison facilities provide some minimal amount of mental health treatment in 
conformance with constitutional obligations.  See infra note 282.  But see BECK & 
MARUSCHAK, supra, at 2 (reporting that 13.2% of state minimum-security prison facilities 
reported providing no mental health screening or treatment).  This is a simplification, but the 
simplified context probably suffices to establish the basic point that offenders with serious 
mental illnesses suffer disproportionately in this (common) setting. 
43
See infra Part II.  For a discussion of limitations in this data, see infra notes 159–165. 
44
The degree to which sentencing judges should individualize punishments on grounds 
of offender hardship necessarily presents a line-drawing problem, both as to which offender 
characteristics to recognize, and as to the nature and degree of risks to consider.  Given the 
strength of social science data outlined in Part II, this Article will focus on offenders with 
Axis I disorders.  I leave to others the responsibility of debating the relevance of other 
offender characteristics to proportionate sentencing.  As to which risks merit attention, I 
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Second, the Article looks to just desert theory, a theory of sentencing 
developed by Professor Andrew von Hirsch and others,
45
 to assess the 
relevance of vulnerability due to serious mental illnesses for proportionate 
punishment.  Desert theory aims to determine a just system for apportioning 
punishment in individual cases,
46
 so this theory should inform the current 
debate about the relevance of vulnerability to proportionate sentencing.  A 
close analysis of just desert theory suggests that the theory relies upon a 
conception of punishment that comprehends foreseeable risks of serious 
harm proximately caused by the state, at least for certain populations of 
offenders.
47
  To the extent this observation is sound, it may call for 
punishment theorists to take a fresh look at the traditional, narrower 
understanding of punishment, which is restricted to deprivations 
intentionally imposed by a lawful sentencing authority.
48
  The Article uses 
just desert theory to identify several prescriptions for the proportionate 
punishment of offenders with serious mental illnesses and highlights 
potential pitfalls in the application of this theory. 
This Article consists of four Parts.  Part II examines social science 
literature to demonstrate that prisoners with serious mental illnesses are 
substantially more likely to suffer sexual and physical assault, violate 
prison rules, experience solitary confinement, and sustain an exacerbation 
of mental illness than prisoners without preexisting mental disorder.  Part 
III explores the significance of this differential impact for sentencing within 
a retributive framework.  First, it suggests an expressive understanding of 
punishment and offers a conception of punishment severity that includes 
foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm, proximately caused by the 
state in the context of incarceration.  Next, it moves to just desert theory to 
identify and evaluate three ways in which the vulnerability of offenders 
who have serious mental illnesses may factor into a proportionality 
analysis. 
II. HEIGHTENED VULNERABILITY OF PRISONERS WITH SERIOUS  
MENTAL ILLNESSES 
Judges routinely consider an offender’s mental health history when 
 
build on others’ contributions, see infra notes 201–210, to argue that punishment, for 
purposes of sentencing, includes foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm that are 
proximately caused by the state.  Reasonable minds could, and have, disagreed on where to 
draw the lines on offender characteristics and risk, but I defend these lines for the reasons 
explained in this Article.  See infra Part III.A 
45
See infra notes 187, 283. 
46
See infra notes 188–191. 
47
See infra notes 192–194, 336–343 and accompanying text, as well as Part III.B.3. 
48
See infra notes 198–199 and accompanying text. 
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determining which sentence is warranted in a given case.  Many state 
statutes require probation officers to include an offender’s mental health 
history in the presentencing report created for the court,
49
 and others permit 
the inclusion of this information if relevant to the appropriateness of 
sentencing options.
50
  Defense counsel typically have the opportunity to 
challenge or supplement this information or, if no report is compiled or it is 
not disclosed, to gather and submit to the court any evidence concerning a 
defendant’s mental health history, status, or prognosis that counsel believes 
should result in mitigation or adoption of an alternative sentence.
51
  Thus, 
avenues exist in both state and federal sentencing frameworks to bring to 
judges’ attention scientific wisdom about the effect of mental illness when 
these findings bear upon the appropriateness of particular sentencing 
options for specific offenders. 
Prison
52
 is a toxic environment for individuals with serious mental 
 
49
See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-3-2(a)(1) (West 2007) (“In felony cases, the 
presentence report shall set forth: the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality, 
physical and mental history and condition, family situation and background, economic 
status, education, occupation and personal habits . . . .”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3(8) (West 
2003 & Supp. 2012) (“If a presentence investigation is ordered by the court, the investigator 
shall promptly inquire into . . . [w]hether the defendant has a history of mental health or 
substance abuse problems.”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.20 (McKinney 2005) (requiring 
presentence investigations and reports for all offenders convicted of felonies, and certain 
offenders convicted of misdemeanors); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30 (McKinney 2005) 
(requiring that the presentence report include information regarding defendant’s mental 
health). 
50
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A) (“The probation officer must conduct a 
presentence investigation and submit a report to the court before it imposes sentence.”); FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1)(D)(i) (“The presentence report must identify any factor relevant to the 
appropriate kind of sentence . . . .”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-112(3) (2011) (“The court 
may, in its discretion, require that the presentence investigation report include a physical and 
mental examination of the defendant.”). 
51
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crim 
just_standards_dfunc_blkold.html (standard 4-8.1 for sentencing). 
52
While this Article focuses on prisoners with serious mental illnesses, evidence 
suggests that incarceration in jail also caries antitherapeutic consequences.  See Diane S. 
Young, Jail Mental Health Services, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH WITH 
VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND RESEARCH 425, 436 (David W. 
Springer & Albert R. Roberts eds., 2007) (“[J]ail settings are decidedly nontherapeutic 
environments.  They have many environmental factors that contribute to poor physical and 
mental health.”); cf. E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY 
ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 58 (1992) (“A small number of families 
reported that jail had been a positive experience for their seriously mentally ill relative by 
being the only way the person had been able to get treatment . . . .  For the vast majority of 
mentally ill persons who go to jail, however, the experience varies from being merely 
negative to being catastrophic.”). 
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health problems.
53
  Studies reveal that individuals with major mental 
illnesses, as a class, face a substantial likelihood of incurring serious harm 
in prison,
54
 and are substantially more likely to suffer serious harms than 
non-ill prisoners.  Indeed, numerous studies demonstrate that individuals 
with serious mental illnesses, unable sufficiently to assess danger and 
modify behavior to ward off attacks, are more prone to physical and sexual 
victimization.
55
  They are more likely to be charged with rule violations
56—
often because they are too disorganized to follow the many rules imposed 
by correctional facilities
57—and, as a result, are more likely to be housed in 
solitary confinement.
58
  Numerous studies suggest further that many 
offenders with serious mental illnesses cannot tolerate the severe conditions 




These experiences—the trauma of physical and sexual victimization 
and conditions of solitary confinement, either alone or in combination—
 
53
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 53 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
usa1003.pdf  (“Mental health experts have described prisons as a ‘toxic’ environment for the 
seriously mentally ill.”); Marshall T. Bewley & Robert D. Morgan, A National Survey of 
Mental Health Services Available to Offenders with Mental Illness: Who is Doing What?, 35 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 351, 352 (2011) (“Simply stated, prison environments are not 
conducive to optimal mental health functioning.”); Richard C. McCorkle, Gender, 
Psychopathology, and Institutional Behavior: A Comparison of Male and Female Mentally 
Ill Prison Inmates, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 53, 54 (1995) (“For those with predispositions, the 
incarceration experience can actually trigger psychopathology.”).  
54
This Article will present the magnitudes of risks of harm faced by prisoners with 
serious mental disorders as found in the scientific literature.  This Article will assume, 
without providing a detailed argument in support of this position, that these risks are 
substantial.  Whether a risk merits the label of “substantial” is a complicated question that 
this Article will not address.  See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the 
Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 911–23 (2009) (discussing the objective 
measure of ‘substantial risk of harm’ due to prison conditions for purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment); Richard Siever, HMOs Behind Bars: Constitutional Implications of Managed 
Health Care in The Prison System, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1366–67 (2005) (discussing 
whether the denial of healthcare services presents a substantial risk to prisoners, thus 
implicating the Eighth Amendment).  Future work will explore the extent to which the risks 
detailed in this section are tolerable or, alternatively, so great that housing offenders with 
serious mental illnesses with the general prison population should be considered inhumane 
and prohibited as anathema to retributive punishment. 
55
See infra notes 65–83 (physical assault), 91–103 (sexual assault) and accompanying 
text. 
56
See infra notes 120–123 and accompanying text. 
57
See infra notes 114–120, 124–128 and accompanying text. 
58
See infra notes 146–149 and accompanying text. 
59
See infra notes 152–155 and accompanying text. 
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may aggravate inmates’ psychiatric symptoms and even precipitate the 
onset of new mental disorders.
60
  Inadequate mental health treatment 
available in many prisons
61
 and especially in solitary housing units 
compounds this psychiatric deterioration.
62
  Not surprisingly, offenders 
with major mental illnesses are particularly prone to commit suicide while 
incarcerated.
63
  A discussion of each of these experiential categories 
follows. 
A. INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF PHYSICAL VICTIMIZATION 
Physical assault is a fairly common occurrence in prison,
64
 but recent 
research suggests that serious mental illness may significantly increase 
inmates’ likelihood of victimization.  In 2006, the Bureau of Justice 
 
60
See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text. 
61
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 94–127 (detailing the state of 
inadequate mental health treatment in prisons); JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 2, at 9 (finding 
that only 34% of state prisoners and 24% of federal prisoners who evidenced a mental health 
problem had received treatment since admission); Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, 
Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 105 (2010) (“Relative to the number of prisoners 
needing help, there is an insufficient number of qualified staff, too few specialized facilities, 
and few programs.”); Nancy Wolff et al., Rates of Sexual Victimization in Prison for Inmates 
with and Without Mental Disorders, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1087, 1088 (2007) (stating that 
“underidentification and undertreatment of mental illness inside correctional settings are 
well established”). 
62
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 154–61 (documenting the lack of 
mental health care services available to inmates in solitary confinement); Craig Haney, 
Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 124, 143 (2003) (describing mental health care options often available to inmates 
with mental illnesses in segregation); Metzner & Fellner, supra note 61, at 105 (“Mental 
health professionals are often unable to mitigate fully the harm associated with isolation.  
Mental health services in segregation units are typically limited to psychotropic medication, 
a health care clinician stopping at the cell front to ask how the prisoner is doing (i.e., mental 
health rounds), and occasional meetings in private with a clinician.”).  For a list of 
characteristics of segregation facilities with inadequate mental health care, see Gary E. 
Beven, Offenders with Mental Illnesses in Maximum- and Supermaximum-Security Settings, 
in HANDBOOK OF CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH 209, 216 (Charles L. Scott & Joan B. 
Gerbasi eds., 2005) (Table 10-6). 
63
See infra notes 110 and 153. 
64
See, e.g., JAMES STEPHAN & JENNIFER KARBERG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2000, at 9, 10 
(2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/csfcf00.pdf (reporting twenty-
eight inmate-on-inmate assaults per 1,000 inmates in federal and state prisons in 2000); 
Nancy Wolff, Jing Shi & Ronet Bachman, Measuring Victimization Inside Prisons: 
Questioning the Questions, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1343, 1344 (2008) 
(“Representative prevalence rates remain elusive, with ranges varying from . . . 10% to 25% 
for physical victimization.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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Statistics of the Department of Justice reported that 10% of non-disordered 
state prisoners are injured in fights while incarcerated, but this injury rate 
doubles for prisoners reporting a recent history or symptoms of major 
depression, mania, or psychotic disorders.
65
  A prior report by the Bureau 
found even higher rates of altercation involving individuals with mental 
illnesses, with 36% of state prisoners with mental illnesses reporting 
involvement in fights, compared to 25% of non-disordered inmates.
66
  The 
few reports that have isolated victimization data by perpetrator have found 
that victimization by prison staff is more common than victimization by 
inmates, at least for male prisoners.
67
 
While reports have long suggested that mental illness serves as a 
predictive variable for physical assault in correctional facilities,
68
 
researchers have only recently attempted to support this conjecture with 
empirical data.
69
  The most important study of the physical victimization of 
 
65
JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 2, at 10.  The study defined having a mental health 
problem as, in the twelve months preceding the interview, being told by a mental health 
professional that the individual had a mental disorder; staying overnight in a hospital 
because of a mental health problem; using prescribed medication to treat a mental health 
problem; receiving professional mental health therapy; or experiencing symptoms of major 
depression, mania, or psychotic disorder.  Id. at 1–2. 
66
PAULA M. DITTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL 
HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 9 (1999), available at http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf.  This study identified a prisoner as mentally ill if 
he reported a current mental or emotional condition, an overnight stay in a mental hospital, 
or participation in a treatment program.  See id. at 2.  No data was reported on diagnosis. 
67
See Cynthia L. Blitz et al., Physical Victimization in Prison: The Role of Mental 
Illness, 31 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 385, 389–90 (2008) (Tables 2 and 3) (showing that 
20.5% of male prisoners had experienced physical victimization by inmates over the last six 
months, while 24.6% had been victimized by staff; figures for female inmates were 20.6% 
for victimization by inmates and 8.3% for victimization by staff).  Reflecting on the 
difference in staff victimization of male and female inmates, Professor Nancy Wolff and her 
colleagues have suggested that the data reflect “gender-patterned interactions between 
inmate and staff in which (a) male inmates, compared to female inmates, are more 
aggressive against authority figures, resulting in physical altercations with staff; (b) staff is 
more willing to use physical force against male inmates than female inmates; or (c) some 
combination of both.”  Nancy Wolff, Jing Shi & Jane A. Siegel, Patterns of Victimization 
Among Male and Female Inmates: Evidence of an Enduring Legacy, 24 VIOLENCE & 
VICTIMS 469, 477 (2009). 
68
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 56–57 (suggesting that inmates 
with mental illnesses are particularly likely to be victimized by other inmates); TORREY ET 
AL., supra note 52, at 21 (finding that 51.8% of the 1,202 jails that reported housing inmates 
with serious mental illnesses reported that these offenders “increase the potential for 
outbreaks of violence”). 
69
Blitz et al., supra note 67, at 385 (“[W]hether [people with mental disorders] are at 
elevated risk for victimization inside prison has not been shown empirically, although it has 
been suggested in numerous reports.” (internal citations omitted)); Annette S. Crisanti & B. 
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prisoners with serious mental illnesses to date—conducted by Cynthia 
Blitz, Professor Nancy Wolff, and Jing Shi in 2005—involved questioning 
approximately 7,000 inmates at fourteen facilities in one state prison 
system.
70
  This study found that 42.8% of male inmates with prior treatment 
for schizophrenia or bipolar disorder reported being physically assaulted by 
another inmate or a prison guard over a six-month period, compared to 
32.4% of offenders without a mental disorder.
71
  More mentally ill inmates 
(27.8%) reported physical victimization effectuated through the use of a 
weapon than did inmates without a mental disorder (23.0%).
72
  The authors 
found rates of physical victimization to be similarly elevated for male 
inmates previously treated for depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, or 
an anxiety disorder.
73
  In total, these researchers found that the physical 
victimization rates of male prisoners with a serious mental illness were 1.6 
times higher for inmate-on-inmate violence and 1.2 times higher for staff-
on-inmate violence than those of male prisoners with no major mental 
disorder.
74
  A 2010 study of violence-related injuries in jails across the 
 
Christopher Frueh, Risk of Trauma Exposure Among Persons with Mental Illness in Jails 
and Prisons: What Do We Really Know?, 24 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 431, 434 
(2011) (presenting a review of the “scant” recent literature on this topic). 
70
See Blitz et al., supra note 67, at 385.   This study was the first one to explore the rate 
of physical victimization within a state prison system, inclusive of male and female 
facilities, and to address inmates with mental illnesses in particular.  See also Nancy Wolff 
& Jing Shi, Feelings of Safety Among Male Inmates: The Safety Paradox, 34 CRIM. JUST. 
REV. 404 (2009); Wolff et al., supra note 61; Nancy Wolff et al., Understanding Physical 
Victimization Inside Prisons: Factors that Predict Risk, 26 JUST. Q. 445 (2009) [hereinafter 
Wolff et al., Understanding Physical Victimization]; Nancy Wolff & Jing Shi, Victimisation 
and Feelings of Safety Among Male and Female Inmates with Behavioural Health Problems, 
20 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. S56 (2009) [hereinafter Wolff & Shi, Victimisation 
and Feelings of Safety]. 
71
Blitz et al., supra note 67, at 389 (Table 2); see also Wolff & Shi, Victimisation and 
Feelings of Safety, supra note 70, at S67 (Table 3).  Other studies, however, have found that 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder do not function as risk factors for physical victimization.  
See Paul-Philippe Pare & Matthew W. Logan, Risks of Minor and Serious Violent 
Victimization in Prison: The Impact of Inmates’ Mental Disorders, Physical Disabilities, 
and Physical Size, 1 SOC’Y & MENTAL HEALTH 106, 113, 116–17 (2001); Wolff et al., 
Understanding Physical Victimization, supra note 70, at 468 (finding that schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder did not function as risk factors in a multilevel predictive model of 
victimization and explaining this counterintuitive finding by observing that, in the prison 
system studied, inmates with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are partially protected from 
predation by being housed in separate residential units when they are actively psychotic or 
symptomatic). 
72




Id. at 389–90.  This study did not report on the severity of physical assaults that 
inmates experienced, although it did differentiate between assaults committed with and 
without weapons.  Id. at 389. 
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United States reached similar conclusions.
75
  A subsequent study found that 
inmates diagnosed with depression, and those with symptoms of 




A number of factors contribute to the higher rate of victimization of 
inmates with serious mental illnesses.  Both prison officials and inmates 
have constructed intricate systems of rules and codes of conduct that 
offenders with cognitive limitations may be particularly ill-equipped to 
navigate.
77
  Inmates with serious mental disorders may have difficulty 
adapting to the peculiar environment of a prison, which typically requires 
rapid assessment of danger and subsequent behavioral adjustment to ward 
off potential threats.
78
  As inmates with cognitive deficiencies struggle to 
adapt, they may be “disciplined” for violating behavioral norms.79  In 
addition, inmates with serious mental disorders often lack behavioral 
control, which may signal vulnerability to, and spark predation by, other 
inmates.
80
  Inmates with serious mental illnesses may respond to 
overstimulation and danger by withdrawing, but individuals without social 
support are at greater risk of victimization.
81
  Inmates taking antipsychotic 
 
75
See Hung-En Sung, Nonfatal Violence-Related and Accident-Related Injuries Among 
Jail Inmates in the United States, 90 PRISON J. 353, 361 (2010) (finding, in a study of 6,982 
inmates from 417 local jails, that a recent history of mental health treatment and symptoms 
of delusion or hallucination resulted in a statistically significant increase in the odds of 
violence-related injuries, and concluding that mental illness is a “powerful predictor” of 
violence-related injuries). 
76
See Pare & Logan, supra note 71, at 113, 116–17.  The authors defined serious 
victimization as involving a stabbing, a gun wound, a broken bone or internal injury, 
unconsciousness, or sexual assault.  Id. at 112. 
77
For a description of the “prison code” and the difficulty inmates with mental illnesses 
have adapting to it, see KUPERS, supra note 9, at 18–19.  
78
See Merrill Rotter & Michael Steinbacher, The Clinical Impact of “Doing Time”—
Mental Illness and Incarceration, in CIVIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FORENSIC MENTAL 
HEALTH: WORKING WITH OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 16-1, 16-2 (Gerald Landsberg & 
Amy Smiley eds., 2001); Sung, supra note 75, at 364. 
79
See Kenneth Adams, Adjusting to Prison Life, 16 CRIME & JUST. 275, 310 (1992) 
(discussing research suggesting that “odd behavior” is a significant cause of violence 
between inmates); Wolff et al., Understanding Physical Victimization, supra note 70, at 448 
(“Psychiatric or cognitive impairment may also increase victimization if impaired inmates 
are either easy marks or chronic violators of norms of behavior that are strictly enforced by 
captives and captors.”). 
80
See Maureen L. O’Keefe & Marissa J. Schnell, Offenders with Mental Illness in the 
Correctional System, 45 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 81, 87 (2007). 
81
See Rotter & Steinbacher, supra note 78, at 16-5 (“Loners can be seen as weak or 
lacking protection and are often preyed upon.  Individuals suffering from mental illness who 
withdraw, seeking to reduce stimulation or avoid others to meet safety or social distance 
needs, make the error of having no supports and put themselves at risk.”). 
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medication often experience slowed reaction times, increasing their 
vulnerability to attacks from the side or behind.
82
  Finally, offenders may 
anticipate that prison officials are likely to discount or ignore allegations of 




B. INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 
Extant studies have reached widely divergent conclusions about the 
incidence of sexual victimization in prisons: estimates range from less than 
1% to 41% of all prisoners.
84
  In the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 
Congress charged the Bureau of Justice Statistics to conduct an annual, 
comprehensive, statistical review and analysis of the incidence and effects 
of prison rape.
85
  The Bureau conducted its first wave of surveys in 2007 
and found that 4.5% of prisoners reported experiencing sexual abuse one or 
more times during the twelve months preceding the survey.
86
  Rates varied 
dramatically among prison facilities, with ten facilities reporting sexual 
assault rates between 9.3% and 15.7%, and six reporting no abuse.
87
  A 
May 2012 study by the Bureau found much higher rates of sexual abuse.  
Investigating incidents of sexual victimization over the course of former 
prisoners’ most recent periods of incarceration, the study found that 7.5% 
of former state prisoners experienced at least one instance of sexual 
victimization.
88
  Former state prisoners were more likely to report abuse by 
staff than by inmates: the study found that 3.7% of former state prisoners 
experienced inmate-on-inmate sexual victimization, but that 4.7% reported 
 
82
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 57 (quoting KUPERS, supra note 9, at 20). 
83
O’Keefe & Schnell, supra note 80, at 87. 
84
Wolff et al., supra note 61, at 1087 & n.17; see also GERALD G. GAES & ANDREW L. 
GOLDBERG, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PRISON RAPE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 2 
(2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/213365.pdf (reporting 
prevalence estimates in existing studies ranging from 0% to 40%).  This variance can be 
explained by methodological differences in sample size and location, definitions of 
victimization and perpetrator, the framing of questions, and the modes of questioning.  See 
Wolff et al., supra note 61, at 1087 & n.17 (providing examples of varying questions asked); 
Nancy Wolff et al., Understanding Sexual Victimization Inside Prisons: Factors that Predict 
Risk, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 535, 537 (2007). 
85
Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15603 (2006). 
86
ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS REPORTED BY INMATES, 
2007, at 1 (April 2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf. 
87
Id. at 2. 
88
ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY FORMER STATE PRISONERS, 2008, at 8 (May 
2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svrfsp08.pdf. 
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suffering abuse perpetrated by correctional staff.
89
  The Bureau surmised 
that the longer average exposure period—the duration of an individual’s 
most recent term of incarceration—in the later study might explain why it 
found higher rates of sexual victimization than had past studies.
90
 
Inmates with serious mental illnesses are at a heightened risk of sexual 
victimization in prison, particularly by other inmates.  Professor Nancy 
Wolff and her colleagues conducted the earliest and most extensive study to 
date on the role that serious mental illness plays in the incidence of sexual 
victimization, both by inmates and prison staff.
91
  They found that male 
inmates with a mental illness—defined as having received prior treatment 
for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, posttraumatic stress 
disorder, or an anxiety disorder—reported experiencing more sexual 
victimization in prison than non-disordered inmates, regardless of the 
disorder, the definition of victimization, or the identity of the perpetrator.
92
  
Overall, their data showed that 15.1% of inmates with mental disorders 
experienced sexual victimization over a six-month period, while 8.9% of 
non-disordered inmates were victimized.
93
  The research by Wolff and her 
colleagues reveals that inmates, more so than correctional staff, selectively 
prey on fellow prisoners with serious mental illnesses.
94
  The authors found 
that “approximately one in twelve inmates with a mental disorder reported 
at least one incident of sexual victimization by another inmate over a six-
month period, compared with one in thirty-three inmates without a mental 
disorder.”95  Rates of inmate-on-inmate victimization were particularly high 
for inmates with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, with 10.1% reporting 
 
89
Id. (Table 1). 
90
Id. at 10. 
91
See Crisanti & Frueh, supra note 69; Wolff et al., supra note 61, at 1088; Wolff et al., 
supra note 84, at 540 (reporting data collected from 7,785 state prison inmates). 
92
See Wolff et al., supra note 61, at 1089–90 (Table 1). 
93
See id. at 1089 (Table 1); see also Wolff et al., supra note 84, at 546 (“Compared with 
inmates without mental disorders, reporting prior treatment for depression, anxiety, and 
posttraumatic stress disorder increases the likelihood of sexual victimization by 2.6 to 1.8 
within a 6-month time period.  Inmates with prior treatment for schizophrenia or (547) 
bipolar disorder were 50% more likely to report an abusive sexual contact within a 6-month 
time period compared with inmates without prior treatment for mental disorders.”). 
94
Rates of sexual victimization by staff were also higher for disordered inmates than for 
those without a mental illness, but the variance was less dramatic.  See Wolff et al., supra 
note 61, at 1090 (“Roughly one in ten male inmates with a mental disorder reported some 
form of sexual victimization by staff, compared with one in 14 male inmates without a 
mental health disorder.”).  Among inmates with a mental disorder, the rate of sexual 
victimization by any perpetrator was nearly twice as high among female inmates (27.2%) as 
among male inmates (15.1%).  See id. at 1089–90 (Tables 1 and 2). 
95
Id. at 1089–90. 
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sexual victimization by another inmate.
96
  These statistics include both acts 
of forced sex and “abusive sexual contacts,” defined as unwanted 
intentional touching of specified parts of the body done in a manner that felt 
sexually threatening.
97
  Focusing on the most serious forms of sexual 
assault, 4.9% of offenders with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder reported 
being forced by another prisoner or staff member to perform oral or anal 
sex, compared to 4.5% of inmates with any mental disorder and 2.3% with 
no mental disorder.
98
  Prisoners with chronic, serious mental illnesses were 
much more likely to be targeted for abuse by other inmates: inmates with 
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder were nearly four times (3.8%) more likely 
to be raped than non-disordered inmates (1.1%).
99
  A recent review of 
officially reported sexual assaults in the Texas prison system confirms the 
increased victimization of prisoners with mental disorders.
100
 
These findings add empirical support to previous speculation by 
advocacy groups and Congress that inmates with mental disorders are at an 
increased risk for rape and sexual assault in correctional facilities.
101
  
Researchers have opined that the same constellation of factors that places 
seriously disordered inmates at greater risk for physical victimization also 
places them at greater risk for sexual victimization.
102
  Although only a 
 
96
See id. at 1089 (Table 1) (reporting sexual victimization rates of 10.1% for inmates 
with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, compared to 8.3% for inmates with any mental 
disorder and 3.1% for non-disordered inmates). 
97
Id. at 1088. 
98
Id. at 1089 (Table 1). 
99
See id. (reporting rates of inmate-on-inmate nonconsensual sexual acts of 3.8% for 
inmates with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, compared to 1.1% for non-disordered 
inmates). 
100
See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE TEXAS 
PRISON SYSTEM, at iv, 41 (2006), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
215774.pdf (finding, in a review of nearly 2,000 officially reported sexual assaults in the 
Texas prison systems between 2002 and 2005, that prisoners classified as mentally ill were 
eight times more likely to be victimized than inmates not so classified). 
101
See, e.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2006) (“Inmates 
with mental illness are at increased risk of sexual victimization.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 53, at 58–59 (describing incidents of rape of individuals with mental illnesses in 
prison); TORREY ET AL., supra note 52, at 60 (sharing accounts from inmates with mental 
illnesses and their families of attempted and actual rape in jail). 
102
See NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION 
COMMISSION REPORT 72–73 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf 
[hereinafter PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION REPORT] (“For men, women, and juveniles coping 
with serious mental illness, both the disease itself and the treatment can render them 
extremely vulnerable.  Symptoms ranging from hallucinations and paranoia to anxiety and 
depression may make it difficult to build the kind of supportive social networks that could 
protect prisoners from sexual abuse.  Psychotropic medications often have side effects, such 
as sleepiness, slowed reactions, uncontrolled movements, and withdrawal that increase a 
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minority of those with a serious mental illness reported sexual victimization 
over a six-month period, Wolff and her colleagues concluded that having a 
serious mental illness serves as a “‘mark[]’ . . . tantamount to wearing a 
bull’s eye on your back” for victimization inside prison.103 
The psychological effects of physical and sexual assault may extend 
beyond the trauma of the incidents themselves.
104
  Trauma—imparted 
through actual victimization, threats of bodily harm, or witnessing 
violence
105—contributes to the etiology of several mental disorders.106  
 
person’s vulnerability as well.  Moreover, medications are often dispensed in open areas of 
the facility during peak traffic periods, such as around meal times, effectively ‘outing’ 
people with a mental illness.”); TORREY ET AL., supra note 52 (observing that “mentally ill 
inmates who are confused and less able to defend themselves are more vulnerable” to 
attempted or actual rape). 
103
Wolff et al., supra note 84, at 539. 
104
See Beth Ribet, Naming Prison Rape as Disablement: A Critical Analysis of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Imperatives of 
Survivor-Oriented Advocacy, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 281, 287–95 (2010) (exploring 
prison sexual assault as a process of disablement, observing the vulnerability of individuals 
with mental illnesses, and noting consequent long-term psychological and physical injuries, 
illnesses, and impairments). 
105
See Kim T. Mueser et al., Trauma, PTSD, and the Course of Severe Mental Illness: 
An Interactive Model, 53 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 123, 124 (2002). 
106
KUPERS, supra note 9, at 40; Nancy L. Wolff & Jing Shi, Trauma and Incarcerated 
Persons, in HANDBOOK OF CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH 277, 284 (Charles L. Scott ed., 
2d ed. 2010); see also, e.g., Ellen Frank & Barbara Pazak Anderson, Psychiatric Disorders 
in Rape Victims: Past History and Current Symptomatology, 28 COMPREHENSIVE 
PSYCHIATRY 77, 81 (1987) (concluding that the experience of rape “produces a period of 
acute psychological distress,” and that individuals who have been raped later frequently 
meet the requirements for a diagnosis of major depressive disorder or generalized anxiety 
disorder); Mueser et al., supra note 105, at 126 (explaining that the trauma of sexual or 
physical abuse, in patients with severe mental illness, is related to increased severity of 
symptoms of depression, suicidality, anxiety, delusions, hallucinations, and dissociation); 
Mark Shevlin et al., Cumulative Traumas and Psychosis: An Analysis of the National 
Comorbidity Survey and the British Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, 34 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 
193, 197 (2008) (reporting that sexual abuse is one of the strongest correlates of psychosis).  
Dr. Terry Kupers has characterized the relationship between trauma and the development of 
mental illness in prison in the following way: 
Since schizophrenia and other major mental disorders usually surface during early adulthood, the 
age when most felons first enter prison, it is often difficult to discern whether a mentally 
disordered prisoner entered prison suffering from the disorder or the disorder was caused by 
harsh prison conditions and the massive traumas that regularly occur behind bars . . . .  Many 
previously nondepressed people become severely depressed in jail and prison, and a significant 
proportion go on to commit suicide.  Based on the large number of clinical cases I have reviewed 
and my interviews with prisoners and staff, I have come to the conclusion there is merit in both 
claims: A much greater number of mentally ill people are being sent to jails and prisons today, 
where their condition deteriorates on account of the harsh environment and inadequate mental 
health services; and the harsh conditions and brutality of life in prison are making previously 
very sane prisoners suffer psychiatric breakdowns.   
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When a person prone to emotional breakdown experiences severe trauma, 
the event can prompt a psychotic or depressive episode.
107
  It may also 
precipitate the onset of posttraumatic stress disorder.
108
  Posttraumatic 
stress disorder, in turn, can exacerbate existing symptoms of mental 
illness.
109
  Each of these conditions—posttraumatic stress disorder, 




C. HIGHER INCIDENCE OF DISCIPLINARY INFRACTION 
Prisons require compliance with a complex set of rules and procedures 
that regulate all aspects of inmate behavior.  All prisoners, including those 
 
KUPERS, supra note 9, at 17–18. 
107
See KUPERS, supra note 9, at 39, 44, 46; Charles B. Nemeroff & Pascal J. 
Goldschmidt-Clermont, In the Aftermath of Tragedy: Medical and Psychiatric 
Consequences, 35 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 4, 5 (2011) (stating that “stress is known to precipitate 
episodes of, or exacerbate, a variety of severe psychiatric disorders including major 
depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and all of the major anxiety and substance abuse 
disorders”). 
108
See Frank & Anderson, supra note 106, at 81 (finding that rape victims frequently 
develop posttraumatic stress disorder); Nemeroff & Goldschmidt-Clermont, supra note 107, 
at 5 (finding that syndromal posttraumatic stress disorder may develop in a significant 
minority of trauma victims); Barbara Olasov Rothbaum et al., A Prospective Examination of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Victims, 5 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 455, 471 (1992) 
(reporting that 60% to 65% of rape victims satisfy the requirements for posttraumatic stress 
disorder one month after the incident). 
109
Blitz et al., supra note 67, at 393; see also Meaghan L. O’Donnell et al., 
Posttraumatic Disorders Following Injury: An Empirical and Methodological Review, 23 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 587, 591 (2003) (reporting that between 80% and 85% of patients 
with posttraumatic stress disorder also satisfy requirements for at least one other condition, 
with depression being particularly common). 
110
See Maria A. Oquendo et al., Association of Comorbid Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
and Major Depression with Greater Risk for Suicidal Behavior, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 580, 
580 (2003); Ildiko Suto & Genevieve L. Y. Arnaut, Suicide in Prison: A Qualitative Study, 
90 PRISON J. 288, 294, 304 (2010).  Studies indicate that mental disorder constitutes a salient 
risk factor for suicide in prison.  See, e.g., Jacques Baillargeon et al., Psychiatric Disorders 
and Suicide in the Nation’s Largest State Prison System, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
188, 191 (2009) (finding, in a one-year study of 234,031 inmates incarcerated in the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice, that inmates with major depressive disorder, bipolar 
disorder, schizophrenia, and nonschizophrenic psychotic disorders exhibited “strikingly 
elevated” risks of suicide); Anasseril E. Daniel & Jennifer Fleming, Suicides in a State 
Correctional System, 1992-2002: A Review, 12 J. CORR. HEALTH CARE 24, 27 (2006) 
(finding that 73% of prisoners committing suicide in Missouri had been diagnosed with an 
Axis I disorder); Raymond F. Patterson & Kerry Hughes, Review of Completed Suicides in 
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1999 to 2004, 59 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 676, 678 (2008) (finding that 73% of suicides in the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation—between 1999 and 2004—involved inmates with a history 
of psychiatric treatment, and 56% involved inmates currently on the mental health caseload). 
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with major mental illnesses, are held to the same standards of conduct and 
in most instances face the same repercussions when rules are broken.
111
  
The severity of penal response varies with the importance of the underlying 
infraction.  Minor infractions are typically punishable by reprimand, 
temporary loss of privileges, cell restriction, or extra work duty, while 
punishments for major infractions include disciplinary segregation or loss 
of good-time credit.
112
  Rule violation rates are important in part because 
they serve as a proxy for inmates’ adjustment to prison.113  Evidence 
suggests that, on the whole, inmates with certain mental illnesses adapt to 
prison less successfully, are less able to conform to prison rules, and are 
punished more often and more severely than their non-ill counterparts. 
Inmates with serious mental illnesses often are limited in their ability 
to cope with the environmental and social stressors of incarceration and to 
adhere to the highly regimented routine demanded by prisons.
114
  This 
inability to adapt is often a function and symptom of mental illness: certain 
mental disorders are defined by breaks with reality and limitations in one’s 
 
111
See Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 394 (2006) (“Apart from the mental health services that may 
or may not be provided, prisons typically treat prisoners with mental illness identically to all 
other inmates.”). 
112
 Ron Jemelka & David Lovell, When Inmates Misbehave: The Costs of Discipline, 76 
PRISON J. 165, 167–68 (1996).  Minor infractions include theft of food, horseplay, deceit, 
abusive language, and failure to comply with count procedures.  Id. at 167.  Major 
infractions encompass intoxication, assault, fighting, arson, and homicide.  Id. at 168. 
113
See id. at 166; O’Keefe & Schnell, supra note 80, at 97 (stating that mental health 
crises and disciplinary violations “can be thought of as behavioral reactions to the 
correctional environment”).  For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between severe 
mental illness, maladaptation, and disciplinary infractions, see T. Howard Stone, 
Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental Disorders: 
Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 300–02 (1997); see also 
SpearIt, Mental Illness in Prison: Inmate Rehabilitation & Correctional Officers in Crisis, 
14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 277, 280–93 (2010) (examining mentally ill prisoners’ 
predisposition to break disciplinary rules, psychological deterioration resulting from 
segregation, exacerbation of mental illness due to inadequate mental health care, and 
deficiencies in mental health training for correctional officers). 
114
See TORREY ET AL., supra note 52, at 58–59 (“Jails have rigid rules, both implicit and 
explicit, and the inmates who get along best in jails are those who can follow those rules. 
Inmates who are seriously mentally ill often can neither understand nor follow such rules 
and, consequently, may be very disruptive for other inmates and for the corrections 
officers.”); Metzner & Fellner, supra note 61, at 105 (“Persons with mental illness are often 
impaired in their ability to handle the stresses of incarceration and to conform to a highly 
regimented routine.  They may exhibit bizarre, annoying, or dangerous behavior and have 
higher rates of disciplinary infractions than other prisoners.”); Young, supra note 52, at 429 
(“Because of their illnesses and the corresponding confusion, suspicion, or fear, [severely 
mentally ill inmates] may have trouble understanding jail rules or following orders.”). 
2013] SENTENCING AND MENTAL ILLNESS 171 
ability to control emotions and behavior.
115
  Anxious, depressed, or 
psychotic individuals may experience particular difficulty in managing the 
typical conditions of prison, such as overcrowding, threat of violence and 
exploitation, lack of privacy, high noise level, uncomfortable temperatures, 
physical limitation, inability to control one’s time, restricted contact with 
loved ones, and a dearth of opportunities for productive, purposeful 
activities.
116
  As a result, they may experience emotional deterioration and 
impaired judgment.
117
  In addition, some individuals manifest their illnesses 
through obstreperous behavior, hostility, aggression, and violence.
118
  With 
distorted perceptions of reality, deficits in behavioral control, and limited 
social skills, inmates with major mental disorders, in the words of forensic 
psychologist Keith Curry, “are less able to conform their behavior to the 
rigid expectations of prison life and often fall into self-defeating patterns of 
irrational opposition to the demands placed upon them.”119   
Consequently, seriously disordered offenders tend to accrue 
disciplinary infractions.  Numerous studies have found that inmates with 
mental illnesses are more likely to violate prison rules than non-disordered 
prisoners.  A 2006 study conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, for 
instance, found that 57.7% of state prisoners with a mental health problem 
were charged with rule violations, compared to 43.2% of non-disordered 
inmates.
120
  Statistics for federal prisoners are similar: 40% of inmates with 
a mental illness were charged with rule violations, compared to 27.7% of 
inmates without.
121





See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for 
Post-Prison Adjustment (“From Prison to Home” Conference, The Urban Inst., U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Working Paper, Jan. 30–31, 2002), available at http://img2. 
tapuz.co.il/CommunaFiles/19852476.pdf (“For mentally-ill and developmentally-disabled 
inmates, part of whose defining (but often undiagnosed) disability includes difficulties in 
maintaining close contact with reality, controlling and conforming one’s emotional and 
behavioral reactions, and generally impaired comprehension and learning, the rule-bound 
nature of institutional life may have especially disastrous consequences.”). 
116
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 53–54; O’Keefe & Schnell, supra 
note 80, at 86. 
117
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 54. 
118
See Adams, supra note 79, at 309 (“[I]t has been shown that seriously depressed 
inmates are more violent toward themselves, that highly confused or disoriented inmates are 
more violent toward others, and that inmates who are both depressed and confused are more 
destructive of property.”); Beven, supra note 62, at 214. 
119
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 59 (quoting a letter from Keith R. Curry, 
Ph.D., to Donna Brorby, Mar. 19, 2002).   
120




See DITTON, supra note 66, at 9 (Table 13) (finding, for state prisoners, that 62.2% of 
inmates with a mental illness were charged with breaking rules, compared to 51.9% of non-
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Smaller studies of state prison systems have also found higher rates of 
disciplinary infraction by inmates with mental illnesses.
123
 
Scrutinizing the nature of infractions committed by inmates with 
mental disorders, researchers have discovered that infractions often reflect 
symptomatic behavior.  Professor Kenneth Adams, in his study of the 
disciplinary experiences of inmates in two New York prisons, found that 
inmates with serious mental illnesses are more likely to engage in rule 
violations with pathological overtones.
124
  For example, inmates referred for 
mental health treatment are more likely to be disciplined for refusing to 
leave their cells, setting fire to their cells, and destroying state property, as 
well as for self-injury and health and hygiene violations.
125
  Adams 
articulated the relationship between this type of conduct and pathology as 
 
disordered inmates and, for federal prisoners, that 41.2% of inmates with a mental illness 
were charged with breaking rules, compared to 32.7% of non-disordered inmates); cf. 
McCorkle, supra note 53, at 58–59 (analyzing data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ 
1986 Survey of Inmates at State Correctional Facilities and finding that prisoners utilizing 
past or present mental health services disproportionately committed disciplinary infractions 
in prison but, after accounting for race, concluding that only female prisoners currently on 
medication were significantly more likely to have experienced greater disciplinary 
problems). 
123
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 39 (reporting that, at the Bedford 
Hills Correctional Facility in New York, 80% of documented incidents involving serious 
threats to facility safety or security involved prisoners on the active mental health caseload); 
Kenneth Adams, The Disciplinary Experiences of Mentally Disordered Inmates, 13 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 297, 304–05 (1986) [hereinafter Adams, Disciplinary Experiences] (finding 
that inmates referred to mental health units of two prisons in New York had significantly 
higher infraction rates than nonreferred inmates); Kenneth Adams, Former Mental Patients 
in a Prison and Parole System: A Study of Socially Disruptive Behavior, 10 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 358, 366–68 (1983) [hereinafter Adams, Socially Disruptive Behavior] (finding that 
the annual rate of infractions for former mental patients was 21.6 per 100 inmates, whereas 
for the other inmates the annual rate was 14.0 infractions); O’Keefe & Schnell, supra note 
80, at 97 (finding that offenders with mental illnesses committed 22% of the 23,852 
disciplinary violations in Colorado prisons during fiscal year 2005, even though these 
inmates comprised only 25% of the offender population); Hans Toch & Kenneth Adams, 
Pathology and Disruptiveness Among Prison Inmates, 23 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 10–11 
(1986) (finding that inmates who are mentally disturbed, as measured by a history of 
hospitalization or outpatient mental health treatment, have higher annual infraction rates for 
both violent and nonviolent infractions than inmates who are not mentally disturbed); see 
also Fellner, supra note 111, at 396 (discussing a subset of these studies). 
124
See Adams, Disciplinary Experiences, supra note 123, at 312–13; see also HANS 
TOCH, KENNETH ADAMS & J. DOUGLAS GRANT, COPING: MALADAPTATION IN PRISONS 63 
(1989) (finding that hospitalized offenders are four times more likely than nonpatients to 
commit infractions suggesting unusual emotional states, such as throwing feces and setting 
fire to one’s cell).  
125
Adams, Disciplinary Experiences, supra note 123, at 307; see also Adams, supra note 
79, at 310 (“Disturbed inmates . . . are more likely to engage in acts suggesting peculiar or 
extreme emotional states, such as self-injury, throwing feces, and arson.”). 
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follows: 
Refusing to leave a cell can be an attempt at isolation and withdrawal, which can stem 
from problems emotionally troubled inmates have in coping with high levels of 
stimulation.  These inmates may look upon their cells as safer, less stressful, more 
familiar environments than the general prison population. . . .  Neglect of personal 
hygiene can follow as a consequence of withdrawing from the environment, or it can 
be a psychotic symptom.  Setting fire to one’s cell, injuring oneself, and destroying 




Researchers have also found that “more often than not periods of high 
disciplinary involvement overlap with symptomatic behavior for seriously 
disturbed inmates.”127  Although “[t]emporal coincidence does not 
necessarily imply causation in the sense that disciplinary problems are 
always the result of emotional disorders[,] [i]t does suggest . . . that, at 
some level, different manifestations of coping problems are interrelated.”128 
While certainly not all infractions are linked to pathology, some 
conduct that is treated by prison officials as constituting a rule violation 
seems to be an obvious manifestation of severe mental illness.  In its 
groundbreaking 2003 report on the plight of prisoners with mental illnesses, 
Human Rights Watch collected examples of prisons’ punishing inmates for 
rule-breaking stemming from their disorders.
129
  For instance, in one 1998 
incident in an Illinois prison, prison officials discovered an inmate with 
serious mental illness eating his flesh after having cut open his arm with a 
piece of glass.
130
  Charged with possessing dangerous contraband and 
brought before a disciplinary committee, the inmate explained: “I’m guilty.  
I was hungry[,] and I was eating my arm that day.  I found the piece of 
glass in my cell after I busted my light out.”131  He was found guilty and 
sentenced to one year in disciplinary segregation.
132
  Jamie Fellner, a senior 
advisor at Human Rights Watch, has detailed other examples: 
Prisoners have been punished for self-mutilation because that behavior entailed the 
“destruction of state property”—to wit, the prisoner’s body.  Prisoners who tear up 
bed-sheets to make a rope for hanging themselves have been punished for misusing 
state property. Prisoners who scream and kick cell doors while hearing voices have 
been charged with destruction of property and creating a disturbance.  And prisoners 
 
126
Adams, Disciplinary Experiences, supra note 123, at 312–13. 
127
HANS TOCH & KENNETH ADAMS, ACTING OUT: MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN 
CONFINEMENT 107 (2002); see Adams, supra note 79 (discussing this phenomenon). 
128
TOCH & ADAMS, supra note 127, at 112. 
129
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 65–68. 
130
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who smear feces in their cells have been punished for “being untidy.”
133
 
Observers of inmates with serious mental illnesses have represented that 
examples of prison officials’ disciplining inmates for symptomatic behavior 
are “legion.”134 
As punishment for their disruptive conduct, inmates with mental 
illnesses may lose good-time credits earned, be placed in disciplinary 
segregation, and eventually (unlike many non-ill prisoners) serve most or 
all of their maximum sentences.
135
  Indeed, the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
has documented that inmates with mental illnesses, on average, tend to 
spend five months longer in prison than state prisoners without mental 
disorders.
136
  Much of this time may be spent in solitary confinement, 
which may exacerbate inmates’ mental illnesses or lead to psychosis. 
D. PREVALENCE OF AND EXPERIENCE IN SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT 
Prisons may place inmates with mental illnesses in solitary 
confinement in response to disciplinary violations, their perceived need for 
protective custody, or their status designation as dangerous prisoners.
137
  
Particular attention has been paid recently to “supermax” facilities,138 which 
typically hold “dangerous” inmates139 and have proliferated in the United 
States since the 1990s.
140
  Although conditions of solitary confinement 
 
133
Fellner, supra note 111, at 397. 
134
Id.; see also KUPERS, supra note 9, at 31–32. 
135
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 68; Fellner, supra note 111, at 
401–02. 
136
JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 2, at 8 (146 months compared to 141 months). 
137
For a fascinating list of activities or beliefs that have resulted in isolation, see Angela 
A. Allen-Bell, Perception Profiling and Prolonged Solitary Confinement Viewed Through 
the Lens of the Angola 3 Case: When Prison Officials Become Judges, Judges Become 
Visually Challenged, and Justice Becomes Legally Blind, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 763, 
772–76 (2012). 
138
These facilities may be denominated by various monikers, including “control units,” 
“special management units,” “security housing units,” “high security units,” “intensive 
management units,” or “special controls units.”  Haney, supra note 62, at 151 n.1. 
139
Though policies differ somewhat by institution, supermax facilities typically serve as 
a form of administrative segregation, housing inmates deemed to be dangerous or members 
of a disruptive group, such as a gang.  See id. at 127.  Thus, inmates are often kept in solitary 
confinement for an indefinite term “not specifically for what they have done but rather on 
the basis of who someone in authority has judged them to be.” Id. 
140
For a history of supermax facilities and a description of the psychological problems 
that they may cause, see id.  A 2009 New Yorker article estimated the current population 
housed in supermax prisons at 25,000 or more inmates.  See Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW 
YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 42; cf. Heather Y. Bersot & Bruce A. Arrigo, Inmate Mental 
Health, Solitary Confinement, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment: An Ethical and Justice 
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differ among classifications and between facilities,
141
 some commonalities 
exist.
142
  Professor Jeffrey Metzner and Jamie Fellner have summarized the 
stark conditions in solitary confinement in this way: 
Whether in the so-called supermax prisons that have proliferated over the past two 
decades or in segregation (i.e., locked-down housing) units within regular prisons, 
tens of thousands of prisoners spend years locked up 23 to 24 hours a day in small 
cells that frequently have solid steel doors. They live with extensive surveillance and 
security controls, the absence of ordinary social interaction, abnormal environmental 
stimuli, often only three to five hours a week of recreation alone in caged enclosures, 
and little, if any, educational, vocational, or other purposeful activities (i.e., 




Under current prison policies, inmates may be housed in solitary 
confinement for years without relief.
144
  Conditions in protective custody 
are often similar to those in long-term solitary confinement, but with the 
important difference that the stint is, at least in some respects, voluntary, as 
the confined individual often sought isolation as a means of protection.
145
 
Studies show that inmates with mental illnesses are significantly more 
likely than non-disordered inmates to be placed in segregated units and 
 
Policy Inquiry, 1 J. THEORETICAL & PHIL. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 12–13 (2010) (stating that, while 
the most frequently cited figure for the population in solitary confinement is 20,000 inmates, 
this estimate was obtained from reports compiled in the 1990s using dated findings). 
141 See Carl B. Clements et al., Systemic Issues and Correctional Outcomes: Expanding 
the Scope of Correctional Psychology, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 919, 926 (2007) (criticizing 
scholars’ interchangeable use of such terms as “administrative detention,” “solitary,” 
“isolation,” “super max,” and “protective custody,” and listing contextual variables that may 
vary and affect an individual’s ultimate experience in segregation, including the layout of the 
cell, the size of the exercise yard, and access to recreational equipment, personal effects, and 
services). 
142
See Haney, supra note 62, at 125–27.  For an in-depth look at solitary confinement in 
one prison system, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY 
CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA (1997).  
143
Metzner & Fellner, supra note 61.  For other descriptions of life in solitary 
confinement, see Beven, supra note 62, at 211–12; Haney, supra note 62, at 125–27; Peter 
Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and 
Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 448–49 (2006). 
144
Administrative segregation is often imposed for an indefinite time period.  
Disciplinary segregation, while ordered for a set term, can be extended if the offender 
commits new disciplinary infractions.  Inmates with mental illnesses may be particularly 
likely to violate prison rules as their mental health deteriorates in isolation.  See HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 153 (“Achieving sufficient periods of good behavior to 
secure release from segregation is particularly difficult for mentally ill prisoners. The same 
inability to comply with the rules that got them placed in segregation originally then extends 
the time in isolated confinement.”); Beven, supra note 62, at 214. 
145
See Haney, supra note 62, at 135. 
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supermax facilities.
146
  Estimates vary, but most researchers aver that 
inmates with preexisting mental illnesses comprise 20% to 50% of the total 
solitary population, which is two to three times their prevalence in the 
general prison population.
147
  A 2003 report by Human Rights Watch 
reported that individual state prison figures vary between 23% and 66%.
148
  
One researcher has remarked that “[i]t is impossible to ignore the extremely 
disproportionate rate at which inmates with serious mental illness are 
assigned to [administrative segregation], which has to some degree 
‘shocked the conscience’ of the courts.”149  Commentators have observed 
that prisons with a high proportion of seriously mentally ill inmates in 
solitary confinement often lack adequate mental health services.
150
 
While data suggest that non-disordered inmates often develop a host of 
psychological and physical problems when subjected to prolonged periods 
of solitary confinement,
151
 there is a growing consensus that solitary 
 
146
Bersot & Arrigo, supra note 140, at 7–8 (compiling sources); see also Stanley L. 
Brodsky & Forrest R. Scogin, Inmates in Protective Custody: First Data on Emotional 
Effects, 1 FORENSIC REP. 267, 269–70 (1988). 
147
See, e.g., MAUREEN L. O’KEEFE ET AL., ONE YEAR LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION, at iv (2010), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232973.pdf (estimating that the rate of inmates 
with mental illnesses in administrative segregation is around 50% higher than the rate within 
the general prison population); Bersot & Arrigo, supra note 140, at 13 (“Current findings 
indicate that nearly a third (29%) [of segregated inmates] have been diagnosed with a 
psychiatric disorder.  However, most researchers contend that the number of mentally ill 
incarcerates may be far greater.” (internal citations omitted)); Haney, supra note 62, at 142 
(“Research conducted over the past several decades suggests that somewhere between 10% 
to 20% of mainline prisoners in general in the United States suffer from some form of major 
mental illness.  The percentages in supermax appear to be much higher.  Although too few 
studies have been done to settle on the precise estimates of mentally ill supermax prisoners, 
and the numbers undoubtedly vary some from prison system to prison system, the 
percentages may be as much as twice as high as in the general prisoner population.” (internal 
citations omitted)); cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 142, at 21 (stating that “even the 
staff acknowledges that somewhere between one-half and two-thirds of the inmates [in 
Secured Housing Unit] are mentally ill”). 
148
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 147–49; Fellner, supra note 111, at 403 
n.54. 
149
O’KEEFE ET AL., supra note 147, at x (internal citations omitted).   
150
See 1 FRED COHEN, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED INMATE AND THE LAW ¶ 11.1 (2d ed. 
2008); Haney, supra note 62, at 143 (“Especially for prison systems that lack sufficient 
resources to adequately address the needs of their mentally ill mainline prisoners, 
disciplinary isolation and supermax confinement seems to offer a neat solution to an 
otherwise difficult dilemma.  In such systems, supermax becomes the default placement for 
disruptive, troublesome, or inconvenient mentally ill prisoners.”). 
151
See, e.g., KUPERS, supra note 9, at 53–58; Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 146, at 279 
(“When inmates are subjected to extensive cell confinement and deprivation of activities and 
stimulation, a majority can be expected to report moderate to serious psychological 
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confinement is particularly damaging and dangerous for inmates with 
preexisting mental illnesses.
152
  When faced with severely limited social 
contact and productive activity, individuals with mental illnesses are even 
more vulnerable to decompensation, psychotic break, and suicide 
ideation.
153
  Inmates suffering from schizophrenia, chronic depression, 
 
symptoms.”); Stuart Grassian & Nancy Friedman, Effects of Sensory Deprivation in 
Psychiatric Seclusion and Solitary Confinement, 8 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 49, 53–54 
(1986); Haney, supra note 62, at 132 (“[T]here is not a single published study of solitary or 
supermax-like confinement in which nonvoluntary confinement lasting for longer than 10 
days, where participants were unable to terminate their isolation at will, that failed to result 
in negative psychological effects.”); Smith, supra note 143 (exhaustively reviewing 
historical and contemporary studies and concluding that “[r]esearch suggests that between 
one-third and more than 90 percent [of inmates] experience adverse symptoms in solitary 
confinement, and a significant amount of this suffering is caused or worsened by solitary 
confinement”).  But see O’KEEFE ET AL., supra note 147, at 78 (finding that negative 
psychological and cognitive symptoms manifested by segregated offenders were not unique 
to the administrative segregation environment); Clements et al., supra note 141, at 925–26 
(arguing that research on the effects of segregation is inconclusive, given the diversity 
among segregation experiences); Jeffrey Metzner & Joel Dvoskin, An Overview of 
Correctional Psychiatry, 29 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 761, 765 (2006) (asserting that, 
“[d]espite claims to the contrary, it is not currently clear whether, how often, and under what 
circumstances such [long-term] confinement causes persons [without preexisting mental 
illness] to develop serious mental illness”). 
152
See, e.g., Fellner, supra note 111, at 403 (“Prisoners with preexisting psychiatric 
disorders are at even greater risk of suffering psychological deterioration while in 
segregation.  The stresses, social isolation, and restrictions of segregated confinement can 
exacerbate their illness or provoke a recurrence, immeasurably increasing their pain and 
suffering.”); Metzner & Fellner, supra note 61, at 104–05.  See generally HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 142, at 39–40 (discussing expert and court opinions on vulnerability of 
offenders with mental illnesses to exacerbation and onset of new mental illnesses when 
housed in solitary confinement); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 149–53 
(discussing the impact of isolation on inmates with mental illnesses); KUPERS, supra note 9, 
at 61–64; cf. O’KEEFE ET AL., supra note 147, at 82 (finding that “inmates with serious 
mental illness are less likely to improve in segregation and are less likely to get worse 
compared to mentally ill inmates in [the general population]”).  But see Kenneth Adams & 
Joseph Ferrandino, Managing Mentally Ill Inmates in Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
913, 921 (2008) (suggesting that research on the effects of segregation is inconclusive).  
153
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 147, at 38–39; Terry A. Kupers, What 
to Do with the Survivors? Coping with the Long-Term Effects of Isolated Confinement, 35 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005, 1014 (2008).  Studies have documented the link between 
isolation and increased risk of suicide.  See CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., MENTAL HEALTH IN THE 
HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS 57 (2004), available at www.correctionalassociation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2004/06/Mental-Health.pdf (finding that, between 1998 and April 2004, 
34% of prison suicides occurred in disciplinary lockdown, although inmates in these units 
comprised less than 7% of the total prison population); Bersot & Arrigo, supra note 140, at 
17 (reporting on a 2006 study of the California prison system that found that 70% of inmates 
who committed suicide over a one-year period had been housed in long-term solitary 
confinement); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 179–81 (discussing the 
increased risk of suicide in segregation units and providing examples of individual state 
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borderline personality disorder, or an impulsive personality are especially at 
risk.
154
  Professor Terry Kupers has described the effect of solitary 
confinement on various mental illnesses in this fashion: 
[The impact] depends on what the mental illness is.  Prisoners who are prone to 
depression and have had past depressive episodes will become very depressed in 
isolated confinement.  People who are prone to suicide ideation and attempts will 
become more suicidal in that setting.  People who are prone to disorders of mood, 
either bipolar . . . or depressive will become that and will have a breakdown in that 
direction.  And people who are psychotic in any way . . . those people will tend to 
start losing touch with reality because of the lack of feedback and the lack of social 
interaction and will have another breakdown . . . .
155
 
In light of such evidence, several courts have found that prolonged 
confinement of inmates with preexisting serious mental illnesses in 
extremely isolated conditions constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
156
  In addition, some human rights 
experts agree that isolating inmates with preexisting major mental illnesses 







Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1236 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also 1 COHEN, 
supra note 150, ¶ 11.2, at 11-15; Grassian & Friedman, supra note 151, at 60. 
155
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 53, at 152 (quoting Testimony of Dr. Terry 
Kupers, Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001)). 
156
See Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1279–80 (“With respect to the SHU [Special Housing 
Unit at California’s Pelican Bay prison], defendants cross the constitutional line when they 
force certain subgroups of the prison population, including the mentally ill, to endure the 
conditions in the SHU, despite knowing that the likely consequence for such inmates is 
serious injury to their mental health, and despite the fact that certain conditions in the SHU 
have a relationship to legitimate security interests that is tangential at best.”); Jones ‘El, 164 
F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (holding that imprisoning inmates with serious mental illnesses at 
Wisconsin’s supermax facility has “more than a negligible chance” of constituting cruel and 
usual punishment).  Largely in response to such litigation, some states—including Ohio, 
California, Illinois, Wisconsin, and recently New York—now exclude inmates with serious 
mental illnesses from confinement in supermax facilities.  See Metzner & Dvoskin, supra 
note 151, at 763; Agreement Reached on SHU Bill—Will Help Enhance Quality of Life for 
Many New Yorkers with Psychiatric Disabilities in Prisons, MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N IN N.Y. 
STATE (Jul. 19, 2007), http://www.mhanys.org/publications/mhupdate/update070719.htm.  
For a discussion of these cases and the constitutionality of housing inmates with mental 
illnesses in solitary confinement, see 1 COHEN, supra note 150, at ch. 11; Haney, supra note 
62, at 145–48. 
157
See Metzner & Fellner, supra note 61 (citing the Human Rights Committee Against 
Torture and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and stating: “Whatever one’s 
views on supermax confinement in general, human rights experts agree that its use for 
inmates with serious mental illness violates their human rights”). 
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In summary, offenders with major mental disorders face a substantial 
risk of serious physical and mental harm in prison
158
 and are significantly 
more vulnerable to these harms than non-ill offenders.  Inmates with serious 
mental illnesses are more likely than non-disordered offenders to 
experience physical victimization and rape or other forms of sexual 
victimization.  This trauma may exacerbate existing illnesses and lead to the 
onset of new disorders.  Offenders with major mental illnesses are less 
likely to adapt successfully to prison life and therefore have higher rates of 
disciplinary infraction.  On account of their heightened vulnerability and 
high infraction rates, offenders with mental illnesses are disproportionately 
likely to be confined in isolation.  There, inmates experience predictable 
worsening of their disorders.  All of these factors, in combination, work to 
subject seriously mentally ill inmates, on average, to greater suffering 
during their incarceration than that endured by their non-disordered 
counterparts. 
Although the studies described above establish the differential 
vulnerability of prisoners with major mental disorders, limitations in the 
data may affect their use in particularized risk assessment.
159
  For instance, 
it is clear that offenders with mental illnesses are disproportionately kept in 
some state of segregation
160
 and that “many” of these individuals will suffer 
acute psychological deterioration and distress.
161
  But precise data are 
lacking regarding the likelihood of mental decompensation for an 
individual with a particular disorder resulting from confinement for any 
given period of time and set of conditions, and whether any damage 
suffered is permanent or temporary.  In addition, little is known about the 
extent to which variables in segregation experience—such as the physical 
layout of cells, access to personal effects, and programming opportunities—
may impact the psychological harm suffered by prisoners with serious 
mental disorders.
162
  We are left with only a general sense that some 
 
158
See supra note 54. 
159
See Nancy Wolff, Courting the Court: Courts as Agents for Treatment and Justice, in 
COMMUNITY-BASED INTERVENTIONS FOR CRIMINAL OFFENDERS WITH SEVERE MENTAL 
ILLNESS 143, 157–58 (William H. Fisher ed., 2003) (highlighting limitations in available data 
and arguing that unfounded generalizations about the distributional properties of the 
antitherapeutic impact of incarceration on offenders with mental illnesses should not be used 
to support differential treatment under the law).  
160
See supra notes 141, 146–149. 
161
See, e.g., Metzner & Dvoskin, supra note 151, at 763 (“There is general consensus 
among clinicians that placement of inmates with serious mental illnesses in these settings is 
contraindicated because many of these inmates’ psychiatric conditions will clinically 
deteriorate or not improve.”). 
162 See Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 152, at 921; Clements et al., supra note 141, at 
925–26 (2007).  
180 E. LEA JOHNSTON [Vol. 103 
segments of the mentally ill population—presumably those with the 
greatest difficulty complying with prison rules and those with the greatest 
vulnerability to abuse—are more likely than non-ill offenders to be housed 
in some state of segregation and that, once there, they are more likely to 
suffer psychological harm. 
Moreover, most studies do not include subjects’ treatment histories, so 
it is difficult to predict how an individual’s treatment with drugs or 
psychotherapy may reduce his likelihood of victimization, rule infraction, 
or mental deterioration in prison.  It is possible, for instance, that the less 
manifest a person’s symptoms, the more his risk profile will resemble that 
of a non-ill offender.  On the other hand, some researchers have suggested 
that receiving pharmaceuticals or speaking with mental health 
professionals—steps typically necessary for attaining or maintaining mental 
health—may signal a person’s vulnerability, and that abusers may target 
persons observed receiving such treatment for victimization.
163
  In addition, 
the drugs used to treat Axis I disorders often carry side effects that render 
individuals vulnerable to attack.  Psychotropic medications, for instance, 
may produce uncontrolled bodily movements, drowsiness, and slowed 
reaction time, which can diminish an individual’s ability to detect danger 
and defend himself against assault.
164
  Finally, studies that have analyzed 
the experiences of prisoners with major mental illnesses have not compared 
their experiences to those of inmates with other vulnerabilities, such as 
diminutive stature, effeminate appearance, homosexuality, bisexuality, 
mental retardation, or physical disability.  It is therefore unclear how a 
particular mental disorder compares to other risk factors in terms of 
potency,
165
 and this Article does not purport to create a hierarchy of 
vulnerabilities for purposes of proportionate punishment.
166
 
Despite limitations in the data, evidence demonstrates that offenders 
with serious mental illnesses face heightened vulnerability to serious harm 
in prison as compared to non-ill inmates.  Statistical risk alone, however, 
may not merit a change in sentencing.
167
  To warrant sentencing 
 
163
See PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION REPORT, supra note 102, at 73 (“[M]edications are 
often dispensed in open areas of the facility during peak traffic periods, such as around meal 
times, effectively ‘outing’ people with a mental illness.”). 
164




See infra note 221 (drawing upon the work of Professor Uma Narayan to suggest that 
it might be morally defensible to limit sentencing accommodation for foreseeable harm to 
certain vulnerabilities).  
167
Cf. Kenneth W. Simons, Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2012) (distinguishing between statistical and individualized knowledge for purposes of 
culpability determinations).  
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accommodation, an offender with a serious mental illness may need to 
make a particularized showing that harm is probable in his case.
168
  In many 
instances an individualized showing of likelihood of serious harm will be 
possible given prior patterns of behavior, a personal history of abuse, and a 
constellation of other risk factors that can be brought to a judge’s attention 
at a sentencing hearing.
169
  Defense counsel or the court could possibly 
even use a risk-assessment instrument, currently utilized in prisons for 
purposes of housing assignments, to measure an individual’s risk of 
experiencing prison violence at the hands of other inmates.
170
 
In response to individuals’ foreseeable vulnerability to serious harm in 
prison, some courts have reduced offenders’ terms of confinement or 
ordered sanctions other than incarceration.
171
 Judges have granted 







See id. at 36–44 (setting forth and defending the “special stringency principle” for 
highly concentrated risks, which “explains the presumptive unjustifiability of acting with 
individualized knowledge” of serious harm, as opposed to mere statistical knowledge). 
169
Risk factors for sexual assault identified by the Attorney General in May 2012 in the 
National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape include mental disorder; 
physical or developmental disability; youth; diminutive stature; first incarceration in prison 
or jail; nonviolent history; sexual offender status; whether the inmate is likely to be 
perceived as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex, or gender nonconforming; 
previous sexual victimization; and the inmate’s own perception of vulnerability.  See 
National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape § 115.41, 76 Fed. Reg. 
6248, 6280 (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115) [hereinafter National Standards for Prison 
Rape], available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_final_rule.pdf; see also PRISON 
RAPE ELIMINATION REPORT, supra note 102, at 7–8, 69–74. 
170
See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN & PATRICIA L. HARDYMAN, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., OBJECTIVE 
PRISON CLASSIFICATION: A GUIDE FOR CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES (2004), available at 
http://nicic.gov/Library/019319 (reviewing the current state of prison classification 
procedures and providing guidelines for implementing classification systems); PATRICIA L. 
HARDYMAN, ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., INTERNAL PRISON CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS: 
CASE STUDIES IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 2–4 (2002), available at 
http://nicic.gov/Library/017381 (describing the Adult Internal Management System (AIMS), 
whose purpose is “to reduce institutional predatory behavior by identifying predators and 
separating them from vulnerable inmates,” and which is utilized by several facilities in the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons and by several state departments of corrections); id. at app. 
(including copies of the AIMS checklists used by the Missouri Department of Corrections); 
PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION REPORT, supra note 102, at 75–77 (recommending adoption of 
national standards for screening of all offenders for risk of victimization and abusiveness).  
Congress recently mandated that all federal confinement facilities assess inmates during 
intake and upon transfer for their risk of sexual victimization by other inmates.  National 
Standards for Prison Rape, supra note 169, at § 115.41. 
171
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (discussing states’ abilities to depart 
from presumptive sentences on the basis of offender hardship and predicted vulnerability to 
harm). 
172
See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that 
“extreme vulnerability to assault in prison may be a ground for departure” under 18 U.S.C. 
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victimization.  Judges have reduced sentences when they expect individuals 
to spend a significant portion of their prison terms in solitary 
confinement.
174
  Finally, courts, fearing that offenders’ time in prison might 
end in suicide or self-harm, have modified offenders’ sentences based on 
offenders’ depressed mental states or likelihood of mental deterioration.175 
 
§ 3553(b) and, “to qualify for a downward departure, a defendant’s vulnerability must be so 
extreme as to substantially affect the severity of confinement, such as where only solitary 
confinement can protect the defendant from abuse”); United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 
1277–78 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding the lower court’s downward departure under U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINE § 5H1.4 based on reports that the defendant “would be exceedingly 
vulnerable to victimization and potentially fatal injuries”); United States v. Cotto, 793 F. 
Supp. 64, 65, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (granting a downward departure under U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINE § 5K2.13 in part because the defendant’s “dull mien, general slackness, and 
extreme passivity . . . make it unlikely that he could resist attacks of predatory fellow 
inmates during a long prison term”). 
173
See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1990) (granting a 
downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE § 5H.13 
based on the defendant’s “particular vulnerability due to his immature appearance, sexual 
orientation and fragility,” which created an extraordinary situation); United States v. Rausch, 
570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302, 1308 n.8 (D. Colo. 2008) (assigning a more lenient sentence in 
part because the defendant “may be easily taken advantage of by others, especially given his 
physical limitations and medical disabilities”); United States v. Ruff, 998 F. Supp. 1351, 
1354–60 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (granting the defendant, who was effeminate, was slight of build, 
and had a history of sexual victimization, a downward departure because he “is vulnerable to 
sexual assault and victimization” and recognizing “not only the unconscionable 
commonality of sexual violence in this nation’s prisons, but also the heightened risks facing 
an inmate with [the defendant’s] personal characteristics”).  
174
See, e.g., Lara, 905 F.2d at 603 (recognizing that the defendant’s protective 
placement in solitary confinement “exacerbated” the “severity of [his] prison term” and 
justified a downward departure in sentencing under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §§ 5H1.3 
and 5H1.4); United States v. Noriega, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1379–80 (S.D. Fla. 1999) 
(reducing the defendant’s sentence after finding that he had been confined to a type of 
“social isolation” that was considered “a more difficult (‘harder’) type of confinement than 
in general population,” and claiming that, “if there was some divine way one could equate 
the nature of Defendant’s confinement to that which would be more normal, I suppose we 
would find that he has in fact done more time now than the [actual] years which have 
passed”); United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting the 
homosexual defendants a downward departure in part because “homosexual defendants may 
need to be removed from the general prison population for their own safety,” which “would 
amount to a sentence of almost solitary confinement, a penalty more difficult to endure than 
any ordinary incarceration”). 
175
See, e.g., United States v. Boutot, 480 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419, 421 (D. Me. 2007) 
(granting a downward departure because the court was “concerned about the impact that 
serving a prison term with the general inmate population would have” on the defendant, who 
was prone to mental decomposition when not adequately treated); United States v. Roach, 
No. 00 CR 411, 2005 WL 2035653, at *6–8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2005) (finding “that[,] absent 
continuing and appropriate psychotherapy, [the defendant] will be placed at significant risk 
of a relapse to serious depression, placing her at risk of suicide . . . ,” and thus reducing the 
defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to allow for treatment); United States v. 
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This Article looks to just desert theory to discern why and how 
vulnerability to serious harm should factor into sentencing. The next Part 
outlines several justifications, each rooted in proportionality analysis.
176
  To 
comprehend why foreseeable risk of serious harm should be relevant to 
proportionate punishment, however, it is necessary first to endorse an 
understanding of punishment capacious enough to include such risks. 
III. HOW VULNERABILITY MAY AFFECT THE DISTRIBUTION  
OF DESERVED PUNISHMENT 
While philosophers, scholars, and policymakers have argued for 
centuries over the proper justification for state-imposed punishment, less 
attention has been paid to theories governing the allocation of 
punishment.
177
  Critically, the principles that justify the power of the state 
to impose punishment may differ from those that control the distribution of 
punishment—the type and quantity of punishment the state should order a 
particular offender to suffer for a particular crime relative to the penalties 
other offenders should receive for their offenses.
178
  Given the great variety 
 
Ribot, 97 F. Supp. 2d 74, 84 (D. Mass. 1999) (emphasizing the defendant’s twenty-five year 
struggle with depression and prior suicide attempt and granting a downward departure under 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §§ 5H1.3 and 5K2.13 in part because “sending [the defendant] 
to prison would aggravate his major depressive disorder with potentially life threatening 
consequences”); People v. Jackson, Nos. 282708, 284430, 2009 WL 1361956, at *3 (Mich. 
Ct. App. May 14, 2009) (upholding the lower court’s reduction of the defendant’s sentence 
based in part on “her suicidal ideations”); People v. Zung, 531 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615–16 (App. 
Div. 1988) (substituting the punishment of community service for imprisonment in part 
because “uncontroverted medical documents indicate that a period of incarceration would be 
severely detrimental to this defendant’s mental health, and could possibly exacerbate his 
suicidal tendencies”). 
176
A rigorous analysis of each option is beyond the scope of this Article but will be 
explicated in future work.  
177
See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences: A Desert Perspective, in WHY 
PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT, infra note 191, at 207, 207 (describing the 
origins of desert theory and estimating that the movement toward proportionality-based 
sentencing began with the publication of AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971)); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of 
Punishment: From “Why Punish?” to “How Much?,” 1 CRIM. L.F. 259, 259–60 (1990) 
[hereinafter Proportionality] (“Recent philosophical writing about punishment has been 
devoted mainly to the ‘why punish?’ question . . . .  The philosophical writings have paid 
comparatively little attention to the criteria for distributing punishments—particularly to the 
criteria for deciding how much to penalize convicted offenders.”). 
178
See Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and the Impact 
of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW 
VON HIRSCH 251, 252–53 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998) [hereinafter 
FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY] (distinguishing between justifying the censure of 
wrongdoers and the imposition of hard treatment); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4 (1968) (stressing the importance of 
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and sheer number of offenses and offender characteristics, and the 
competing norms at stake, elucidating a defensible distributive theory is a 
difficult question of tremendous practical significance.
179
 
There are numerous strands of retributivism,
180
 but one dominant 
viewpoint holds that state-imposed punishment serves to express blame or 
censure.
181
  Professor Joel Feinberg first observed that punishment has a 
denunciatory aspect: “[P]unishment is a conventional device for the 
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of 
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority 
himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”182  While 
 
parsing questions concerning the general justifying aim of punishment and its distribution); 
Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as 
Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1089–90 (2010). 
179
See Robinson, supra note 178, at 1089–90. 
180
Retributivism defies easy definition.  See Mitchell N. Berman, The Justification of 
Punishment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Andrei Marmor ed., 
2012); John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238 (1979) (delineating nine 
distinct retributivist theories); Mitchell N. Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism 1 (July 19, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117619 (“Even if we 
limit consideration to those central or paradigmatic forms of retributivism that would justify 
punishment in terms of an offender’s negative desert, particular accounts espouse different 
positions regarding, for example, just what it is that offender’s [sic] deserve, in virtue of 
what they deserve it, and what justifies the state in endeavoring to realize those deserts.”).  A 
traditional variant of retributivism theorizes that deserved punishment, justified by the moral 
culpability and desert of the offender, is an intrinsic good.  See G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS 
OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 127 (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821) 
(“[T]he universal feeling of peoples and individuals towards crime is, and always has been, 
that it deserves to be punished, and that what the criminal has done should also happen to 
him.”); Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, 
AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (“Retributivism is the view 
that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive it.  A retributivist 
punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.”).  Other retributivists, 
however, view punishment as an instrumental good and suggest that it may promote crime 
control or provide pleasure or utility.  See Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, in 
RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY (Mark D. White ed., 2011).  For recent 
scholarship complicating the dominant understanding of retributivism, and challenging the 
strict divide between retributivist and consequentialist theories of punishment, see Mitchell 
N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 
433 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011). 
181
See BARBARA A. HUDSON, UNDERSTANDING JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO IDEAS, 
PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES IN MODERN PENAL THEORY 47 (2d ed. 2003) (“Most 
retributivists in justification . . . emphasize the denunciation aspect of punishment. . . .  The 
degree of severity of a penalty announced marks the degree of disapproval of the crime.  
This censure is said by retributivists to be the core characteristic and function of 
punishment.” (internal citations omitted)).   
182
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 400 (1965), 
reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 95, 98 (1970). 
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few would disagree with this descriptive account, more controversial has 
been some scholars’ assertion that the distribution of punishment can be 
justified as a means of expressing a certain quantum of censure.
183
  Modern 
desert theorists have distinguished between justifying the censure of 
criminals and justifying the imposition of the hard treatment typically 
inherent in state punishment.
184
  According to some expressive 
perspectives, the hard treatment inherent in a criminal sanction should 
reflect the degree of censure appropriate for an offender’s 
blameworthiness.
185
  This viewpoint inspired the development of just desert 
theory, which rose to prominence in the late 1970s as a means of curtailing 




Just desert theory, which has been propounded most thoroughly and 
effectively by Professor Andrew von Hirsch,
187
 purports to allocate 
 
183
See supra note 181.  For examples of scholars who have defended expressive 
accounts of punishment, see, e.g., DUFF, supra note 30, at 233–66; ROBERT NOZICK, 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363–97 (1981); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative 
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Igor Primoratz, Punishment as Language, 
64 PHIL. 187 (1989).  Expressive accounts of punishment have generated intense criticism.  
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 180, at 181; Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1414–27 (2000); Michael Davis, Punishment 
as Language: Misleading Analogy for Desert Theorists, 10 LAW & PHIL. 311, 312 (1991).  
Professor von Hirsch has embraced the view that communication of censure provides the 
dominant justifying aim for punishment, but that the hard treatment in punishment also 
“serves as a prudential reason for obedience to those insufficiently motivated by the penal 
censure’s moral appeal.”  Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences: A Desert 
Perspective, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 115, 116–18 
(Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) [hereinafter PRINCIPLED SENTENCING]. Von 
Hirsch stresses that prudential reasons “should supplement rather than replace the normative 
reasons for desisting from crime conveyed by penal censure—that is, it provides an 
additional reason for compliance to those who are capable of recognizing the law’s moral 
demands, but who are also tempted to disobey them.”  Id. at 118; see also R.A. Duff, 
Punishment, Retribution and Communication, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra, at 126, 
128–29 [hereinafter Punishment]  (characterizing von Hirsch’s rationale for using hard 
treatment as the medium of communication of censure).   
184
See Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 252 (citing R.A. Duff, Andrew von 
Hirsch, and Uma Narayan). 
185
See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 132 (2001); von 
Hirsch, supra note 177, at 277.  This Article adopts a similar position.   
186
See Frederic R. Kellogg, From Retribution to “Desert,” 15 CRIMINOLOGY 179 (1978) 
(describing the origins of the desert movement); Malcolm Thornburn & Allan Manson, The 
Sentencing Theory Debate: Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 278, 280–81 (2007) (reviewing VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27). 
187
Von Hirsch developed and refined his sentencing theory over the course of four 
books, see infra note 283, and is widely regarded as a leading just desert theorist.  See, e.g., 
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 17 (1996) (describing von Hirsch as “the most 
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punishment according to a proportionality equation involving culpability, 
seriousness of harm, and severity of penalty.
188
  A chief aim of desert 
theory is to translate retributivism’s general call for just punishment into a 
workable scheme to guide sentencing policy and individual sentencing 
decisions.
189
  Desert theory gives “conceptions of justice a central role in 
sentencing policy” through the mechanism of proportionality, which is 
intended to ensure that penal sanctions fairly reflect the culpability of an 
offender and the harmfulness of his offense.
190
  One especially relevant 
concern of desert theorists is whether, and how, to take into account the 
differential impact of certain penalties on vulnerable populations of 
offenders.
191
  Desert theory, in light of its prominence and explicit aim to 
determine the proper amount of punishment in individual cases, should 
inform the current debate over retributivism’s accommodation of 
foreseeable risk of harm. 
As will be explained in Part III.B, just desert theory measures a 
penalty’s severity by how the sanction typically affects an offender’s 




influential modern proponent of just desert theories”); Thornburn & Manson, supra note 
186, at 309 (reviewing VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27) (describing VON HIRSCH & 
ASHWORTH, supra note 27, as “the best account yet of a theoretically-based sentencing 
model that fulfills the fundamental justice goal of providing a judge with a clear and 
principled basis to explain the imposition of state punishment”). 
188
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 4 (“The desert rationale rests on the 
idea that the penal sanction should fairly reflect the degree of reprehensibleness (that is, the 
harmfulness and culpability) of the actor’s conduct.”); see infra note 289. 
189
See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 183, at 115–16 (“Desert theories for sentencing have 
had the attraction that they purport to be about just outcomes: the emphasis is on what the 
offender should fairly receive for his crime, rather than how his punishment might affect his 
future behaviour or that of others.”).  See generally infra notes 283–304 and accompanying 
text. 
190
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 4 (“Proportionalist sentencing is 
designed to avoid unjust results—through giving conceptions of justice a central role in 
sentencing policy.  The desert rationale rests on the idea that the penal sanction should fairly 
reflect the degree of reprehensibleness (that is, the harmfulness and culpability) of the 
actor’s conduct.”). 
191
See infra Part III.B.3.  Additional issues of concern include how to order offenses to 
reflect their relative seriousness, whether previous convictions should affect seriousness 
judgments, how to order penalties to reflect their relative severity, how to link particular 
penalties with particular crimes, how to anchor penalty systems, how to space penalties 
along a penalty scale, where to draw the line in the rank ordering of offenses between 
incarceration and other penal options, how to determine if penalties are too severe or too 
lenient to perform the justifying aim of punishment, and how much (if at all) to take into 
account utilitarian concerns.  For sources addressing some of these topics, see generally VON 
HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27; FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY, supra note 
178; WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT (Michael Tonry ed., 2010). 
192
See infra notes 336–343 and accompanying text. 
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Given desert theory’s focus on deprivations as typically experienced by 
offenders (as opposed to considering only those hardships intended by a 
sentencing authority), the theory appears to rely upon an understanding of 
punishment broad enough to encompass at least foreseeable, substantial 
risks of serious harm, proximately caused by the state in the context of 
incarceration.
193
  This appears especially true for one strand of desert 
theory—that developing and applying the “equal-impact principle”—which 
is premised upon a recognition that particular sanctions typically pose 
significant and foreseeable (but presumably unintended) hardships for 
offenders with certain handicaps.
194
  For that reason this Article will 
stipulate to and partially defend a definition of punishment ample enough to 
include foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm that is proximately 
caused by the state.
195
  Recently scholars have debated whether punishment 
should include foreseeable risks of harm and from whose perspective the 
severity of a penalty should be measured.
196
  Offering a full defense of a 
 
193
Andrew von Hirsch has defined punishment without limiting it to deprivations or 
hard treatment intended by the state: “Punishment (for our purposes) means the infliction by 
the state of consequences normally considered unpleasant, on a person in response to his 
having been convicted of a crime.”  ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF 
PUNISHMENTS 35 (1976).  He derived this definition from the iconic and narrower definition 
crafted by H.L.A. Hart, so von Hirsch’s decision to allow punishment to extend beyond 
intended hardships appears to have been purposeful.  See id. at n.1 (citing HART, supra note 
178); see also infra note 197. 
194
See infra Part III.B.3; VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 176 (explaining 
that the aim of the equal-impact principle, when applied in the case of an offender with a 
physical handicap, is to make “adjustments in sentence to deal with certain foreseeable 
differential impacts”).   
195
This Article largely avoids exploring the important remedial implications of 
embracing a definition of punishment that includes foreseeable, substantial risks of serious 
harm. 
196
See JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A CRITICAL 
INVESTIGATION 111–13 (2004) (arguing that punishment should not be confined to 
intentional consequences); Bronsteen et al., supra note 34, at 1482–95 (arguing that 
punishment includes reasonably foreseeable acts proximately caused by the state); Gray, 
supra note 32, at 1622 (arguing that “punishment should be described, accounted for, and 
justified on objective grounds without reference to the subjective experiences of particular 
offenders”); Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 35, at 185–86 (arguing that 
sentencing should reflect offenders’ subjective experiences of punishment); Kolber, 
Unintentional Punishment, supra note 36, at 2–3 (arguing that retributivism must measure 
and take account of unintentional harms associated with punishment to ensure that the 
punishment is just); Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 961 (arguing that “if the ancillary 
burden the inmate experiences during his imprisonment lacks authorization, then we cannot 
equate that burden with justified, authorized punishment; thus, it does not necessarily 
warrant relief from otherwise justified and authorized punishment”).  These issues have also 
been debated within the context of the Eighth Amendment.  See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 
54, at 897–908 (arguing that all state-created prison conditions constitute punishment for 
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particular definition or theory of punishment is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but the following section will highlight some of the main arguments 
in favor of extending punishment beyond intentional deprivations as well as 
offer additional support, derived from an expressive view of punishment, 
for why evaluation of punishment severity for purposes of sentencing 
should include foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm that is 
proximately caused by the state in the context of incarceration. 
A. “PUNISHMENT,” RISK OF SERIOUS HARM, AND PENAL 
SEVERITY 
Criminal punishment is, broadly speaking, the state’s imposition of a 
typically unpleasant condition on an individual in response to that 
individual’s violation of a legal rule.197  Traditionally, philosophers and 
legal scholars have defined punishment as consisting only of hardships or 
deprivations intended and authorized by a legitimate sentencing 
authority.
198
  Recently, Professors Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, and David 
 
Eighth Amendment purposes); Thomas K. Landry, “Punishment” and the Eighth 
Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1607, 1607 (1996) (advancing a governmentalist definition of 
punishment, which includes the express terms of the penal statute and sentence, and those 
conditions and events in prison that are attributable to the punitive intent of the government 
in its role in controlling the machinery of punishment); Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 167–71 (2006) (arguing that, “when a person is sentenced to 
prison as criminal punishment, the standard and foreseeable conditions of incarceration,” 
including sexual violence, “are part of that punishment”); Ristroph, supra note 30, at 1391–
94 (discussing the work of David Enoch, who has argued that the state’s reliance on the 
intention–foresight distinction is often an attempt to evade moral responsibility and that state 
actors should assume special responsibility for the foreseen effects of their actions).  My 
ultimate conclusion largely coheres, at least with respect to foreseeable risk of serious harm, 
with those reached by Professors Kolber, Ristroph, Dolovich, Enoch, Bronsteen, 
Buccafusco, and Masur, though for reasons slightly different from the ones they express. 
197
See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 185, at xiv–xv (observing that “punishment is, typically, 
something intended to be burdensome or painful, imposed on a (supposed) offender for a 
(supposed) offense by someone with (supposedly) the authority to do so”); HART, supra note 
178, at 4–5 (defining punishment as the imposition of something unpleasant for a legal 
offense on a supposed offender by a person who intends to administer such punishment 
within the framework of a legitimate legal authority); VON HIRSCH, supra note 193, at 35 
(“Punishment . . . means the infliction by the state of consequences normally considered 
unpleasant, on a person in response to his having been convicted of a crime.”).  Scholars 
disagree as to whether the harm of punishment should be confined to intentional 
deprivations of liberty or whether the harm may also include intentional suffering.  See 
Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 36, at 20 nn.41–43 (making this observation 
and collecting sources). 
198
See supra note 197; Richard A. Wasserstrom, Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
SOCIAL ISSUES 112, 112 (1980) (“Punishment, whatever else may be said of it, involves the 
intentional infliction of pain and suffering upon human beings by other human beings.”); 
Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg’s Liberal Theory of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 
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Gray have defended a similar conception of punishment.
199
  Under this 
formulation, the kinds of experience described in Part II—physical and 
sexual assault by inmates and prison guards, and mental deterioration from 
extended stints of solitary confinement—would not constitute punishment.  
Physical and sexual assault are both unlawful and are unintended by a 
sentencing authority.  If these harms fall outside the realm of punishment, 
then a sentencing judge may be under no obligation to consider the 





111–12 (2001) (observing that the definitions of punishment offered by Joel Feinberg, 
Stanley Benn, Antony Flew, H.L.A. Hart, and John Rawls all specify that deprivations or 
suffering imposed on a person for a legal wrong must be “intended” by a recognized legal 
authority); Richard W. Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. PHIL. 193, 193, 194 
n.1 (1982) (adopting Anthony Flew’s definition of punishment and stating that punishment 
“involves the intentional infliction of suffering”); Anthony Flew, The Justification of 
Punishment, 29 PHIL. 291, 293–95 (1954) (defining punishment as the suffering of an 
offender for his offense imposed intentionally by human agencies in connection with a 
system of laws); see also Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 36, at 5 & n.9 
(“Criminal law scholars widely agree that in order for some conduct to constitute 
punishment, it must be intentionally imposed.”).  As early at the 1930s, philosophers 
distinguished “punishment” as an intentional deprivation of liberty from “its accessories,” 
including both the foreseeable and unforeseeable consequences of such deprivation.  See 
J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 165 (1939) (“When a man is sentenced to 
imprisonment he is not sentenced also to partial starvation, to physical brutality, to 
pneumonia from damp cells and so on.  And any movement which makes his food sufficient 
to sustain health, which counters the permanent tendency to brutality on the part of his 
warders, which gives him a dry or even a light and well-aired cell, is pure gain and does not 
touch the theory of punishment.”). 
199
See Gray, supra note 32, at 1653 (arguing that, “because it is incidental, objectivist 
forms of retributivism . . . bear no burden to justify . . . additional or surplus suffering 
because it is not ‘punishment,’ and therefore is not justified”); Markel & Flanders, supra 
note 8, at 959–64 (challenging Kolber’s argument that a just punishment system calls for 
contemplating both intended liberty deprivation and unintended ancillary distress); Dan 
Markel, Chad Flanders & David Gray, Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice 
Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 618 (2011) (asserting that, “[i]f the hardship endured by the 
offender is not authorized, intentionally imposed, and proximately caused by the state, then 
it is a conceptual error to call it ‘punishment’”). 
200
See Gray, supra note 32, at 1648 (“If it is true that some suffering is incidental and 
some not, then it may simply be the case that all the subjective inequalities Kolber and 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur are concerned with, whether measured subjectively, 
comparatively, or diachronically, are incidental to punishment and therefore impose no 
duties of accommodation or accounting on theories of punishment.”).  But see RYBERG, 
supra note 196, at 113 (“What I am claiming, of course, is not that possible differences in 
sensibility or in prison conditions would be irrelevant to the proportionalist sentencer, who 
believes that it is intended severity that counts; if, for instance, there is an intention to punish 
two persons equally severely and the sentencer knows that there are such differences then 
they should be accounted for when the sentencer seeks to carry out the intention.  The 
problem rather is that, if the sentencer is misinformed or lacks information on these matters, 
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Challenging that viewpoint, a number of scholars have recently 
stressed that the state should be morally responsible for the foreseeable 
results of its actions, and some have argued that assessments of a sanction’s 
severity, for purposes of sentencing, should therefore include foreseeable 
risks of harm.
201
  As Professor Alice Ristroph has pointed out, punishment 
is not designed and meted out by a single actor with a single intent, but 
rather consists of a set of practices, with one practice triggering the next.
202
  
Given the numerous and potentially conflicting intentions involved in 
imposing and administering punishment (including the intentions of 
members of a legislature and possibly a sentencing commission, a 
sentencing judge, and prison officials),
203
 differentiating between 
intentional and foreseen punishment can be difficult,
204
 and it is unclear 
whether any difference would hold moral salience.
205
  Professor David 
Enoch has argued that states’ reliance upon the distinction between 
intention and foresight is an attempt to evade moral responsibility and that 
state actors should instead feel heightened responsibility to take into 
account the foreseen effects of their actions.
206
  Professor Jesper Ryberg has 
 
then there will not be reasons concerning justice to object to the resulting punishments as 
long as what was intended did not violate justice.”).  Although Professor Gray appears to 
believe that sentencing judges are not obligated to consider the risk of prison violence in 
sentencing as a matter of proportionate punishment, he argues that “prudence” or mercy may 
call for action by other institutional players.  See, e.g., Gray, supra note 32, at 1692–93.  In 
particular, because such violence is not punishment, it may motivate prison officials to 
modify penal circumstances, supply grounds for a tort claim or criminal action, or, if 
pervasive, require reform of punishment practices.  See id. at 1627, 1630 n.46, 1653, 1670; 
see also Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 961 (“If an unconstitutional tort occurs during 
the punitive encounter, the state’s obligation may reasonably take the form of compensation, 
apology, injunctive relief, or administrative reform.  Such harm to the offender does not 
necessitate the remission of the offender’s balance of punishment; there are other currencies 
the state can use.”).  Professor Gray also suggests that “excessive suffering at the hands of 
other prisoners . . . may well provide good reason for early release from a justly imposed 
term of imprisonment,” and observes with approval that “judges and executive-branch 
officials routinely entertain pleas for mercy from prisoners who have suffered inordinately 
during their incarceration.”  Gray, supra note 32, at 1692. 
201
These arguments have been made both as a matter of moral theory and within the 
context of the Eighth Amendment. 
202
Ristroph, supra note 196, at 168. 
203
See Bronsteen et al., supra note 34, at 1488–89; Ristroph, supra note 30, at 1399–
1400 (observing that “[r]arely can a single coherent intent be attributed to the entire 
institutional apparatus that imposes punishment” and detailing “all the state actions that must 
occur in order for a person to be punished with a prison sentence”); supra note 30. 
204
See Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 36, at 6–7. 
205
Id. at 7; Ristroph, supra note 30, at 1393 (discussing the work of David Enoch). 
206
David Enoch, Intending, Foreseeing, and the State, 13 LEGAL THEORY 69, 91 (2007); 
see also id. at 82 (“A responsible agent, it can be argued, accepts responsibility for all 
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argued through the use of hypotheticals that attempts to exclude foreseeable 
side effects and other unintended aspects of punishment from evaluations of 
punishment severity do not accord with common intuitions of just deserts 
and are “implausible.”207  Professor Adam Kolber has made a compelling 
case for a justification-symmetry principle: namely, “any state actor who 
harms an offender in the name of just punishment must have a justification 
for doing so if you or I would need a justification for causing the same kind 
of harm to nonoffenders” under the criminal law.208  Thus, state actors 
should be required to justify harms that they recklessly or negligently inflict 
upon offenders in the punishment process.
209
  Finally, to the degree that an 
aim of punishment is to convey censure or blame, the state “cannot define 
the content of its messages by authorial fiat,” in the words of Professors 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, but must consider reasonable 
interpretations of its message, which would include foreseeable harms 
associated with a given penalty.
210
 
1. Additional Support for Conceptualizing Certain Foreseeable  
Risks of Harm as Punishment 
An expressive understanding of punishment suggests additional 
reasons why evaluation of punishment severity should extend beyond 
intentional deprivations to consider foreseeable, substantial risks of serious 
harm, proximately caused by the state during confinement.  As stated 
previously, this Article adopts the position that the penalty imposed in 
response to an offender’s crime should communicate society’s disapproval 
and censure.
211
  Thus, it is critical that society view the medium of the 
message (the penalty) as censorious and the penal response as roughly 
 
(foreseen) consequences of her actions, both intended and unintended.  This suspicion—that 
hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction is really just evading responsibility—is 
arguably at least a part of the rationale for the entrenched doctrine of the criminal law, 
according to which under certain circumstances foresight can substitute for intention.”); 
Ristroph, supra note 30, at 1391–94 (discussing the work of David Enoch). 
207
See RYBERG, supra note 196, at 112–13. 
208
See Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 36, at 14–15.  Though Kolber 
argues that the state must take responsibility for the foreseeable results of its actions, he does 
not challenge the “technical” definition of punishment. See also id. at 2 (“[E]ven if the 
unintended side effects of punishment are technically not punishment, the state has a moral 
obligation to take account of the actual or expected ways in which punishment affects 
inmates’ lives.”). 
209
Id. at 3–4. 
210
See Bronsteen et al., supra note 34, at 1487; see also Kolber, Subjective Experience, 
supra note 35, at 208–10 (exploring why offenders’ subjective experiences should matter to 
expressive views of retributivism). 
211
See supra notes 181–184 and accompanying text. 
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proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.
212
  For this reason, some 
scholars have concluded that a penalty should be measured by how society 
perceives the typical offender will experience it.
213
 
It is reasonable, however, to expect that the widespread experience of 
a class of people subjected to a penalty will shape, at least to some extent, 
the public’s perception of the severity and constitution of that penalty, so 
long as the experience of that class is brought to the public’s attention.214  
This should be especially true when published, empirical studies document 
a group’s experience and the class of persons affected can be readily 
identified.
215
  If the public recognizes that offenders with major mental 
illnesses are more vulnerable to serious physical or mental harm in prison 
than non-ill offenders, then it should be inclined to evaluate the severity and 
constitution of carceral penalties for these offenders differently from those 
for non-disordered individuals.  Indeed, evidence suggests that, at least to 
 
212
See Duff, Punishment, Retribution and Communication, supra note 183, at 126, 132 
(explaining that his expressive account of punishment “requires us to attend not just to the 
general meaning of punishment as a mode of censure, but to the distinctive meanings of 
different modes of punishment”); Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming 
Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2086 (2006) (“[C]itizens will expect punishments not only 
to express condemnation but also to express condemnation in a way that coheres with . . . 
their more basic cultural commitments.”); Primoratz, supra note 183, at 201 (“[The 
punishment] has to be appropriate as moral condemnation.  It has to be truthful, just and 
deserved, and to be seen as such, by everyone involved: by those conveying it, and by all 
those to whom it is being conveyed.”). 
213
See, e.g., Markel et al., supra note 199, at 624 (“[T]he polity need only be 
constrained by the reasonable interpretation of the sentence imposed, and this will largely 
follow the polity’s perspective since it is the polity that is creating and reflecting the social 
meaning involved here.”); Simons, supra note 40, at 3 (arguing that, to expressive 
retributivists who believe that punishment expresses the community’s resentment, “it is 
absolutely crucial that the public view the conditions of the offender’s punishment as 
proportionate to the initial blaming judgment”).  But see Bronsteen et al., supra note 34, at 
1478 (arguing that a communicative theory of punishment that values only the perception of 
how a typical offender experiences punishment (as opposed to evidence of the actual 
experience of a typical offender) is unappealing and incredible). 
214
See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 35, at 209 (“[P]eople may not 
investigate the more detailed facts about an objectively defined punishment so as to know its 
true severity.  But surely an offender cannot be said to deserve the vague punishment given 
by ill-informed societal condemnation any more than an innocent person deserves the 
culpability judgment of an ill-informed factfinder.”); Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 
supra note 36, at 2; cf. Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 954–55 (“To be sure, awareness 
of hedonic adaptation or expected subjective preference patterns of the public at large may 
conceivably inform the ex ante selection of sentencing ranges or penal techniques approved 
by legislatures.”). 
215
For a discussion of limitations in data and how they may affect particularized risk 
assessments, see supra notes 159–169 and accompanying text.  Of course, psychiatrists may 
also disagree about the existence of a disorder in a particular offender. 
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some degree, society does differentiate between the prison experiences of 
offenders with and without mental illnesses
216
 and does believe that this 
experience merits mitigation of the sentences of seriously disordered 
offenders.
217
  It is important to keep in mind, though, that the public’s 
perception of desert is not static but highly malleable and susceptible to 
change through public education.
218
  Therefore, as a normative matter, it is 
useful to analyze whether judges, as conduits for expressing society’s 
disapproval, should pay attention to—and adjust sentences in response to—
the ways in which offenders with major mental disorders, as a class, tend to 
experience serious harm in prison. 
Retributivism’s commitment to justice and respect for the individual 
offender suggest the proper resolution of this normative question.  Justice is 
 
216
The differential effect of incarceration on offenders with mental illnesses—especially 
the effect of prolonged solitary confinement—has been the subject of recent media attention.  
See, e.g., Vince Beiser, A Necessary Evil?, L.A. TIMES MAG., Oct. 19, 2003, at 14; Colin 
Dayan, Barbarous Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at A19; Editorial, Prison 
Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, at A22; Andrew Cohen, An American Gulag: 
Descending into Madness at Supermax, THEATLANTIC.COM (June 18, 2012, 2:10 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/an-american-gulag-descending-into-
madness-at-supermax/258323/; Andrew Cohen, Supermax: The Faces of a Prison’s 
Mentally Ill, THEATLANTIC.COM (June 19, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/print/2012/06/supermax-the-faces-of-a-prisonsmentally-ill/258429/; Frontline: The 
New Asylums, PBS (May 10, 2005), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
asylums/inmates/; Laura Sullivan, At Pelican Bay Prison, a Life in Solitary, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Jul. 26, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5584254. 
217
Judges and legal commentators have cited the differential suffering of prisoners with 
mental illnesses as a reason supporting the creation of mental health courts.  See, e.g., 
RICHARD D. SCHNEIDER ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: DECRIMINALIZING THE MENTALLY 
ILL 2 (2007); Robert Bernstein & Tammy Seltzer, Criminalization of People with Mental 
Illness: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform, 7 U.D.C. L. Rev. 143, 143 
(2003); James D. Cayce & Kari Burrell, King County’s Mental Health Court: An Innovative 
Approach for Coordinating Justice Services, 53 WASH. ST. B. NEWS 19 (1999); Susan Stefan 
& Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
507, 510 (2005).  Mental health courts typically allow participants to avoid incarceration in 
exchange for court-supervised treatment.  See E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health 
Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 521 (2012).  Though intuitions regarding offenders with 
major mental illnesses were not specifically tested, recent empirical work suggests that a 
substantial minority of the public would support mitigation of punishment for offenders who 
would suffer undue hardship.  See Paul H. Robinson, Sean E. Jackowitz & Daniel M. 
Bartels, Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, 
Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal 
Punishment,  65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 782, 824 (2012) (reporting that 28% of study 
respondents believed that mitigation of punishment was justified when the punishment 
would have an undue hardship on the offender); id. at 782, 824–25 (reporting that 22% of 
study respondents believed that advanced age would warrant mitigation).  
218
See Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1309 (2006). 
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the chief concern of retributive theory, and, as a matter of justice and 
fairness, a punishment system should strive to avoid imposing punishments 
of differential impact on equally deserving offenders.
219
  Ideally, the actual 
punishment experienced by an offender should equal in severity the penal 
response deemed deserved by his criminal act.  Of course some degree of 
variance between predicted and actual experience is unavoidable.  To the 
extent, however, that empirical evidence establishes that a penalty poses a 
foreseeable, substantial risk of serious harm, proximately caused by the 
state,
220
 to a morally significant class of offenders,
221
 this vulnerability 
 
219
ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL POLICY 277 (1983) (“The argument, 
then, is that whilst it is just to impose the same sentence on two equally culpable offenders 
for two equally grave offences, it is unjust to do so if the two offenders have such differing 
‘sensibilities’ that the sentence would have a significantly different effect on each of them.  
The sentencer should take account of any relevant and significant differences, and should 
strive to achieve equality of impact.”); Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 253 
(advocating “a general principle of equal treatment, by which we mean that a sentencing 
system should strive to avoid its punishments having an unequal impact on different 
offenders or groups of offenders”); Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 35, at 199–
210 (arguing that various versions of retributivism must factor subjective experience into 
sentencing in order to fulfill the proportionality requirement).  I explore the concept of 
“equal impact” in more depth at Parts III.B.2–3. 
220
See Dolovich, supra note 54, at 939 (observing in the context of incarceration that 
“there will likely be few cases in which harm to prisoners is not traceable to official 
conduct”). 
221
If penalties that pose a foreseeable, substantial risk of serious harm are not inhumane, 
it may be that a sentencing accommodation is only warranted for offenders with certain 
vulnerabilities.  See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 173 & n.f (discussing, in 
the context of application of the equal-impact principle, when a living standard analysis 
should be tailored to members of “nonstandard” groups for whom “imprisonment typically 
becomes more burdensome” and referencing the dissertation of Professor Uma Narayan, 
infra, for elucidating these special cases).  For instance, Professor Uma Narayan has argued, 
in the context of regulating offensive conduct, that nonstandard interests held by individuals 
with “special natural vulnerabilities”—those stemming from relatively natural causes such as 
physical or mental disability, illness, youth, or advanced age—are particularly worthy of 
protection “because these vulnerabilities are not even remotely matters of choice, often pose 
serious risk of harm or offense, and are potentially likely to affect any currently ‘standard’ 
person.  Also, people in this category are usually unable to provide the requisite special 
protection for themselves.”  Uma Narayan, Offensive Conduct: What Is It and When May 
We Legally Regulate It? 212–13, 223 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Philosophy Dept., 
Rutgers University).  To the extent that Narayan has identified factors sufficient to 
distinguish morally cognizable vulnerabilities from those without similar salience, a number 
of classes beyond the seriously mentally ill may be worthy of recognition in the sentencing 
context.  In particular, cognizable vulnerabilities, if verified, could include those stemming 
from advanced age, youth, diminutive stature, effeminate appearance, gay and transgender 
orientation, mental retardation, and physical disability.  This Article leaves to others the 
important work of making that case and defending the use of Narayan’s criteria—or another 
set—to distinguish groups of offenders whose foreseeable harm should factor into 
sentencing. 
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should factor into sentencing.
222
  Indeed, this approach is essential if the 
severity of a penalty experienced by an offender is to be fairly calibrated to 
the degree of censure intended by the state.
223
 
The second argument in favor of reflecting risk of serious harm in 
sentencing derives from the role that offenders play as punishment’s 
primary audience.
224
  Again, society, as the sender of the communicatory 
message of punishment must, at base, view the penalty as censorious and 
roughly proportionate to the crime.
225
  But society should tailor a 
punishment by how it anticipates that an offender in a given class will 
experience and understand a particular penalty.  Professor R.A. Duff, who 
has articulated a powerful and distinctive communicative view of 
punishment,
226
 has explained the importance of tailoring a punishment to an 
offender in these terms: 
If I am trying to communicate with someone, I must try to make the form and content 
of my communication appropriate to its context, its subject matter, and my 
interlocutor: I must do my best to ensure both that my communication does justice to 
its subject matter and also that it is so phrased and expressed that my interlocutor 
(given what I know about her) will have the best chance of understanding it. If we 
apply this idea to the context of punishment, it suggests that sentencers should look 
for (or try to create) that particular sentence that will express most appositely the 
censure merited by this offender’s crime and which will be appropriate to this 
particular offender. Now this communicative ideal includes a requirement for 
proportional severity: the stringency of the censure we communicate must not be 
disproportionately severe (or lenient) in comparison to the crime we are censuring. It 
also, however, involves a requirement of substantive appositeness of “match” or “fit” 
 
222
See Kolber, supra note 41, at 635–40. 
223
See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 35, at 208–10; Kolber, supra note 36, 
at 28–29. 
224
I argue here that, under an expressive theory of retributive punishment, the offender 
should be the primary intended audience for society’s message of condemnation.  This 
understanding mutes any difference, for my purposes, between expressive and 
communicative theories of punishment (though adherents to communicative theories of 
punishment may be more receptive to the arguments advanced in this Part of the Article).  
Cf. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2000) (“To express a mental state requires only 
that one manifest it in speech or action.  To communicate a mental state requires that one 
express it with the intent that others recognize that state by recognizing that very 
communicative intention.”); Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 929 & n.89 (differentiating 
“communicative” action directed to a designated recipient “in a way the sender of the 
message thinks will make sense to the recipient, and is performed in a way that the thought 
conveyed can be made sense of, or effectuated, through the free will of the recipient” from 
“expressive” action that “emit[s] certain views or attitudes but does not require that a 
particular member of the audience for the action understands the basis for or purpose behind 
the action”). 
225
See supra note 212. 
226
See supra note 183; see also DUFF, supra note 185, at 75–130.  
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between the particular substantive punishment and this particular crime and this 
particular criminal: is this the best kind of punishment by which to communicate to 
this offender an appropriate judgment on her particular crime?
227
 
Treating the offender as the primary audience for society’s censure 
reflects retributivism’s preoccupation with, and commitment to honoring, 
the offender as a moral agent.
228
  When empirical evidence demonstrates 
that a penalty poses a substantial risk of serious harm to an identifiable 
class of offenders, using class members’ foreseeable experiences in part to 
measure the content and severity of punishment would be one way to 
express respect for the moral autonomy and dignity of the offender.
229
  In 
addition, using the offender’s anticipated experience as the benchmark for 
punishment severity presents the most rational way to achieve a key 
expressive or communicative aim of punishment: the hard treatment 
conveys to the offender that what you did was wrong, and this is how 
wrong it was.
230
  The offender need not respond in any particular way to 
society’s expression of disapprobation—epiphany and reform are hoped for 
but unnecessary results of punishment—but society assumes that competent 





R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 61–62 (1996). 
228
See infra notes 305–312 and accompanying text. 
229
See DUFF, supra note 185, at 129–30 (“[Punishment] addresses offenders, not as 
outlaws who have forfeited their standing as citizens, but as full members of the normative 
political community; it is inclusionary rather than exclusionary.  It treats them as citizens 
who are both bound and protected by the central liberal values of autonomy, freedom, and 
privacy.  It holds them answerable, as responsible moral agents, for the public wrongs they 
commit.  But it also respects their own autonomy (since it seeks to persuade rather than 
merely to coerce), their freedom (since it constitutes a legitimate response to their 
wrongdoing and leaves them free to remain unpersuaded), and their privacy (since it 
addresses only those aspects of their lives and actions that properly fall within the public 
sphere).”); Bronsteen et al., supra note 34, at 1487 (arguing that “the state cannot define the 
content of its messages by authorial fiat” and that, “[t]o the extent that the state ignores an 
offender’s reasonable interpretation of the message, it fails to treat her fully as moral 
agent”); von Hirsch, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 273–74 (“Such communication of 
judgment and feeling is the essence of moral discourse among rational agents.”). 
230
See generally Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 35, at 208 (“If the severity 
of punishment depends on how the condemnatory message is understood by offenders, then 
it is easy to see why offenders’ punishment experiences matter.”); Primoratz, supra note 
183, at 200 (“So if society’s condemnation of their misdeeds is really to reach [offenders], if 
they are really to understand how wrong their actions are, it will have to be translated into 
the one language they are sure to understand: the language of self-interest.  This translation 
is accomplished by punishment.”). 
231
See DUFF, supra note 185, at 87 (“Punishment as censure gives offenders the 
opportunity to listen to the law’s moral voice and so to repent their crimes and seek their 
own moral reform.  But it does not find its justifying purpose in an attempt to elicit (or 
coerce) such moral responses.” (citations omitted)); von Hirsch, supra note 183, at 116–17 
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Thus, from the moment a punishment is imposed to the moment it is 
completed, the way that an offender is likely to experience and understand a 
penalty should be of critical, though not controlling,
232
 importance to the 
assessment of a penalty’s content and severity. 
The challenge of sentencing, then, is to accommodate both society’s 
and offenders’ views of the nature and severity of punishment.  Most 
fundamentally, society must understand a proposed penalty as censorious 
and its severity as roughly proportionate to the seriousness of a given 
offense.  Because offenders are the ultimate recipients of (and audience for) 
punishment’s message of condemnation, society’s proportionality analysis 
should consider how offenders are likely to experience a given penalty.  
Penalties need not be calibrated to every offender’s idiosyncratic tolerance 
for punishment.  But when an offender is an identifiable member of a 
vulnerable class, society’s evaluation of a penalty’s severity should reflect 
available evidence regarding how the penalty is likely to affect members of 
that class.  At a sentencing hearing,
233
 a judge should consider the 
empirically documented, substantial risks of serious harm that incarceration 
poses to offenders with major mental disorders and factor these risks into 
his sentencing calculus.
234
  In particular, when evidence demonstrates that a 
particular sanction poses a substantial risk of serious harm to a seriously 
disordered individual, a judge should consider selecting an alternative 





(“A response to criminal wrongdoing that conveys blame gives the individual the 
opportunity to respond in ways that are typically those of an agent capable of moral 
deliberation: to recognise the wrongfulness of action; feel remorse; to make efforts to desist 
in future—or to try to give reasons why the conduct was not actually wrong.”); Markel & 
Flanders, supra note 8, at 933 (“[T]hough the offender must be able to rationally understand 
the communication, he need not be persuaded by it.”). 
232
See supra note 212 and accompanying text (stressing that, at base, society must view 
a penalty as censorious and roughly proportionate to a crime). 
233
See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
234
See Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 260; Bronsteen et al., supra note 34, at 
1482–95; cf. Kolber, supra note 36, at 15–16. 
235
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 156 (“The criterion for substitutions 
among penalties should, on a desert model, be that of comparable severity: approximate 
equivalence in penal bite.  The principle of proportionality addresses the severity of 
penalties, not their particular mode.”); NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN 
PRISON AND PROBATION, at ch. 4 (1990) (setting forth principles of interchangeability of 
punishments to provide for the principled distribution of punishments with rough 
equivalence of punitive bite on utilitarian grounds); id. at 93 (“[F]rom a moral perspective, 
the measure of punishment is not its objective appearance but its subjective impact.  Our 
goal is to achieve a system of interchangeable punishments that the state and the offender 
would regard as comparable in their punitive effects on him.”); Robinson, supra note 26, at 
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By considering foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm, 
proximately caused by the state and posed by available criminal sanctions, 
the sentencing judge can take steps to ensure that the chosen penalty, as 
experienced, will equal the degree of condemnation actually warranted by 
an offender’s criminal act.  Of the myriad actors in the criminal justice 
system, the sentencing judge is the institutional player charged with 
selecting and conveying, within constraints established by the legislature 
and possibly a sentencing commission, the type and length of sentence that 
constitutes an offender’s just deserts.236  Because a judge typically cannot 
select the facility where an offender will serve a term of incarceration
237
 (an 
aspect of an offender’s sanction that will greatly affect its severity238), he 
possesses only a limited ability to ensure that an offender’s ultimate 
punishment, as executed, is not harsher than intended.  Often all a judge can 
do is attempt to predict, given data brought to his attention during the 
 
151–52 (arguing that, “[a]s long as the total punitive ‘bite’ of the punishment achieves 
[ordinal] ranking, [deontological and empirical] conceptions of desert have little reason to 
care about the method by which that amount of punitive ‘bite’ is imposed” and suggesting 
the adoption of an equivalency table for alternative sanctions).  It is possible, however, that 
only a showing of individualized risk warrants a sentencing adjustment.  See supra notes 
167–170 and accompanying text.   
236
See supra note 30.  It is for this reason that offender vulnerability is a proper 
consideration of sentencing, as opposed to an issue solely of penal administration. 
237
Judges typically lack the authority to select the institution to which an individual will 
be assigned to serve his term of imprisonment.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006) (“The 
Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment.”); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 20.315(7) (West 2009) (“The department [of corrections] shall place each offender in 
the program or facility most appropriate to the offender’s needs, subject to budgetary 
limitations and the availability of space.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-10(13) (2006) (granting 
the director of the department of corrections the power to “assign or transfer those persons 
[committed to the custody of the department] to appropriate facilities and programs”). 
Judges may, however, recommend particular housing assignments.  See 18 U.S.C 
§ 3621(b)(4) (stating that, in making its determination under the statute, the Bureau of 
Prisons may consider any statement by the sentencing court concerning the purposes of a 
term of imprisonment or recommending a certain type of correctional facility).  The degree 
to which these recommendations are honored varies by jurisdiction. 
238
Violence levels and victimization rates, in reality, will vary by facility and security 
level.  See ALLEN J. BECK & CANDACE JOHNSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY FORMER STATE PRISONERS, 2008, at 22–23 
(May 2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svrfsp08.pdf (showing 
prevalence rates of sexual victimization, for male former prisoners, that are 1.7 to 3.0 times 
higher in maximum-security prisons than in minimum-security prisons and comparing 
victimization rates for prisons by type of facility); GAES & GOLDBERG, supra note 84, at 50 
(suggesting that sexual victimization rates are highest at higher-security-level prisons).  In 
addition, treatment opportunities and program options vary by facility and prison security 
level.  See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN & KENNETH MCGINNIS, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., 
CLASSIFICATION OF HIGH-RISK AND SPECIAL MANAGEMENT PRISONERS 31, 33 (2004), 
available at http://www.nicic.org. 
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sentencing process, how an individual will fare if incarcerated
239
 and then 
assess sentencing options accordingly.  When an individual with a serious 
mental illness faces a possible term of incarceration, a sentencing judge 
should consider the defendant’s foreseeable vulnerability to serious harm 
when weighing sentencing options to best ensure that the ultimate sentence 
ordered, as likely to be experienced, will convey the degree of censure 
warranted by his offense. 
As this discussion suggests, expressive theory could potentially 
support a definition of punishment that encompasses a broad swath of 
foreseeable risks of harm,
240
 and some scholars have suggested that 
punishment should be understood in this way.
241
  However, primarily for 
prudential reasons, this Article takes the less radical position that 
foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm, proximately caused by the 
state and occurring in the context of confinement, should factor into the 
distribution of punishment under a theory of proportionality.
242
  For 
 
239
See supra notes 49–51. 
240
See infra notes 387–393. 
241
See Bronsteen et al., supra note 34, at 1466 (“The state is responsible for the 
foreseeable, proximately caused effects of punishment—effects that the typical offender will 
understand to be part of her punishment—and this responsibility should influence the 
legislative crafting of punishments.”). 
242
The decision to limit the risks that should factor into sentencing to substantial risks of 
serious harms is supported by several moral and prudential considerations.  First, when 
sentences ignore substantial risks of serious harm, the ultimate penalty experienced is likely 
to be vastly disproportionate to the penalty deserved.  Sentences cannot practically 
contemplate all risks of harm, and those that are insubstantial are far less likely to impose 
vastly disproportionate punishments.  See ASHWORTH, supra note 219, at 274 (arguing that 
“there are degrees of injustice, and that a slightly inaccurate estimation of desert is strongly 
preferable to an approach to sentencing which in no way aspired to proportionality and 
departed widely from it”).  Second, although accounting for all nonserious harms might 
require great variation in length or severity of punishment, see Simons, supra note 40, at 5, 
this should be less true when accounting for only truly serious harms for which a 
foreseeable, substantial risk exists at the moment of sentencing.  Third, the state’s moral 
obligation to consider foreseeable risks of harms—and act to prevent their realization—is at 
its apex when those risks are substantial and the harms are of a serious nature.  Fourth, while 
sentencing two equally blameworthy offenders differently on the basis of vulnerability—
assuming the basis of the distinction is inadequately explained or publicized—may result in 
the appearance of a lack of uniformity and unfairness, this cost is arguably dwarfed by that 
of imposing vastly disproportionate and inhumane sentences on morally significant, 
vulnerable populations, which is a likely result if judges ignore foreseeable, substantial risks 
of serious harm at sentencing.  The extent to which the definition of punishment should turn 
on prudential, as opposed to moral, reasoning is questionable, however.  After all, 
proponents of restricting punishment to intended harm can call upon the prudential reasons 
of ease of administration and commensurability to support their position as well.  Future 
work will explore in more depth the existence of  moral grounds for limiting the scope of 
punishment to substantial risks of serious harms proximately caused by the state. 
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purposes of this Article, the term “serious harm” is limited to serious 
impairment of functioning and includes, but is not necessarily confined to, 
serious physical assault, serious sexual assault, substantial exacerbation of 
serious mental illness, and precipitation of a new serious mental disorder.  
This definition does not cover many of the harms and negative experiences 
suffered by offenders with serious mental disorders, but it does cover the 
most substantial harms experienced by at least a segment of this population. 
2. Consideration of Prison Violence 
The extent to which sentencing should reflect the foreseeable risk of 
prison violence merits separate discussion.  Rape and assault in prison are 
certainly “not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their 
offenses against society,” and prison violence can never be condoned.243  
On this ground, Professors Gray, Markel, Flanders, and Mary Sigler have 
objected to the consideration of risk of prison violence in sentencing under 
a theory of proportionate punishment.
244
  Their primary argument seems to 
be that, because a just punishment can never include rape or assault,
245
 it 
would be immoral for sentencing authorities to consider the risk that these 
acts may occur and to provide a sentence reduction on the basis of that 
risk.
246
  Reducing an offender’s sentence in response to the fear that he 
 
243
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation omitted). One 
important issue, not addressed in this Article, is the extent to which prison violence 
effectuated by inmates—as opposed to prison guards—may constitute punishment even 
though private actors, who are not authorized to inflict sanctions, carry it out.  See, e.g., Alon 
Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case Against Privately 
Inflicted Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113, 114 (2008) (“Insofar as the state is the source of 
criminal prohibitions, it should also determine the nature and the severity of the sanctions 
that follow their violation and should inflict these sanctions.”).  This Article assumes, but 
does not defend the notion, that prisoner-on-prisoner violence constitutes punishment when 
the state has created the conditions of confinement in which prison violence is likely to 
occur, such that acts of prisoner-on-prisoner violence foreseeably arise from those conditions 
and may be considered proximately caused by the state.  See Bronsteen et al., supra note 34, 
at 1485 n.86.  See generally Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing 
Fiction of Guideline Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 568 (2006) (describing when the 
Eighth Amendment protects individuals from victimization by other inmates).  With that 
said, it is worth emphasizing that prison violence certainly can never be considered just 
punishment. 
244
See Sigler, supra note 243; supra note 199 and accompanying text.  For arguments 
that foreseeable prison violence should be conceived as part of an offender’s punishment for 
purposes of the Eighth Amendment, see Dolovich, supra note 54 at 906–07; Alexander A. 
Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 
1611–22 (2012); and Ristroph, supra note 196, at 167–70. 
245
See Gray, supra note 32, at 1649–53 (characterizing prison violence as “crime,” not 
“punishment”); Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 960–61. 
246
See Sigler, supra note 243, at 562 (arguing that “the doctrine of downward departures 
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might be raped in prison would, according to this viewpoint, convey official 
approval of or acquiescence to that violence.
247
  Indeed, Gray has intimated 
that modifying a sentence based on the risk or realization of prison violence 
would render the victim ineligible for a remedy and the perpetrators of 
violence “immune” from prosecution.248  And Markel has warned that 
taking the risk of prison violence into account in sentencing might mean 
that, if the predicted violence does not occur, an offender might deserve 
increased punishment through resentencing.
249
 
Though some exaggeration is surely at work here—it is hard to 
understand how an exercise of sentencing discretion for the benefit of one 
individual could deprive a prosecutor of the authority to prosecute another 
individual for perpetrating a crime
250—the arguments made by these 
scholars raise an important theoretical point, and it is worth examining it in 
some detail.  For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to distinguish 
between two types of sentencing accommodations that may be available as 
a means to respond to an offender’s predicted hardship in prison: 
substituting a prison term with one or more noncarceral sanctions
251
 and 
ordering a reduced prison term.
252
  This Article will refer to the latter option 
as a sentencing “discount.”  To examine whether an evaluation of penalty 
severity should ever include foreseeable risk of serious harm, let us assume 
that, for the commission of a certain crime, offender A of a particular 
degree of blameworthiness deserves a term of imprisonment of ten years. 
Now assume that offender B commits the same crime with the same degree 
of blameworthiness.  He is identical to offender A except that, for him, 
imprisonment predictably carries a substantial likelihood of serious sexual 
assault.  Does responding to that risk through an adjustment in sentencing 
necessarily entail approval of violence?  The answer is no. 
First, it is possible that the risk of serious harm to offender B could be 
so great that incarcerating him for any length of time would be inhumane.  
 
on the basis of extreme vulnerability is problematic in political, moral, and practical terms”). 
247
See id. at 573 (observing that the common result of granting a downward departure 
for extreme vulnerability, under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, is not total relief from 
incarceration, but rather, a reduced carceral term “at rape”); see also Gray, supra note 32, at 
1650 (“[I]f the suffering occasioned by prisoner-on-prisoner violence is ‘punishment,’ and 
‘punishment’ is the suffering which offenders deserve as a consequence of their crimes, then 
the perpetrators of sexual assault in prison are by definition immune from prosecution 
because the suffering they inflict is ‘punishment.’”). 
248
See Gray, supra note 32, at 1649–50.  For an effective response to this point, see 
Reinert, supra note 244, at 1619. 
249
See E-mail from Dan Markel to author (Feb. 6, 2012) (on file with author). 
250
Cf. Reinert, supra note 244, at 1619. 
251
See infra Part III.B.2. 
252
See infra Part III.B.3. 
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Confining a person under conditions posing a high likelihood of serious 
sexual assault would be degrading, dehumanizing, and akin to torture,
253
 
and thus should be prohibited within a system of punishment premised on 
respect for the moral autonomy and dignity of the offender.
254
  Therefore, 
consideration of the offender’s vulnerability may compel the determination 
that imprisonment—for any period (assuming that risk of sexual assault 
does not markedly increase over time)—is not an available option, and a 
judge should order one or a combination of noncarceral penalties as a 
roughly equivalent alternative.
255
  Part III.B.2 explores this process in more 
detail. 
A second example of when a sentencing accommodation may be 
appropriate is when a judge believes that prison officials are likely to take 
measures to reduce an individual’s vulnerability to predation, but those 
protective measures are likely to create harmful collateral effects.
256
  For 
instance, in many jurisdictions, prisons protect vulnerable inmates by 
isolating them in protective custody.  Conditions in protective custody often 
resemble those in disciplinary isolation,
257
 with isolation for twenty-one to 
 
253
See Dolovich, supra note 54, at 915–16 (“To force prisoners to live in constant fear 
of violent assault, under conditions in which many of the most vulnerable among them can 
expect that fear to be realized, is to inflict a form of physical and psychological suffering 
akin to torture.  It is plainly cruel to punish criminal offenders with the strap, with rape, or 
with any other form of brutal corporal treatment.  And for the same reason, the state may not 
place incarcerated offenders in a position of ongoing vulnerability to assault by predatory 
prisoners, thus creating conditions that would amount to the same thing.”). 
254
See, e.g., Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Confinement in a 
prison where terror reigns is cruel and unusual punishment.  A prisoner has a right to be 
protected from the constant threat of violence and from sexual assault.”), overruled on other 
grounds by Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 
1986); Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 262–64 (arguing that “prison conditions 
which fall below the minimum and which constitute inhuman or degrading treatment are 
simply not acceptable”).  For a discussion of inhumanity in the context of retributivism, see 
Part III.B.1. 
255
See supra Part III.B.2. 
256
See Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 262 (observing that, after one determines 
that prison conditions are not inhumane but vary, one must ask “whether, and, if so, how, to 
take account of those variations when calculating sentencing length”).  I am grateful to 
Professor Michael Seigel for suggesting the “collateral consequences” terminology. 
257
Haney, supra note 62, at 135 (“Conditions of confinement for protective custody 
prisoners are in many ways similar to those in supermax confinement.  That is, they are 
typically segregated from the rest of the prison population, restricted or prohibited from 
participating in prison programs and activities, and often housed indefinitely under what 
amount to oppressive and isolated conditions.”); James E. Robertson, The Constitution in 
Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 91, 91 (1987) (“In exchange for security, protection inmates often experience 
conditions of confinement similar to those imposed as punishment for disciplinary 
infractions.”). 
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twenty-four hours a day.
258
  Confinement under those conditions is certainly 
more onerous than confinement in the society of others.
259
  A judge could 
order a reduced sentence for offender B to reflect the increased harshness of 
those conditions and the substantial risk of serious psychological harm 
those conditions pose.
260
  Ordering a reduced prison term on the basis of the 
spartan conditions of protective custody would not constitute approval or 
anticipation of sexual assault, so the discount would avoid the charge of 
having incorporated risk of an inherently unjust penalty (the crime of sexual 
assault) into an offender’s sentence.261 
Other collateral consequences of vulnerability to victimization may 
also supply grounds for a sentencing discount, so long as the collateral 
consequences pose a foreseeable, substantial threat of serious harm and are 
susceptible to justification in light of the state’s legitimate retributive 
 
258
See Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 3–4 (2011) (stating that, due to the fact that gay men and transgendered women are 
“almost automatically” targets for sexual abuse, many carceral facilities routinely house 
these inmates in protective custody—“a classification that typically involves isolation in ‘a 
tiny cell for twenty-one to twenty-four hours a day,’ the loss of access to any kind of 
programming (school, drug, treatment, etc.), and even deprivation of basics like ‘phone calls, 
showers, group religious worship, and visitation’”) (internal citations omitted).   
259
It is possible that confinement in isolation may, given its likely effects on an 
individual, be inhumane.  For purposes of this discussion, I am assuming that conditions in 
protective custody, while harsh, would not be inhumane for the individual in question.  In 
addition, to reduce an offender’s prison sentence based on the foreseeable, substantial risk of 
psychological damage from protective custody, this harm must be capable of justification.  
See infra note 262. 
260
See ASHWORTH, supra note 219, at 277 (observing that some courts in England grant 
sentencing discounts to offenders likely to serve their sentences in protective segregation in 
order to reflect “the greater pains of imprisonment” to be experienced by these offenders).  
Indeed, some courts that have departed downwards under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines on 
the basis of extreme vulnerability to abuse in prison have done so on this basis.  See United 
States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1990) (observing that “the only means for prison 
officials to protect Morales was to place him in solitary confinement”); see also Sigler, 
supra note 243, at 571 (arguing, in reference to Lara, that “[i]n effect, the court found that a 
shorter period of time in protective custody is equivalent to a lengthier sentence in the 
general population”).  For purposes of clarity, it is important to highlight that the sentencing 
discount addressed in general terms in this section does not equate substantively or 
procedurally to the downward departure currently available under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5K2.0(a)(2). 
261
In addition, by granting a sentencing discount to a vulnerable inmate, a judge will 
make sexual assault less likely to occur and, if it does occur, the discount should make a 
remedy more likely.  By highlighting an offender’s vulnerability in a sentencing order, a 
judge will put prison officials on notice of the offender’s susceptibility to harm.  Such notice 
will be relevant to prison officials’ liability under the Eighth Amendment.  See Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (holding that “a prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ 
to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment”). 
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goals.
262
  For instance, perhaps a judge may find that offender B is likely to 
remain within the general prison population, where he will likely face the 
threat of assault but will not actually be harmed due to the successful 
protective efforts of prison guards.  In this case, the discount could reflect 
the psychological harm that offender B is likely to incur by being confined 
in a dangerous environment.
263
  Factoring this kind of anxiety into 
calculations of penalty severity bears some similarity to the government’s 
policy of compensating employees for living in dangerous environments, 
and this example is useful for the limited purpose of demonstrating how 
receiving compensation for exposure to a dangerous environment (in our 
case, through a sentencing discount) does not deprive an inmate of any 
remedy if harm ultimately materializes.
264
 
Currently, the U.S. Department of State increases an employee’s 
 
262
This Article does not address the extent to which foreseeable harms flowing from 
incarceration can be justified by the state’s legitimate retributive aims, beyond the limited 
circumstance of prison violence, which can never be justified.  Such foreseeable harm 
might—and might not—be justified through application of the doctrine of double effect, 
originally attributable to St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae and summarized by 
Professor Warren S. Quinn as involving: 
[A] set of necessary conditions on morally permissible agency in which a morally questionable 
bad upshot is foreseen: (a) the intended final end must be good, (b) the intended means to it must 
be morally acceptable, (c) the foreseen bad upshot must not itself be willed (that is, must not be, 
in some sense, intended), and (d) the good end must be proportionate to the bad upshot (that is, 
must be important enough to justify the bad upshot).   
Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 334 n.3 (1989).  See generally THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: 
PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE (P.A. Woodward ed., 2001) 
(presenting arguments for and against the principle of double effect).  Professor Adam 
Kolber has argued that, while “retributivists might argue [that] many of the unintended 
harms of incarceration can be justified by the state’s legitimate retributive intentions . . . the 
job of justifying the side-effect harms of incarceration . . . is hardly so easy.”  Kolber, supra 
note 36, at 22–23.  Kolber observes, for instance, that “there are limits on the magnitude of 
foreseen harm that can be justified by an intended positive aim” and that, if an alternative 
means of achieving a legitimate objective exists that is like the original means in all respects 
except that it would pose a lower risk of harm to others, the person seeking the objective is 
morally obligated to select the alternative.  See id. at 23.  If, considering evidence of 
statistical and individualized risk, see Simons, supra note 167, a serious, foreseeable harm 
stemming from incarceration cannot be justified, a judge should not order a carceral penalty 
in a given instance, but should look to potential alternative sanctions.  See Part III.B.2. 
263
Cf. Dolovich, supra note 54, at 916 (characterizing as “excruciating” the 
psychological harm of “being forced to live for extended periods in dread of attack,” which 
could leave individuals “desperate to protect themselves at all costs and rob them of the 
ability to function in any reasoned or self-possessed way”). 
264
This example serves the very limited purpose outlined in the text.  Otherwise, 
employment by the U.S. Department of State bears little similarity to confinement in a state 
or federal prison.  For instance, an employee of the State Department can resign at will; a 
prisoner, of course, has no such option. 
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compensation when that employee is stationed in a particularly dangerous 
environment—such as Iraq, Israel, or Lebanon265—where “civil 
insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm or 
imminent danger to all U.S. Government civilian employees.”266  This 
“danger pay” varies by location according to the government’s assessment 
of the physical threat posed by that environment.
267
  In essence, living 
under a constant threat of physical danger is itself a form of harm that 
warrants compensation, even if the threat never materializes.  The 
government’s provision of danger pay does not serve to authorize, justify, 
or condone violence that may occur in these locations.  If an employee is 
injured while on duty, he may be eligible for medical and wage loss 
benefits, schedule awards for permanent impairment, and vocational 
rehabilitation.
268
  In addition, nothing would prevent injured individuals 
from seeking redress (or demanding that the U.S. government seek redress) 
against the perpetrators of violence, as permitted by the law of the relevant 
jurisdiction.
269
  Similarly, a judge’s acknowledgement of and 
responsiveness to harsher conditions likely to be experienced by a 
vulnerable offender—even if the offender’s original vulnerability was to 
prison violence—would not serve to condone the actual occurrence of 
assault, so long as the discount is not based explicitly on the likelihood of 
the occurrence of that crime. 
While discounts on the basis of harm that is capable of justification—
including harm stemming from correctional efforts to reduce an 
 
265
See Danger Pay Allowance (DSSR 650), Percentage of Basic Compensation, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, http://aoprals.state.gov/Web920/danger_pay_all.asp (rates effective Feb. 
24, 2013). 
266
See Frequently Asked Questions About Danger Pay, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 





See Overseas Compensation and Medical Benefits for Department of Justice 
Employees, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/jmd/ps/docs/overseas-comp.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2012). 
269
The Federal Tort Claims Act allows civil actions on claims against the United States 
for money damages for: 
[P]ersonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee 
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.  
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). The Act bars claims against the United States based on 
injuries suffered in a foreign country, however.  See id. § 2680(k); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692 (2004).  
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individual’s likelihood of predation—are morally permissible,270 this 
Article agrees with Professors Sigler, Gray, Markel, and Flanders that it 
would be immoral for a judge to base a sentencing discount on the express 
likelihood of an offender’s victimization.271  In that case, the proportionality 
of the punishment would depend on the foreseeable occurrence of a 
criminal harm that can never be a moral part of a just punishment.
272
  To be 
clear, the grant of a discount would not deprive an offender of any remedies 
he would otherwise have under the law
273—indeed, the sentencing discount 
should alert prison officials to the offender’s vulnerability to abuse, which 
should trigger officials’ Eighth Amendment obligation to take reasonable 
steps to abate any substantial risk of serious harm posed to that prisoner.
274
  
However, that practical caveat does not take away from the important moral 
point that anticipated actual abuse should not factor into a sentencing 
discount.  But, while the state should not include anticipated acts of abuse 
in its proportionality analysis, it can—and should—take into account the 
repercussions that inure to vulnerable prisoners from their foreseeable 
vulnerability when those collateral consequences pose a substantial risk of 
serious harm, so long as that foreseeable harm is justified.
275
 
Even if judges were to exclude illegal acts and their collateral 
consequences from the definition of punishment and omit them from the 
sentencing calculus, judges should still consider foreseeable, substantial 
risks of other forms of serious harm that occur in prison.  As discussed in 
Part II, many offenders with serious mental illnesses are unable to cope 
within prison or comply with the requirements of prison life and, as a result, 
are likely to violate prison rules and be isolated in solitary confinement, 





See supra note 262. 
271
In some cases, judges may use “vulnerability to abuse” as a proxy for harsher prison 
conditions of varying sort, which may sometimes include, unfortunately and unintentionally, 
prison violence.  Probably in light of their inability to control housing assignments and 
conditions of incarceration—and because sentencing is at base a predictive enterprise—
sentencing judges often do not go to great lengths to delineate the many forms that harsher 
conditions in prison might take for an individual vulnerable to abuse.  In these cases, it may 
be impossible to divine the predicted source of harm that motivated a sentencing discount. 
272
See Gray, supra note 32, at 1649–50; Sigler, supra note 243, at 573–74.  
273
See Reinert, supra note 244, at 1619. 
274
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also supra note 261. 
275
See supra note 262.  In addition, prison conditions must not be so degrading or 
dehumanizing that the penalty is rendered inhumane.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
276
See supra notes 114–134 (difficulty coping and rule violation as result of mental 
illness), notes 146–157 (incidence and consequences of confinement in isolation) and 
accompanying text.  Some prisons, often in response to court orders or settlements, exclude 
prisoners with Axis I disorders from prolonged confinement in isolation.  See supra note 
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At the very least, this predictable consequence of incarceration for 
offenders with serious mental illnesses must be considered in sentencing.
277
  
Arguably, most prisons are currently structured so that prisoners with 
serious mental illnesses are likely to fail, and, when they fail, they suffer 
serious and sometimes irreparable harm.  Indeed, concern about how 
vulnerable individuals will fare within the typical and reasonably 
foreseeable structure of penal institutions has led some scholars to suggest 





and persons with physical disabilities.
280
  The same analysis should apply to 
offenders with serious mental illnesses.
281
  The fact that penal institutions 
have a constitutional duty to provide mental health treatment to inmates 
with serious mental illnesses may make proactive attempts to safeguard 
mental health through sentencing even more compelling.
282
 
B. JUST DESERT THEORY’S ACCOMMODATION OF 
VULNERABILITY 
Assuming that punishment includes certain foreseeable risks of harm, 




Prisons are not unitary institutions that offer uniform experiences but, since judges 
have little control over placement, they can only make educated guesses about how an 
offender will actually experience his punishment.  See supra notes 237–238.  
278
See infra note 371. 
279
See infra note 370. 
280
See infra note 369. 
281
See infra note 368. 
282
See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) 
(“[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s 
liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for 
his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it 
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause.”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” (internal citation omitted)); Ramos v. Lamm, 
639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (“A medical need is serious if it is ‘one that has been 
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay 
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” (internal citation 
omitted)); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that an inmate is 
“entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care 
provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with 
reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner’s symptoms evidence a serious disease or 
injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) 
that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be 
substantial”). 
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of offenders with serious mental illnesses should affect sentencing.
283
  For a 
penalty to reflect properly the degree of censure warranted by an offense, 
three requirements must be satisfied.
284
  First, criminal sanctions must take 
a punitive form so that deprivations are imposed in a manner that expresses 
censure or blame.
285
  Second, the severity of a sanction should convey the 
degree of the censure.
286
  Finally, to effectuate the second requirement, 
punitive sanctions should reflect “ordinal proportionality,”287 that is, they 
“should be arrayed according to the degree of blameworthiness (i.e., 
seriousness) of the conduct.”288  Blameworthiness is an amalgamation of 




According to von Hirsch’s analysis, there are three key aspects of 
ordinal proportionality.  First, ordinal proportionality demands parity: 
individuals convicted of crimes of comparable seriousness should receive 
penalties of comparable severity.
290
  Such offenders need not receive the 
same punishment, but they should receive penalties of substantially the 
same degree of onerousness.
291
  Second, penalties should be ordered so that 
their relative severity reflects the degree of seriousness of their 
corresponding crimes.
292
  Finally, penalties should be spaced so that the 
difference between two penalties’ onerousness mirrors and calls attention to 
the difference between two crimes’ seriousness.293  Just desert theorists 





Professor von Hirsch has developed and refined his sentencing theory, within an 
expressive framework, over the course of four books: DOING JUSTICE, supra note 193, PAST 
OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 
(1985) [hereinafter PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES], CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993) [hereinafter 
CENSURE], and, with Andrew Ashworth, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 27. 
284
See von Hirsch, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 278–79 (outlining three 
implications and concluding that they are supported by multiple versions of expressive 
theory). 
285




See id. at 138–41.  Ordinal proportionality is sometimes referred to as 
“proportionality simpliciter” or “relative proportionality.”  See Greg Roebuck & David 
Wood,  A Retributive Argument Against Punishment, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 73, 76–77 (2011).   
288
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 135.   
289
See id. at 4, 186.  
290
Id. at 139–40; see also von Hirsch, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 282.   
291
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 139–40. 
292
Id. at 140; see also von Hirsch, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 282. 
293
See VON HIRSCH, supra note 193, at 90; see also Roebuck & Wood, supra note 287, 
at 76–77. 
294 See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 235 (1979) (“A theory 
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Ordinal proportionality, however, supplies at most relative 
proportionality, as it is concerned with the internal structure of a 
punishment scale.
295
  To identify the particular penalty that should attach to 
a specific crime, it is necessary to determine the overall magnitude and 
anchoring points of the penalty system.  “Cardinal magnitudes” refer to 
absolute severity levels that must be chosen for certain crimes in order to 
anchor a penalty scale.
296
  For instance, one could argue—as a moral matter 
and without reference to sentences prescribed for other crimes—that the 
commission of an armed robbery of an inhabited dwelling at night warrants 
a term of imprisonment of five years.  The cardinal magnitude of the 
penalty for this crime would thus be established, and appropriate 
punishments for other crimes could be derived based on their ordinal 
ranking relative to this one.  Theorists are in general agreement, however, 
that it is impossible as a deontological matter to divine the precise quantum 
of punishment deserved by a specific crime.
297
  This imprecision reflects 
the fact that the amount of censure conveyed by penal sanctions is a 
 
of justice . . . can at least demand the following: that everyone has the right to have offenses 
graded in terms of individual fault or blameworthiness (i.e. desert) and not mere social 
utility, that other even substantive bases for grading be reasonable, that punishments be 
graded on a comparable basis, and that there be a matching between seriousness of 
punishment and seriousness of offense.”); von Hirsch, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 
282 (“These requirements of ordinal proportionality are not mere limits, and they are 
infringed when persons found guilty of equally reprehensible conduct receive unequal 
sanctions on crime preventive grounds.”).  Limiting retributivists, on the other hand, view 
ordinal proportionality as a “weak” or “limiting” principle.  See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & 
PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 101–02, 126 
(1990); NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY 
VALUES 193–95 (1988); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 151 (1982); 
Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1233, 1263–68 (2005); Michael Tonry, Purposes & Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME 
& JUST. 1, 19–20 (2006) (identifying three difficulties with the concept of ordinal 
proportionality).  For a detailed description and critique of limiting retributivism’s treatment 
of ordinal proportionality, see VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 180–85 
(comparing and contrasting their modified desert proposal to Morris’s limiting 
retributivism). 
295 See Roebuck & Wood, supra note 287, at 77. 
296 See VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 283, at 39 (defining cardinal 
magnitudes as “what absolute levels of severity should be chosen to anchor the penalty 
scale”); id. at 43–46 (discussing the role of desert in determining cardinal magnitudes); see 
also Hugo Adam Bedau, Classification-Based Sentencing: Some Conceptual and Ethical 
Problems, 10 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 13 (1984) (exploring the 
distinction between ordinal and cardinal punishment). 
297
See, e.g., Ristroph, supra note 218, at 1308–09 (arguing that notions of desert are 
indeterminate and highly elastic); Robinson, supra note 26, at 164–67 (observing that moral 
philosophers lack agreement as to how to translate an offender’s moral blameworthiness into 
a specific punishment). 
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convention, and that conventions may vary among communities.
298
 
It is, however, easier to identify unreasonable punishments, both those 
at the ends of a punishment scale and, to a lesser degree, for particular 
crimes within a scale.
299
  The maximum punishment must be humane,
300
 for 
instance, while the minimum penalty must constitute a sanction capable of 
conveying disapproval and blame.
301
  When assessing whether a 
punishment scale is too severe and thus violates principles of cardinal 
proportionality, von Hirsch suggests that one must compare the interests 
affected by crimes with those disturbed by the corresponding punishments 
to determine whether “punished persons’ vital interests are being 
trivialized.”302  When “drastic deprivations are used to convey merely a 
mild degree of censure,” for instance, principles of cardinal proportionality 
are violated.
303
  Thus, desert provides some, though far from definitive, 
guidance for how severe or lenient a punishment scale should be.
304
 
This scheme of ordinal and cardinal proportionality supplies the 
necessary structure for assessing how the empirically demonstrated risk of 
serious harm for offenders with major mental illnesses may factor into the 
allocation and distribution of punishment, given the particular definition of 
punishment adopted in this Article for purposes of sentencing.  Just desert 
 
298
See von Hirsch, Proportionality, supra note 177, at 282. 
299
See Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 954–58 (identifying as an “island of 
agreement” with subjectivists the idea that retributive justice must be sensitive to the 
experience of punishment in ensuring that punishments sufficiently communicate 
condemnation and are not excessive or cruel). 
300
See VON HIRSCH, supra note 193, at 111 n.* (rejecting corporal punishment as a 
permissible form of punishment because it “evokes in its victim intense feelings of 
humiliation and terror,” and asking whether there is “a right to the integrity of one’s own 
body, that not even the state’s interests in punishing may override”); JOHN KLEINIG, 
PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 123 (1973) (“[T]here is a limit to the severity of the punishment 
which can be humanely inflicted upon a wrongdoer.  What these limits are is of course a 
matter for debate, to be decided partly by recourse to normative considerations.”); MURPHY, 
supra note 294, at 233 (“A punishment will be unjust (and thus banned on principle) if it is 
of such a nature as to be degrading or dehumanizing (inconsistent with human dignity).  The 
values of justice, rights and desert make sense, after all, only on the assumption that we are 
dealing with creatures who are autonomous, responsible, and deserving of the special kind of 
treatment due that status.”); infra notes 307–312. 
301
See VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 283, at 53 (“If the state is to 
carry out the authoritative response to [wrongful] conduct—as it must if it visits any kind of 
sanction upon its perpetrators—then it should do so in a manner that testifies to the 
recognition that the conduct is wrong.”). 
302




See Anthony Bottoms, Five Puzzles in von Hirsch’s Theory of Punishment, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY, supra note 178, at 53, 61 n.26; VON HIRSCH, PAST 
OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 283, at 39. 
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theory suggests three primary distributional consequences for the 
punishment of offenders with serious mental illnesses, and the remainder of 
this Part will explore each in turn.  First, Part III.B.1 assesses sentencing 
options flowing from the disqualification of inhumane penalties.  Second, 
Part III.B.2 explores the use of a living standard analysis to identify 
noncarceral penalties for offenders with serious mental illnesses of 
equivalent punitive bite as carceral terms for standard offenders.  Finally, 
Part III.B.3 evaluates the practice of granting discounted carceral terms for 
vulnerable offenders as a means of eliminating the differential effect of 
incarceration under the principle of equal impact.  Future work will explore 
the theoretical and practical nuances of the sentencing options outlined 
below. 
1. Inhumane Treatment and Cardinal Proportionality 
Retributivism and desert theory are premised upon the moral dignity 
and personhood of the offender.
305
  In the words of Professors Andrew von 
Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, “The entire structure of modern desert 
theory is one that views offenders and potential offenders as persons whose 
capacity for moral judgment is to be respected, and whose rights are to be 
taken seriously.”306  Thus, retributivism cannot justify punishment that 
violates human dignity.
307
  Retributive theory provides at least two reasons 
to prohibit degrading or dehumanizing punishments.  First, in failing to 
recognize the personality and humanity of offenders, such punishments 
treat offenders as less than persons.
308
  Second, brutal punishments that 
“approximate a system of sheer terror in which human beings are treated as 
 
305
See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 181, at 51 (discussing the moral theory of Immanuel 
Kant and characterizing it as resting “on a model of the human as someone whose actions 
are the result of moral choices”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 217, 217, 231 (1973) (outlining Immanuel Kant’s theory of punishment with an 
emphasis on its manifestation of respect for dignity, autonomy, rationality, and rights). 
306
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 76. 
307
See Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1054 (1978) (“Because the 
value underlying modern retributivism is to treat people with the concern and respect due 
persons, a punishment that violated our current conception of human dignity could not be 
justified on retributivist grounds.”). 
308
See MURPHY, supra note 294, at 233 (decrying “a punishment which is in itself 
degrading, which treats the prisoner as an animal instead of a human being, which perhaps 
even is an attempt to reduce him to an animal or a mere thing” as inconsistent with human 
dignity); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 490 (1968) (“When we 
treat a human being merely as an animal or some inanimate object our responses to the 
human being are determined, not by his choices, but ours in disregard of or with indifference 
to his.  And when we ‘look upon’ a person as less than a person or not a person, we consider 
the person as incapable of rational choice.”). 
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animals to be intimidated and prodded”309 are liable to transform offenders 
into purely reactive and survival-oriented beings incapable of exercising 
autonomy or understanding the disapprobation communicated through 
state-inflicted punishment.
310
  As Professors Dan Markel and Chad Flanders 
have observed, to the extent that the state “breaks” an offender, or renders 
him incapable of understanding his punishment as punishment, the state 
forfeits its right to punish that individual.
311
  In both respects, degrading 




Assume, for the moment, that the elevated risk of physical and 
psychological harm from existing prison conditions in a relevant 
jurisdiction renders any term of incarceration within the general prison 
population
313
 intolerably degrading or inhumane for any offender with a 
serious mental illness.
314
  Also assume that the relevant prison system’s 
 
309
Morris, supra note 308, at 488.  
310
See Richard L. Lippke, Arguing Against Inhumane and Degrading Punishment, 17 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 29, 36–37 (1998) (“The state is not permitted to attempt to seize control 
of the moral personalities of offenders, nor to manipulate their personalities in ways that 
preclude them from forming and acting on their own judgments about the sanctions being 
inflicted on them . . . .  These forms of treatment would interfere with the important 
retributive requirement that offenders be able to comprehend their punishments as justifiable 
losses or deprivations imposed on them for their past misconduct.”); Herbert Morris, A 
Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 270 (1981) (“Punishments will not 
be permitted that destroy in some substantial way one’s character as an autonomous creature. 
Certain cruel punishments, then, may be ruled out, not merely because they are conducive to 
hardening the heart but, more importantly, because they destroy a good that can never rightly 
be destroyed.”). 
311
See Markel & Flanders, supra note 8, at 957–58. 
312
See Radin, supra note 307, at 1047 (“[I]t appears that retributivist systems define 
dignity coextensively with permissible punishment, with the result that all violations of 
human dignity are inherently excessive.”).  Under a lex talionis perspective, however, some 
would argue that punishments can be proportionate yet inhumane.  See Bedau, supra note 
296, at 17–18.  In this situation, moral principles of humane treatment would serve as an 
external constraint on proportionality.  See id. 
313
As previously noted, offenders’ experiences in prison will vary by the facilities to 
which they are assigned and their levels of security.  See supra note 238 and accompanying 
text. 
314
When prison conditions present a risk of harm great enough to warrant a designation 
as “inhumane” is a tricky issue, and any assumptions here are controversial and will be 
difficult to unpack and defend.  See, e.g., KLEINIG, supra note 300, at 123 (observing that 
limits of humanity are “of course a matter for debate, to be decided partly by recourse to 
normative considerations”); Arnold S. Kaufman, The Reform Theory of Punishment, 71 
ETHICS 49, 52 (1960) (arguing that “[t]he conditions that exist in many of the prisons of even 
the most civilized nations are degrading and barbaric” and that “such conditions violate 
those moral rights a criminal retains even inside prison walls”); Rod Morgan, Not Just 
Prisons: Reflections on Prison Disturbances, 13 POL’Y STUD. 4, 6 (1992) (observing that the 
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means of protecting vulnerable inmates from abuse consists of confining 
inmates in protective custody, in isolation for twenty-three hours a day.
315
  
Further assume that evidence establishes that housing individuals with 
major mental disorders in these conditions, as a means to eliminate (or at 
least minimize)
316
 the risk of sexual and physical violence, would pose an 
unjustifiably high probability of exacerbating offenders’ mental illnesses 
and would also be inhumane.  Assume the prison has no other practical 
means to care for these inmates.
317
  As a result, incarceration of individuals 
with major mental disorders in this environment, for any crime, should be 
 
Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture has adopted “a cumulative view 
of adverse prison conditions,” finding that the combination of overcrowding, lack of integral 
sanitation, and lack of out-of-cell activities results in inhumane and degrading treatment).  In 
the context of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, to warrant 
relief, “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial 
risk of serious harm.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 & n.3 (1994); see also id. at 
834 & n.3 (stating that “the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’; a 
prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure 
of life’s necessities,’” but leaving for another day the question of “[a]t what point a risk of 
inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes” (internal 
citation omitted)).  In addition, the inmate must establish that a prison official was 
subjectively aware of the risk and failed to take reasonable measures to abate it.  See id. at 
828 (holding that “a prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious 
harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment” and defining “deliberate indifference” as 
“requiring a showing that the official was subjectively aware of the risk”).  Arguably, 
retributive theory, with its focus on justice, morality, the dignity of the offender, and 
proportionate punishment, can and should be more sensitive to risk of physical and 
psychological harm than current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  See Andrew von Hirsch 
& Uma Narayan, Degradingness and Intrusiveness, in CENSURE, supra note 283, at 80, 81 
(“[W]hereas the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution (as now construed) scarcely may 
outlaw even the most grossly disproportionate punishments, a fair system of punishment 
should observe more stringent proportionality requirements.  The same point should hold for 
the present issue of degrading punishments.”); Barry Pollack, Deserts and Death: Limits on 
Maximum Punishment, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 985, 988 n.17 (1992) (stating that, while “some 
desert arguments no doubt equate to constitutional arguments,” desert and analysis under the 
Eighth Amendment must be kept distinct because “the desert argument is a matter of policy, 
not constitutionality”). 
315
See Dolovich, supra note 54, at 3–4; Robertson, supra note 257, at 126 (noting that 
inmates in protective custody spend twenty-two hours in isolation per day). 
316
Assault of inmates while housed in protective custody is not unheard of.  See Little v. 
Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1977); PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION REPORT, supra note 
102, at 79 (detailing the case of an inmate who was double-celled with, then raped by, a 
convicted sex offender while in protective custody). 
317
In reality, prisons utilize, to varying extent, a range of short-term and long-term 
housing options for offenders with serious mental illness, especially those in crisis.  See 
NAT’L INST. OF CORR., PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 5–6 (2001), 
available at http://nicic.gov/Library/016724.  One option employed by many prisons 
consists of transferring seriously mentally ill prisoners to psychiatric hospitals during acute 
episodes.  See id. 
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prohibited on moral grounds. 
If prison were deemed an inhumane environment for offenders with 
serious mental illnesses, a legislature could respond in a number of ways.  It 
may direct the prompt reform of the prison system or authorize a system of 
alternative, noncarceral penalties for these individuals.
318
  One alternative, 
which would involve the straightforward application of principles of ordinal 
and cardinal proportionality, could consist of authorizing a nontraditional 
“guilty but mentally ill” verdict, whereby a convicted offender would be 
confined in a segregated facility for offenders with serious mental 
illnesses.
319
  If a legislature created such a segregating mechanism, and it 
succeeded in eliminating the inhumane portion of a carceral term, then the 
penalty scale for offenders with serious mental illnesses would resemble 
that for nonvulnerable offenders, under principles of ordinal and cardinal 
proportionality.  In particular, both sets of offenders could be confined for 
the same amounts of time for the same offenses, just in different facilities. 
For a more complicated example, assume that confining offenders with 
major mental disorders in the segregated facility just described for more 
than forty years poses an impermissibly high likelihood of substantial 
exacerbation of mental illness.  In this situation, carceral sentences of 
longer than forty years should be prohibited, and the entire penalty scale for 
these offenders should shift downward relative to the scale for the general 
population to preserve punishments’ ordinal rankings and principles of 
ordinal proportionality.
320
  To illustrate, assume that the jurisdiction in 
 
318
See supra Part III.B.2. 
319
Some jurisdictions have created segregated residential facilities for vulnerable 
populations, apparently with some success.  See Dolovich, supra note 258, at 44.  In these 
jurisdictions, prison officials make housing determinations.  I am grateful to Professor Jerold 
Israel for suggesting that a reconfigured “guilty but mentally ill” verdict could serve as a 
segregating mechanism and possible means to eliminate the disproportionate portions of an 
offender’s sentence. 
320
See Robinson, supra note 26, at 151 (“If the endpoint of the punishment continuum 
changes, the amount of punishment that an offender deserves under [deontological and 
empirical] conceptions of justice also changes, to the amount of punishment necessary to 
keep it in its proper ordinal rank.”).  This would be the case if incarceration under currently 
existing conditions were not an inhumane penalty for other offenders.  However, it may well 
be that the risk of physical and psychological harm to offenders with major mental illnesses 
does not differ substantially from (or may even be less than) that experienced by other 
vulnerable prison populations, such as gay or transgendered inmates, those of diminutive 
stature, or those with mental retardation or physical disabilities.  See supra note 169 
(detailing risk factors for sexual violence identified by the Attorney General in May 2012).  
There is a shortage of data on how the risks of physical or psychological harm for offenders 
with serious mental illnesses differ from the risks faced by these subgroups.  See Wolff, 
supra note 159, at 158.  It also could be persuasively argued that long-term incarceration—
with widespread risk of physical and psychological harm—is currently morally intolerable 
for any offender.  See MURPHY, supra note 294, at 239–40 (“Studies on the effects of long-
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question has identified life in prison as the most severe penalty that is 
morally permissible
321
 for any individual and sets a small fine as the lowest 
penalty on its punishment scale.  At this point, the penalty scales for 
offenders with and without major mental disorder will be “anchored” by 
their most severe penalties (which will differ for each population) and least 
severe penalties (which will be the same).
322
  Following the methodology 
outlined by von Hirsch, penalties for offenses along the criminal spectrum 
will be assigned based on considerations of ordinal proportionality, 
meaning that crimes and penalties should be ranked and ordered according 
to seriousness, and the spacing of penalties should reflect the differential 
gravity of offenses.
323
  Because the most severe penalty (the upper 
anchoring point) is milder for offenders with serious mental illnesses,
324
 the 
entire spectrum of penalties for this population will shift downward to 
preserve ordinal proportionality.  As a result, the cardinal or absolute 
magnitudes of penalties along the entire penalty spectrum will be lower for 
 
term incarceration in ‘total institutions’ indicate that long-term confinement develops in 
persons an ‘institutional personality’—i.e. a personality with diminished affect, neurotic 
dependencies, loss of autonomy and mental competence generally: in short, a kind of death 
(of personhood).  If these studies are correct, then long-term incarceration will be a kind of 
slow torture and psychic mutilation and should no doubt be banned on Eighth Amendment 
grounds . . . .”); Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of the Eighth Amendment Prison 
Jurisprudence: Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 404–07 (1995) 
(considering whether the cumulative effect of physical and psychological health risks posed 
by contemporary prisons may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation); cf. Eva S. 
Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to 
Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 113–34, 157–74 (2007) (arguing that 
prison sentence length, prison conditions, and poor postrelease reintegration should have 
greater constitutional significance and advocating for a more robust concept of human 
dignity in the context of the Eighth Amendment).  If this is the case, then the long-term 
incarceration of any offender should be disallowed until these risks are eliminated or brought 
within acceptable levels. 
321
Professor John Kleinig has suggested that the most severe penalty deemed morally 
permissible should anchor a penalty scale.  See KLEINIG, supra note 300, at 124.  For 
critiques of this proposal, see VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 283, at 44 
n.*; Don E. Scheid, Theories of Legal Punishment 173–82 (1977) (Ph.D. dissertation, New 
York University). 
322
See VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES, supra note 283, at 92 (“Anchoring points 
are needed that begin to establish the levels of severity appropriate for given degrees of 
blameworthiness.  Otherwise, the crime-seriousness rankings and the punishment scale will 
‘float’ independently of each other.”).  
323
See id. at 44 (“Once . . . the magnitude and anchoring points of the scale have been 
chosen (with whatever uncertainties this choice involves), then the internal scaling 
requirements of proportionality—the ordinal requirements—become binding.”).  
324
This would be true assuming that the jurisdiction decided not to impose greater 
maximum penalties—exceeding in severity incarceration in the segregated facility for forty 
years—through the use of alternative sanctions.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
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offenders with serious mental illnesses than for other offenders.  In other 
words, for any crime except the most trivial one, the corresponding penalty 
imposed on an offender with major mental disorder will be less severe than 
the penalty imposed on a less ill or non-ill offender.
325
 
2. Alternative Penalties and the Living Standard Analysis 
Beyond helping to discern and adjust penalty scales in light of 
inhumane punishments and violations of cardinal proportionality, just 
desert theory supplies guidance for how to identify penalties of equivalent 
punitive bite or onerousness.  If, in our example above, the jurisdiction 
failed to provide a safer housing arrangement in which to confine inmates 
with major mental disorders, then it would need to identify alternative 
penalties to substitute for terms of imprisonment for various crimes.
326
  This 
would involve the construction of a penalty scale with combinations of 
alternative penalties of roughly equivalent severity to the carceral terms 
available for non-ill offenders.  Noncarceral penalties could include 
intermittent confinement at a state-designated facility, home detention with 
electronic supervision, a community service order, a treatment or residential 
order, a fine, or probation.
327
 
To compare the onerousness of various penalties, Professors Andrew 
von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth have proposed utilizing a “living 
standard analysis,” which von Hirsch and Professor Nils Jareborg 
developed in the context of evaluating the severity of criminal offenses.
328
  
A living standard analysis focuses on “the means or capabilities for 
achieving a certain quality of life”329 and compares the severity of various 
penalties by their degree of intrusion into offenders’ interests.330  In 
 
325
Again, this is assuming that no terms of incarceration are inhumane, under currently 
existing conditions, for other offender populations.  See supra note 320. 
326
Cf. infra note 352 (describing the broader potential of this analysis for the sentencing 
of offenders with serious mental illnesses).  Scholars have questioned whether noncarceral 
sanctions are capable of communicating the necessary censure for the most serious crimes.  
See, e.g., VON HIRSCH, supra note 193, at 111 (“One reason for preferring incarceration is 
simply that we have not found another satisfactory severe punishment.”). 
327
See, e.g., id. at 118–23; MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 235, at 11–12. 
328
See Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-
Standard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17–23, 28–32 (1991); see also VON HIRSCH 
& ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at app. 3 (offering a revised and expanded version of the living 
standard analysis in the context of offense seriousness). 
329
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 194. 
330
See Andrew von Hirsch, Seriousness, Severity and the Living Standard, in 
PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 183, at 143, 146 (“What makes punishments more or 
less onerous is not any identifiable sensation; rather, it is the degree to which those sanctions 
interfere with people’s interests.  The unpleasantness of intensive probation supervision, for 
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essence, penalties that typically impair interests more critical to quality of 
life (such as physical integrity) will be considered more severe than those 
that affect less significant interests (such as privacy).
331
  Similarly, a penalty 
that typically threatens individuals’ very subsistence will be understood as 
more severe than one that infringes upon their well-being to a lesser 
extent.
332
  Thus, penalties’ severities can be compared objectively by the 
extent to which the sanctions interfere with offenders’ interests or with 
resources to which offenders have legitimate claims.
333
  Penalties may 
affect multiple dimensions of human welfare, including physical integrity, 
freedom of movement, choice of activity and associates, material support 
and amenities, freedom from degrading treatment, future earning power, 
privacy, and autonomy.
334
  In using this scale to compare penalties’ 
severity, it is necessary both to identify the set of offender interests 
typically affected by a penalty and to classify the extent to which a 





example, depends not on its ‘feeling bad’ in some immediate sense, but on its interfering 
with such important interests as being in charge of one’s own life or moving about as one 
chooses.”). 
331
See id.  
332
See id.  
333
See Andrew von Hirsch, Reduced Penalties for Juveniles: The Normative Dimension, 
in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 183, at 323, 327.  
334
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 147; von Hirsch, supra note 330, at 
144 (“Most victimizing offences involve one or more of the following interest-dimensions: 
(i) physical integrity; (ii) material support and amenity; (iii) freedom from humiliation; and 
(iv) privacy.”); id. at 147 n.4 (“To apply the living-standard idea to penalties, there would 
have to be modifications in the analysis.  When evaluating harms, the main interests are . . . 
those of physical integrity, material amenity and so forth.  For punishments, other interests 
also need to be taken into account: for example, the interest in freedom of movement that is 
affected by incarceration, home detention and intensive probation supervision.”); Thornburn 
& Manson, supra note 186, at 284–85 (reviewing VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27).  
This list was not derived from “deep theory”, but rather, from “impressions of the main 
kinds of concerns that seem typically involved in victimizing crimes” and penalties, VON 
HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 147, 205, and scholars have criticized the list as 
arbitrary.  See JACEK CZBANSKI, ESTIMATES OF COST OF CRIME 67 (2007); Mirko Bagaric & 
James McConvill, Giving Content to the Principle of Proportionality: Happiness and Pain 
as the Universal Currency for Matching Offense Seriousness and Penalty Severity, 69 J. 
CRIM. L. 50, 59 (2005) (“[T]he problem with their ranking system is that despite the fact that 
they concede that their analysis is normative, since it is a theory on how harms ought to be 
rated, it is devoid of an underlying rationale or an empirical or scientific foundation—it is 
built on armchair speculation.”).  
335
See von Hirsch, supra note 330, at 145 (“One might use three living-standard levels: 
(i) subsistence; (ii) minimal well-being; and (iii) ‘adequate’ well-being.  The first, 
subsistence, refers to survival, but with maintenance of no more than elementary human 
capacities to function—in other words, barely getting by.  The remaining levels refer to 
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Critically, a living standard analysis judges the severity of penalties 
from the standpoint of their anticipated, likely effects on offenders, and 
does not restrict its gaze to effects intended by a sentencing judge or 
legislature.  Von Hirsch argues that penalties should be ranked “according 
to the degree to which they typically affect the punished person’s freedom 
of movement, earning ability, and so forth.”336  “The importance of those 
interests,” he continues, should “be gauged according to how they typically 
impinge on a person’s ‘living standard’ . . . .”337  This focus on the actual 
“effects of the penalty on the quality of persons’ lives” reflects the origin of 
the living standard analysis,
338
 which was designed to measure the harms 
effectuated by criminal offenses.
339
  The living standard analysis, in that 
context, measured harm by the way an offense typically set back a victim’s 
interests and impacted his means of achieving a certain quality of life,
340
 as 
assessed through the perspective of the typical victim.
341
  It was normally of 
no consequence in an evaluation of criminal harm whether a perpetrator 
intended to effectuate a particular harm when carrying out an offense—
harm and culpability are distinct components of the seriousness of crime.
342
  
In transplanting the living standard analysis into the context of gauging 
penalty severity, it should likewise be of no consequence whether a 
sentencing authority intended that an offender suffer a particular harm, or 
whether the harm was merely a foreseeable side effect of a penalty, 
proximately caused by the state.  As von Hirsch notes, one benefit of 
evaluating penalties in this way is that the analysis accords with community 
 
various degrees of life quality above that of mere subsistence.”). 
336
VON HIRSCH, CENSURE, supra note 283, at 34 (emphasis added). 
337
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 35 n.* (“What matters is how much a given 
penalty does affect the ordinary person’s living standard.  This is a matter, not of surveying 
what people think, but of analysing the effects of the penalty on the quality of persons’ 
lives.”).  To this end, von Hirsch suggests that research be conducted into “what interests 
penalties intrude upon, how those intrusions would affect the quality of life, and why so.”  
Id.  If cognizable harm were circumscribed by the intent of the sentencing judge or 
legislature, then such an inquiry into actual effect would be unnecessary. 
338 Id. at 35 n.*. 
339
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at app. 3, 186, 201–08, 212–15.  
340
See id. at 194–96. 
341
See id. at 205 (instructing that, to perform a living standard analysis in the context of 
a criminal offense, “first identify and separate out the interest dimensions involved in an 
offense”).  For illustrations of the living standard analysis in the context of several crimes 
and to see how harm is evaluated through the perspective of the typical victim, see id. at 
208–12. 
342
See id. at 186–87, 215.  But see id. at 206 n.g (noting a degree of overlap between 
harm and culpability, in the interest of freedom from humiliation, because humiliation 
normally presupposes at least apparent intent). 
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sentiment about punishments’ severity.343 
Von Hirsch and others have argued that a living standard analysis 
should reflect “the means and capabilities that ordinarily assist persons in 
achieving a good life” and should not vary according to individuals’ 
preferences or subjective perceptions of pain.
344
  They articulate two main 
reasons for confining the living standard analysis to the “typical” offender: 
first, individualizing the standard would create unmanageable diversity;
345
 
and, second, “when one is talking about atypical harms, foreseeability 
diminishes.”346  Although scholars to date have focused largely on the 
average offender, when empirical evidence establishes that a given penalty 
will affect the interests of an identifiable,
347
 vulnerable offender class more 
substantially than average offenders, strong arguments exist for conducting 
a separate analysis for individuals in that class.
348
  Indeed, just desert 
theorists have indicated a willingness to perform living standard analyses in 
“nonstandard cases” by assessing “typical impacts for the members of that 
group.”349 
If certain penalties are prohibited for offenders with serious mental 
illnesses because those penalties are too likely to cause serious harm, a 
living standard analysis would provide a means of identifying sets of 
alternative penalties of roughly equivalent punitive bite, which could serve 
as plausible substitutes for this population.
350
  Take, for example, the felony 
 
343
See VON HIRSCH, CENSURE, supra note 283, at 34–35. 
344
See id. at 35; see also VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 147 (rejecting a 
“subjectivist conception of severity” that would “depend[] upon how disagreeable the 
sanction typically is experienced as being” and asserting that “[w]hat makes punishments 
more or less onerous is not any identifiable sensation; rather, it is the degree to which those 
sanctions interfere with people’s legitimate interests”).  
345
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 188. 
346
Id. at 189. 
347
Of course, the empirical evidence at this point may not suffice to identify precisely 
which offenders with serious mental illnesses are most likely to suffer serious harms in 
prison.  See supra text accompanying notes 159–168 (sketching limitations in available 
data). 
348
See supra Part III.B.3 (explaining how a living standard analysis may be used to 
effectuate proportionate punishment for offenders with serious mental illnesses under the 
equal-impact principle). 
349
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 173 n.f (“Certain kinds of non-standard 
cases . . . [in an interest analysis for gauging severity of punishments] can themselves be 
analysed in terms of typical impacts for the members of that group.  One thus could analyse 
how imprisonment typically becomes more burdensome for those with specified physical 
disabilities.”).  
350
See id. at 41–42 (defining “punitive bite” as “the extent to which those sanctions 
interfere with important interests that people have”); supra note 235.  For a discussion of the 
potential scope of the living standard analysis in application, see infra note 353. 
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of possessing marijuana for other than personal use.  Assume, under state 
law, the minimum penalty for this crime is confinement for one year and 
one day in prison.
351
  Assuming that imprisonment were an inhumane 
penalty for individuals with serious mental illnesses, it would be necessary 
to authorize an alternative penalty or set of penalties for disordered 
offenders so that they could receive a sanction of roughly equivalent 
severity to that imposed on their non-disordered peers.
352
  To identify 
penalties of roughly equivalent punitive bite for the two offender 
populations, one would first assess the degree to which the sanction of a 
year and a day in prison impairs non-disordered offenders’ interests and 
affects their quality of life.  Then one would work to identify alternative 
penalties that would impair seriously disordered offenders’ interests and 
affect their quality of life roughly to the same extent.  Penalties with 
roughly equivalent punitive bite for offenders with serious mental illnesses 
might include, for instance, two years of home detention with electronic 





See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-213 (LexisNexis 2005) (first degree possession of 
marijuana); Id. § 13A-5-6 (sentences for felony convictions). 
352
A living standard analysis holds great potential for the sentencing of offenders with 
serious mental illnesses beyond this limited scenario.  For instance, if a legislature used a 
living standard analysis to identify a slate of penalties of roughly equivalent punitive bite for 
most combinations of criminal offenses and criminal history scores (or adopted similar 
recommendations offered by a sentencing commission), and granted judges the discretion to 
select among these sentencing options for offenders with serious mental illnesses (in light of 
the empirical risks of serious harm posed by incarceration detailed in Part II), then these 
offenders could receive noncarceral sanctions of equivalent punitive bite even if 
incarceration would not reach the threshold of inhumanity.  Cf. infra text accompanying note 
354 (observing that the sanction of incarceration may be reserved for the most serious 
offenses).  Indeed some states, in their sentencing guidelines grids, authorize community 
sanctions or stayed sentences of confinement for the least serious offenses, for all offenders. 
See, e.g., MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, pt. 4.A (2012), available at 
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/grids/2012%20MN%20Sentencing%20Guidelines
%20Grid.pdf (indicating combinations of offenses and criminal history scores with 
presumptive stayed sentences). 
353
For a discussion of scaling principles and grids of sanctions of comparable severity 
see, e.g., MORRIS & TONRY, supra note 235 (relying on limiting retributivism to propose the 
establishment of “exchange rates” to achieve interchangeability between punishments); 
Andrew von Hirsch et al., Punishments in the Community and the Principles of Desert, 20 
RUTGERS L.J. 595 (1989) (applying principles of desert to the choice among noncustodial 
penalties, and advocating for limited substitutability and the ranking of penalties based on 
degree of intrusion on offenders’ interests); Paul Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st 
Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 55 (1987) (providing a sentencing grid that prescribes 
“sanction units” of comparative punitive bite); Martin Wasik & Andrew von Hirsch, Non-
Custodial Penalties and the Principles of Desert, 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 555 (applying 
principles of desert to the choice among noncustodial penalties and advocating for limited 
substitution).   
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A judge could order mental health treatment to accompany some or all of 
these sanctions. 
3. The Equal-Impact Principle and Carceral Discounts 
While a living standard analysis provides a way to identify a slate of 
noncarceral sanctions for most crimes, some scholars have opined that, to 
convey the degree of censure warranted for the most serious crimes, it is 
necessary to impose the sanction of incarceration.
354
  If that is the case—
and in recognition of the reality that most jurisdictions authorize 
incarceration for many, if not most, criminal offenses—it is necessary to 
address whether proportionate punishment calls for reduced terms of 
incarceration for offenders with serious mental illnesses in light of the 
foreseeable risks of serious harms proximately caused by the state in the 
context of confinement.  The following discussion assumes that conditions 
of incarceration in a given jurisdiction, though predictably harsher for an 




When incarceration would be significantly more onerous for a member 
of a vulnerable population, Professors von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth 
have argued that the individual should receive a discounted term of 
confinement as a means to avoid disproportionate penal severity.  The 
principle of equal impact, which resides in the “borderlands” of desert 
theory,
356
 holds that, “when an offender suffers from certain handicaps that 
would make his punishment significantly more onerous, the sanction should 
be adjusted in order to avoid its having an undue differential impact on 
him.”357  The principle of equal impact derives from ideals of fairness and 
 
354
See supra note 326. 
355
Cf. Part III.B.1. 
356
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 131. 
357
Id. at 172; see also Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 253 (“We would argue for 
a general principle of equal treatment, by which we mean that a sentencing system should 
strive to avoid its punishments having an unequal impact on different offenders or groups of 
offenders.  It is a principle with similar roots to proportionality, in that it seeks to respect 
individuals by ensuring fair treatment.”).  The roots of the equal-impact principle can be 
found in the writing of Jeremy Bentham.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION, ch. XIV, para. 14 (1789) (articulating a principle of equal impact); see 
also id. at ch. VI, para. 6 (delineating “circumstances influencing sensibility”).  The 
principle of equal impact is one of several (sometimes competing) values that, as a 
normative matter, arguably should inform general sentencing policy or individual sentencing 
decisions.  See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 95–100 (5th ed. 
2010); ASHWORTH, supra note 219, at 277–78.  Other principles with normative claims in 
sentencing include rule-of-law values, parsimony and restraint in the use of custody, 
economy, and equality before the law.  See ASHWORTH, supra, at 95–100 (listing and briefly 
222 E. LEA JOHNSTON [Vol. 103 
equality and is closely related to a principle of nondiscrimination.
358
  At its 
essence, the equal-impact principle calls for members of certain vulnerable 
classes to receive penalties of roughly equivalent severity as nonvulnerable 
individuals, again identified through use of a living standard analysis.
359
  It 
is important to emphasize that the equal-impact principle does not call for a 
reduction in punishment, but rather for equalizing the severity of penalties 
imposed on equally blameworthy offenders.
360
  While scholars originally 
conceptualized the equal-impact principle as standing outside the bounds of 
proportionality,
361
 desert theorists have argued that, at least in some cases, 





describing these principles). 
358
See Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 253 (equal treatment, nondiscrimination); 
id. at 255 (fairness); Andrew Ashworth & Julian Roberts, Doing Justice to Difference: 
Diversity and Sentencing, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 183, at 342, 343–44 
(equality, nondiscrimination). 
359
See ASHWORTH, SENTENCING, supra note 357, at 295 (“When the principle of equal 
impact is invoked, the decision is often based on assumptions about the typical reaction to 
the sentence of persons in a class to which the offender belongs (e.g. the elderly or the 
young) or of persons placed in the situation in which this offender finds himself (e.g. 
segregated in prison under [rules concerning protective custody] . . . .”); VON HIRSCH & 
ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 172. 
360
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 173 (“The equal-impact principle 
does not actually function as true equity mitigation, because it actually does not call for 
qualifying defendants to suffer less punishment: it merely is a way of avoiding that such 
defendant be made to suffer more.”); von Hirsch, supra note 333, at 323, 327; supra note 
235.  
361
See ASHWORTH, supra note 219, at 275 (arguing that, to avoid “the result that 
objectively similar sentences will have a subjectively variable effect on offenders[,] . . . it 
would be necessary to travel outside proportionality and to adopt equality of impact as a 
principle, so as to take account of manifest differences between offenders which affect the 
degree of pain and deprivation caused to them by particular sentences”). 
362
See Ashworth & Roberts, supra note 358, at 342, 345–46 (“Desert theories can 
plausibly claim that the principle of equal treatment forms part of their rationale: sentences 
should be determined chiefly by the seriousness of the offence . . . .”); Ashworth & Player, 
supra note 178, at 255 (arguing that “those theories which have some requirement of 
proportionality of sentence to the seriousness of the offence must surely concern themselves 
with this problem [of equal impact]”); see also von Hirsch, supra note 333, at  328 (arguing 
that juveniles should be punished less in part because punishments are more onerous for 
them, but stating: “This still assumes, however, that the conventions linking severity and 
seriousness are unchanged.  Where the crimes (adjusting for culpability factors) have similar 
seriousness-ratings, and where the penalties (adjusting for juveniles’ greater vulnerability) 
should have the same severity-ratings, then juveniles and adults would receive equivalent 
punishments.”); cf. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 172 (asserting that, although 
the “‘equal impact’ principle is connected with the proportionalist sentencing model, [it] is 
not part of it in standard cases” and that its use should be reserved for “unusual cases that 
diverge significantly from the norm”).  
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As argued in the previous section, a living standard analysis is best 
understood as calling for a consideration of harms beyond those intended 
by a sentencing judge or legislature,
363
 but it is even more clear that an 
equal-impact inquiry necessarily considers foreseeable harm.
364
  
Presumably, a sentencing judge never intends that an offender with a 
serious mental illness or a physical disability will suffer more than non-ill 
or non-disabled offenders when confined.  Yet the very aim of the equal-
impact principle is to acknowledge the foreseeable, typical, and serious side 
effects that certain penalties hold for these and other vulnerable populations 
and to adjust these penalties so their overall effect will not be 
disproportionately severe.
365
  Restricting contemplated harms to those 
intended by a sentencing authority would obviate the very problem the 
equal-impact principle was created to remedy. 
While the equal-impact principle may also apply to onerous sanctions 
such as community service or intensive probation, scholars typically raise 
the principle within the context of incarceration.
366
  The below example 
illustrates its application in this context: 
Suppose the standard sentence for a given species of offence is three years’ 
imprisonment.  If this sanction is applied to a defendant in a wheelchair, he actually—
under an interest analysis—has his interests set back to a greater degree.  Reducing 




Concerned about the foreseeable impairment of interests critical to 
offenders’ quality of life, scholars have suggested—though provided no 
fulsome analysis to explicate the suggestion—that discounted terms of 
incarceration would be appropriate to effectuate proportionate punishment 
for mentally ill individuals,
368
 the physically disabled,
369





See supra notes 336–343 and accompanying text. 
364
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 176 (considering “certain 
foreseeable differential impacts” that incarceration poses to offenders with particular 
handicaps). 
365
Id. at 172, 176 (explaining that the aim of the equal-impact principle, when applied in 
the case of an offender with a physical handicap, is to make “adjustments in sentence to deal 
with certain foreseeable differential impacts”). 
366
Id. at 172–73. 
367
Id. at 173. 
368
See ASHWORTH, supra note 357, at 100; VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 
173 (“[The equal-impact principle] would work for old, ill, or disabled defendants, where the 
sanction appears to be altered in its impact by the person’s disability . . . .”); Ashworth & 
Player, supra note 178, at 255 (“Many mentally disordered offenders may find the 
experience of imprisonment significantly more painful than others . . . .  We would argue 
that fairness requires a recognition that the same sentence may have a disproportionately 
severe impact on certain offenders, and that only if one adopts a principle of equal impact 
224 E. LEA JOHNSTON [Vol. 103 
Scholars have also argued for categorical youth discounts to ensure 
proportionate punishment for juveniles.  These discounts would reflect the 
fact that incarceration infringes upon important developmental interests of 
juveniles and is more likely to impair juveniles’ self-esteem.371 
Application of the equal-impact principle in the context of mental 
disorder is appropriate because incarceration affects the interests of 
offenders with serious mental illnesses and non-ill offenders differently.
372
  
For example, incarceration typically deprives a standard prisoner of privacy 
and autonomy by restricting the individual’s ability to choose his activities 
and associates.  When the offender has a major mental illness, however, he 
may suffer a much more extreme loss of autonomy due to the deterioration 
of his mental integrity.
373
  The ultimate result of a carceral term 
 
can this problem be minimized.”). 
369
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 172–73, 176. 
370
See id. at 173, 176; Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 259–60. 
371
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 42–43; Andrew Ashworth, 
Sentencing Young Offenders, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, supra note 183, at 294, 300 
(asserting that “we should recognise that punishments are generally more onerous for the 
young because they impinge on important developmental interests, in terms of education and 
socialisation, for which the teenage years are a crucial phase” and that “[p]roportionality 
theory thus requires that sentence levels be significantly lower than those for adults . . . .”); 
von Hirsch, supra note 333, at 323 (arguing that, “in applying a policy of proportionate 
sentencing to juveniles, substantial overall penalty reductions are called for” in part due to 
“criminal sanctions’ greater ‘punitive bite’ when applied to juveniles”); see also Barry C. 
Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. 
KY. L. REV. 189, 247–48 (2007) (concluding that “[s]tates should adopt a categorical ‘youth 
discount’ and sentence youths based on a sliding scale of criminal responsibility”).  Scholars 
have also argued that youthful offenders deserve categorical age-related discounts because 
of their diminished capacity to assess and appreciate the harmful consequences of their 
actions and their reduced volitional controls.  See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, 
at 36–40.   
372
My analysis depends upon subscription to a broad understanding of punishment that 
includes foreseeable, substantial risks of suffering serious harms, proximately caused by the 
state in the context of imprisonment.  See supra III.A. 
373
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 203–04 (identifying “preservation of 
one’s major physical and cognitive functions, and preservation of a minimal capacity of 
social functioning” as necessary for minimal subsistence and “[p]rotection against grossly 
demeaning or insulting treatment” as inherent to minimal well-being).  Some have argued 
that sentence mitigation is particularly appropriate when incarceration exacerbates a current 
medical condition.  See Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 259 (“A distinction can be 
drawn between the effect of a medical condition on the experience of imprisonment, and the 
effect of imprisonment on the medical condition . . . .  The justification for reducing the 
length of a custodial sentence because of an offender’s medical state is arguably more 
compelling if . . . there is evidence that imprisonment has a deleterious effect on that 
condition.”).  In addition, an offender with a major mental disorder may be more likely to 
experience violations of his physical integrity, including health, safety, and the avoidance of 
pain.  However, for reasons explained in notes 243–247 and 271–272, and accompanying 
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(particularly of a long term) may be highly degrading, corroding his 
rationality and perhaps threatening his capacity for autonomous thought.  
As compared to non-ill offenders, the likely psychological toll of 
incarceration on offenders with major mental illnesses impedes a broader, 
more substantial set of interests and affects these interests to a more 
significant degree.  In addition, offenders with serious mental illnesses have 
an interest in receiving mental health treatment to retain or recover their 
mental functioning and autonomy.
374
  As juveniles have certain 
developmental interests that make imprisonment uniquely hard for them,
375
 
offenders with serious mental illnesses have health-related interests that are 
also negatively impacted by incarceration.  These interests include 
receiving regular and adequate mental health treatment in a nurturing 
environment in which they can develop a relationship of trust with a mental 
health provider in order to function at an adequate level.
376
  Mental health 
care in prison is often inadequate, and the environment is far from 
therapeutic.
377
  Under the equal-impact principle, if incarceration is more 
onerous when undergone by offenders with serious mental illnesses, 
principles of cardinal proportionality require that judges reject standard 
terms of incarceration for this population.
378
  To avoid disproportionality, 
judges should select a noncarceral sanction of roughly equivalent punitive 
 
text, an offender’s increased likelihood of physical assault should not be used as the basis of 
a sentencing discount.  This argument applies within an equal-impact framework as well. 
374
See supra note 282. 
375
See von Hirsch, supra note 333, at 327 (arguing that young people “have certain 
development interests”—“critical opportunities and experiences that need be provided 
between the ages of 14 and 18,” such as adequate schooling in a reasonably nurturing 
atmosphere with exposure to adequate role models “in order to mature adequately”—and 
that incarceration is more onerous for juveniles because of its intrusion upon these interests) 
(emphasis omitted). 
376
The fact that community mental health care is inadequate does not detract from the 
interest offenders with serious mental disorders have in receiving such treatment when 
confined.  It should be noted, however, that for many offenders, prison offers an opportunity 
to receive mental health care that they were not receiving in the community.  See H. Richard 
Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, The Shift of Psychiatric Inpatient Care from Hospitals to 
Jails and Prisons, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 529, 531 (2005); E. Fuller Torrey, 
Editorial, Jails and Prisons—America’s New Mental Hospitals, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1611, 1611 (1995).  Other sentencing options—including those provided by mental health 
courts—may be more treatment-friendly than jails and prisons.  See Jacques Baillargeon et 
al., Psychiatric Disorders and Repeat Incarcerations: The Revolving Prison Door, 166 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 103, 107–08 (2009) (reviewing prebooking and postbooking diversion 
programs). 
377
See supra notes 61–62. 
378
Cf. von Hirsch, supra note 333, at 328  (“If punishments are thus more onerous when 
undergone by juveniles, proportionality would require that they be reduced.”).  
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bite
379
 or potentially order a discounted term of incarceration.  A living 
standard analysis would be useful in identifying the proportionate penalty in 
both instances. 
Consistent with the conception of punishment adopted in Part III.A of 
this Article, if a term of imprisonment poses a foreseeable, substantial risk 
of serious harm to an offender with serious mental illness
380—and 
noncarceral sanctions of equivalent punitive bite are not available or 
appropriate
381—a sentencing judge should consider adjusting the term of 
imprisonment through a sentencing discount to avoid its having an undue 
differential impact on the individual.
382
  Two caveats to the application of 
this principle are necessary.  First, to the extent that a sentencing discount 
derives from concerns about an offender’s vulnerability to physical or 
sexual abuse,
383
 the discount should not rest on an anticipation of 
victimization, for reasons explained earlier.
384
  Instead, the discount should 
reflect the increased harshness or severity of the penalty in light of the 
anticipated measures that prison officials will take to protect the offender 
(such as housing the offender in isolation or in conditions with fewer 
programming opportunities) or perhaps the anxiety the offender will likely 
experience while living in a dangerous environment,
385
 if these collateral 





See supra Part III.B.2.  To the extent that noncarceral sanctions pose foreseeable, 
substantial risks of serious harm, proximately caused by the state to offenders with serious 
mental illnesses, this foreseeable harm would be factored into the living standard analysis 
through the process outlined above.  The extent to which any sanction other than 
imprisonment poses foreseeable harm to offenders with serious mental illnesses is an 
empirical question beyond the scope of this Article. 
380
See supra notes 167–170 (discussing the fact that a showing of individualized risk of 
serious harm, in addition to mere statistical risk, may be necessary before a sentencing 
accommodation is warranted).  An important additional caveat is that incarcerating the 
individual must not be inhumane. 
381
See supra note 326. 
382
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 172; see also Ashworth & Player, 
supra note 178, at 253. 
383
At least two scholars have proposed that vulnerability to “significant physical and 
mental abuse from which the prison authorities fail to provide adequate protection” merits 
consideration under the equal-impact principle.  See Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 
260.   
384
See supra notes 243–249, 271–274 and accompanying text. 
385
See supra notes 262–269 and accompanying text.  A living standard analysis would 
include anxiety justifiably arising from threats to personal safety.  See VON HIRSCH & 
ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 208. 
386
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.  Again, this Article does not address the 
question of whether foreseeable harms stemming from prison conditions, beyond physical 
and sexual violence, may ever be justified by valid retributive aims.  See id. 
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Second, judges should not reduce terms of imprisonment on the basis 
of foreseeable, nonserious harms.  While it is clear that a living standard 
analysis is only concerned with diminution of objective interests (and not 
subjective distress), how serious the harms must be to warrant adjustment 
under the equal-impact principle is unclear.
387
  The principle, as expressed, 
intends to provide adjustment for “handicaps that would make [an 
offender’s] punishment significantly more onerous.”388  If a penalty causes 
serious harm when applied to a vulnerable population (and not when 
applied to nonvulnerable individuals), it is certainly “significantly more 
onerous” for the vulnerable population.  Moreover, just desert scholars have 
emphasized a number of interests that, if impaired to a significant degree, 
would constitute serious harm consistent with the position taken in this 
Article.
389
  However, desert scholars’ discussion of the relevant experience 
of persons with mental disorders and how to tailor sentencing in light of 
that experience is sparse and vague,
390
 and some discussion suggests that 
sentencing discounts could be granted on the basis of foreseeable risks of 
nonserious harms.
391
  For instance, when illustrating the hardship faced by a 
physically disabled offender, Professors von Hirsch and Ashworth highlight 
the offender’s “physical handicap that impedes his movement sufficiently 
to make the routines of being imprisoned more onerous.”392  They 
conclude:  
In such cases the “equal impact” principle . . . might still apply.  This would involve 
adjusting the penalty so as to take into account its more onerous character in the 
 
387
Just desert theorists have not provided extensive detail on how to calculate sentencing 
discounts.  See Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 270–71 (anticipating some problems 
with the implementation of sentencing discounts); Austin Lovegrove, Proportionality 
Theory, Personal Mitigation, and the People’s Sense of Justice, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 321, 324 
(2010) (“The drawing of conclusions about the potential effect of personal mitigation is not 
easy, since von Hirsch and Ashworth speak in only general terms about it.”). 
388
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 172. 
389
For instance, Professors von Hirsch, Ashworth, and Jareborg have identified 
“preservation of one’s major physical and cognitive functions,” “preservation of a minimal 
capacity of social functioning,” and “avoidance of intense pain” as necessary for minimal 
subsistence.  See id. at 203.  Impairment of these interests would pose a grave threat to an 
individual’s well-being and should be reflected in a living standard analysis.  See id.  In 
addition, necessary to individuals’ “minimal wellbeing” are “a minimum opportunity for 
self-respect” and “[p]rotection against grossly demeaning or insulting treatment.”  Id. at 204.  
Thus, at least to some extent, just desert theorists’ gaze appears focused on accounting for 
risks of serious harm. 
390
See, e.g., Ashworth & Player, supra note 178, at 255 (“Many mentally disordered 
offenders may find the experience of imprisonment significantly more painful than others.”). 
391
This Article assumes that the substantiality of the risk of harm is not in question for 
offenders with serious mental illnesses.  See supra note 54. 
392
VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 176. 
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particular circumstances.  The duration of a prison sentence might thus be reduced to 
some degree.  The aim would [be to make] . . . adjustments in sentence[s] to deal with 
certain foreseeable differential impacts . . . .
393
  
To the extent that equal-impact proponents intend judges to grant 
sentencing discounts on the basis of foreseen risks of nonserious harms, 
such an application would conflict with the position taken in this Article, 
which advocates for sentencing accommodation only for substantial risks of 
serious harm.  
Other theories, beyond those of proportionality, may support 
responding to the foreseeable, nonserious suffering of vulnerable offenders 
through a sentencing discount.  One such theoretical candidate would be 
mercy.  The proper understanding of mercy and its relationship to justice 
are subjects of lively debate,
394
 but some equal-impact scholars may be 
alluding to mercy when observing that the principle of equal impact “calls 
for reference to factors beyond strict proportionality to the gravity of the 
offence” and rests upon “a more flexible conception of justice which does 
not presume uniformity among offenders.”395  Another theoretical candidate 
may include equity mitigation.
396
  Exploring the potential applicability of 
 
393
Id.  The lack of clarity as to whether punishment should contemplate nonserious 
harms probably stems from the origin of the living standard analysis.  In the context of 
gauging the harms exacted by criminal offenses, it is fully justifiable—and useful—to 
compare the harms effected by criminal offenses by what interests, critical to individuals’ 
quality of life, they disturb.  But punishment, simply put, may not be concerned with all the 
ways in which hard treatment foreseeably affects offenders’ means or capabilities for 
achieving a good life. 
394
See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Questions of Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 321–23 
(2007) (outlining four major positions on the relationship of mercy to justice); Mary Sigler, 
Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital 
Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1153 n.14 (2003) (“Although 
‘mercy’ is commonly invoked in the sentencing context to refer simply to leniency in 
punishment, its role in legal justice is actually ambiguous and complicated.  One issue is 
whether mercy is a feature of justice or an independent value that potentially conflicts with 
justice.”). 
395
Lucia Zedner, Sentencing Young Offenders, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING 
THEORY, supra note 178, at 165, 173, 174.  Scholars have differed in how they conceive of 
mercy as responding to likely offender hardship.  See, e.g., Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 
PHIL. REV. 182, 184 (1972) (arguing that an offender deserves mercy, but has no right to it, 
when otherwise (1) he would suffer unusually more than he deserves, and (2) he would be 
worse off than those who would benefit from the punishment); David Dolinko, Some Naïve 
Thoughts About Justice and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 349, 354 (2007) (suggesting that 
“a judge exercises mercy when she imposes a sentence that is: (1) more lenient than what 
would normally be expected in a case of this sort; (2) yet just, based on consideration of a 
range of mitigating factors broader than what would be standard in sentencing a criminal like 
this one for the same crime”). 
396
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, supra note 27, at 172–78 (discussing equity 
mitigation and outlining when it might apply). 
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these theories falls beyond the scope of this Article. 
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Just desert theory suggests that judges should consider certain 
offenders’ vulnerability when meting out punishment.  This is an issue of 
tremendous practical significance: empirical evidence and data collected by 
human rights groups and others demonstrate that offenders with serious 
mental illnesses are disproportionately likely to suffer a range of harms in 
prison.  These harms include physical assault, rape and sexual assault, 
isolation in solitary confinement, mental deterioration and severe 
psychological distress, and exacerbation and onset of new mental disorder. 
When imprisonment poses foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm to 
an offender with a serious mental illness, a judge’s sentencing calculus 
should include these risks to ensure that the individual receives a 
proportionate and humane sentence. 
By design, the arguments offered in this Article may raise more 
questions than they answer.  Future work will be devoted to probing the 
theoretical implications of including foreseeable harm within the definition 
of punishment for purposes of sentencing and assessing the practical 
implications of the sentencing options outlined here.  For the moment, it is 
appropriate to recognize that factoring vulnerability into sentencing could 
have important and far-reaching effects.  Broadening the definition of 
punishment to include foreseeable harm should help breach the divide 
between punishment in theory and practice and allow the philosophy of 
punishment to expand its relevance and practical effect.
397
  Reforming 
sentencing to reflect offenders’ anticipated experiences should yield more 
humane sentences, increase the use of alternative sanctions, and prompt the 
reform of prison conditions.  Moreover, by taking susceptibility to harm 
into account, we will end the morally indefensible practice of 
overpunishing offenders with major mental disorders and will give these 
offenders, deemed competent and culpable by the criminal justice system, 







See David Garland, Sociological Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME & JUST. 115, 
118–19 (1991) (observing that “difficult issues tend to escape detailed moral scrutiny 
because they do not feature in the oversimplified conception of ‘punishment’ that 
philosophers conventionally use: they are not part of the problem that this tradition has set 
out for itself”). 
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